Pekelis, J. Baker and Agid, JJ., concur.
Tony L. Mathews appeals his conviction for custodial assault in violation of RCW 9A.36.100. He contends that the State charged him with a constitutionally defective information which omitted an essential element of the offense, and thus failed to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.
On September 5, 1989, Lieutenant Mark Bollinger was escorting a group of Monroe Special Offender Center inmates, including Tony L. Mathews, from the medication line to the living units. As they passed through the doors leading to the living units, Mathews lunged at Bollinger. Mathews bit Bollinger's upper lip and stuck his finger in Bollinger's left eye. Members of the staff pulled Mathews off of Bollinger.
On November 1, 1989, the State filed an information charging Mathews with custodial assault in violation of RCW 9A.36.100. The information stated:
CUSTODIAL ASSAULT, committed as follows: That the defendant, on or about the 11th day of September, 1989, did assault Mark Bollinger, a staff member or volunteer, educational personnel, personal service provider, or vendor or agent thereof at an adult corrections institution or local adult detention facility, who was performing official duties at the time of the assault; proscribed by RCW 9A.36.100, a felony.
RCW 9A.36.100 provides, in relevant part:
(1) A person is guilty of custodial assault . . . where the person:
(b) Assaults a full or part-time staff member or volunteer, any educational personnel, any personal service provider, or any vendor or agent thereof at any adult corrections institution or local adult detention facilities who was performing official duties at the time of the assault[.]
At trial, Mathews testified that he deliberately struck Bollinger to cause a disturbance and get back into court in
order to tell the trial judge that he was being held unjustly. The jury found Mathews guilty of custodial assault.
Mathews now contends that the State charged him with a constitutionally defective information because it omitted the nonstatutory "intent" element of custodial assault, and thus failed to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.*fn1 Mathews alternatively asserts that under RCW 9A.04.060, common law "intent" has ...