Alexander, J. Worswick, C.j., and Morgan, J., concur.
Linda Brooks appeals a summary judgment that quieted title to certain real property in Nancy C. Logan and extinguished an interest Brooks claimed in that property by virtue of a prejudgment writ of attachment. We reverse.
On June 10, 1987, PenWest Real Estate, Inc., contracted to sell a 30-acre tract of undeveloped real property in Gig Harbor to Robert Clark and Nancy Logan for a sale price of $285,000. Clark and Logan each contributed to the down payment and each was described in the contract as acquiring "an undivided one-half interest" in the property. The contract obligated Clark and Logan to pay the balance of the contract price, $185,000, on or before June 20, 1988.
In May 1988, Linda Brooks commenced an action against Clark for Clark's alleged failure to make payments on a promissory note. At the same time, and as a part of her action against Clark, Brooks obtained a writ of attachment against Clark's one-half interest in the property. Brooks gave Clark notice of the attachment, but she did not give notice to Logan.
On June 21, 1988, Logan paid PenWest the entire balance owing on the real estate contract. PenWest then delivered a fulfillment deed that recited:
to Robert D. Clark, a single person, to an undivided ONE-HALF INTEREST, and Nancy C. Logan, a single person to an undivided ONE-HALF INTEREST . . . .
Clark thereafter quitclaimed his interest in the property to Logan, in return for Logan reimbursing him for the $25,000 he had contributed to the down payment.
In February 1989, Brooks obtained a judgment against Clark in the amount of $81,956.02. The judgment contained a recitation that the "lien of this judgment . . . relates back to the date of said writ" of attachment against Clark's interest in the property.
Logan commenced an action against Brooks and all other parties claiming an interest in the property, including Clark, to quiet title to the property. Brooks and Logan filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Logan's motion and denied Brooks's, concluding that the writ of attachment did not impress the property with the lien of judgment, because Logan had not been given notice of the attachment.
The facts are not in dispute. The question is to whom should summary judgment have been granted. Logan contends that because she was a tenant in common with Clark, she was entitled to actual notice of any prejudgment attachment and that the failure to give her such notice violated her due process rights. Brooks responds that Clark's undivided one-half interest in the real estate was his separate property, and was subject to attachment without notice to Clark's cotenant.
RCW 6.25.020 provides that a plaintiff, at the time he or she commences an action, may, if certain grounds are established, have property of the defendant attached. RCW 6.25.070 provides that prompt notice of the seizure of ...