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GRANITE FALLS STATE BANK v. SCHNEIDER

November 4, 1970

GRANITE FALLS STATE BANK, a Washington Banking Corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
William E. SCHNEIDER, Director of the Department of General Administration of the State of Washington, Frank Cooper, Supervisor of Banking of the State of Washington, and all other Boards, Officials and other bodies or persons authorized or delegated by the State of Washington to enforce its banking laws, Defendants



Per Curiam

The statutory section in question, RCW 30.04.090 (1969), requires in pertinent part that every state bank, not a member of the Federal Reserve System, maintain available funds of not less than fifteen percent of its demand deposits. *fn1" This percentage, however, may be adjusted by the state supervisor of banking whenever he determines that the maintenance of sound banking practices or the prevention of injurious credit expansions or contractions make such action advisable. It is this power to alter the amount of the reserve that is challenged as being unconstitutional. In particular, plaintiff contends that by altering the reserve requirements the State of Washington is "coining money and regulating the value thereof" in violation of Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, *fn2" and is further coining money, emitting bills of credit, and making monetary units, other than gold and silver, a tender in payment of debts, in violation of Article I, section 10 of the Constitution. *fn3"

Defendants not only deny plaintiff's contentions, but challenge its right to assert them, contending that plaintiff lacks standing to maintain this action. We agree.

 While standing remains an extremely amorphous concept riddled with ambiguities and uncertainties, *fn4" one point is clear; a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must establish that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury due to the enforcement of that statute. See Association of Data Processing Service Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 90 S. Ct. 827, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184, 187 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 101, 106, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947, 961-962, 965 (1968); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, 43 S. Ct. 597, 67 L. Ed. 1078, 1085 (1923); Horne v. Federal Reserve Bank, 344 F.2d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 1965).

 At all times relevant hereto, plaintiff has had demand deposits that average in the range of $559,000. *fn5" On the basis of such deposits, state law requires that $86,000 be maintained on reserve. Plaintiff, however, maintains $286,000 on reserve, some $200,000 more than is required. It appears, therefore, that plaintiff has not suffered a present injury because of the state reserve requirement, and there is no evidence that future damage might be incurred. Indeed, any such damage is at best indefinite and speculative. *fn6"

 Accordingly, this action is ...


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