Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon; Owen M. Panner, District Judge, Presiding; D.C. No. CV-90-6042-OMP.
Goodwin, Alarcon and Hall, Circuit Judges.
Ali Abdul-Habib Hakeem appeals summary judgment for the appellees. Hakeem, a New Jersey prisoner serving his sentence at the Oregon State Penitentiary ("OSP"), brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the appellees have violated his constitutional rights and his rights under the Interstate Corrections Compact ("ICC"). We affirm.
We review a decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1987). Summary judgment may be granted "unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (citations omitted).
Hakeem first argues that his transfer from New Jersey to Oregon violated his due process rights. This claim lacks merit. A prisoner has no justifiable expectation that he will be imprisoned in any particular state. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983). In addition, as the district court correctly noted, the ICC did not create a protected liberty interest.
Nor was the decision by OSP officials to place Hakeem in administrative segregation a violation of his due process rights. In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), the Supreme Court held that an inmate has received due process in the context of administrative segregation if he received "an informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting [the segregation], including whatever statement respondent wished to submit, within a reasonable time after confining him to administrative segregation." Id. at 472. Oregon officials held a hearing in which they reviewed information provided by New Jersey officials and provided Hakeem an opportunity to be heard.
Although Hakeem argues that the decision to place him in administration prior to the hearing, the Court in Hewitt held that such a procedure was permissible. Id. In addition, Hakeem complains that the decision to place him in administrative segregation was improper because it relied on confidential information. But "due process does not require disclosure of the identity of any person providing information leading to the placement of a prisoner in administrative segregation." Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1101, (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987).
Hakeem next alleges that he has been denied the right to attend religious services. OSP does not allow group religious services for prisoners in administrative segregation, but apparently prisoners may arrange visits from religious figures, and may engage in self-study of the Koran.
In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), the Supreme Court addressed the standard for reviewing prison regulations that inhibit religious rights. The Court held that " 'when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.' " O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
The ban on group religious services for administrative segregation prisoners satisfies this test. In O'Lone itself the Court noted that institutional security was a valid penological objective. 482 U.S. at 348. Prohibiting group services among those in Administrative Segregation is rationally connected to that purpose. In ...