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State v. Davis
November 18, 1996
STATE OF WASHINGTON, RESPONDENT,
JACK J. DAVIS, APPELLANT.
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 93-1-04528-6. Date filed: 03/30/95. Judge signing: Hon. Michael J. Fox.
PER CURIAM. Jack Davis pled guilty to one count of reckless endangerment and was given an one year suspended sentence. After the one year period had passed but before entry of an order formally terminating the sentence, the trial court modified the sentence after finding that Davis had violated his probation conditions. Citing to the former version of RCW 9.92.064, and case law interpreting that version of the statute, Davis appeals the court's modification order, arguing that the court lacked statutory authority to modify his sentence after the one year period has past. But RCW 9.92.064 was amended in 1982 to grant the courts specific authority to modify a suspended sentence at any time prior to the entry of a termination order. Because Davis raises no other argument supporting reversal and the plain language of RCW 9.92.064 controls, we affirm.
Davis contends that the court lacked jurisdiction under RCW 9.92.064 and the related case law to modify his suspended sentence because the one year presumptive termination date had passed. His argument is, however, completely without merit because he relies on the former version of RCW 9.92.064 which no longer applies and case law which predates the 1982 amendment to the statute.
Formerly RCW 9.92.064 provided that for persons granted a suspended sentence under RCW 9.92.060, the "court shall set a date [for termination] no later than the time the original sentence would have elapsed and may provide for an earlier termination of the suspended sentence." As Davis points out, the Supreme Court in State v. Monday, 85 Wash. 2d 906, 540 P.2d 416 (1975) interpreted that version of the statute to mean that a sentence could be suspended and probation imposed only for the period of the sentence actually imposed.
The Legislature however amended RCW 9.92.064 in 1982 to grant the courts authority to modify the terms and conditions of a suspended sentence up to the time that an order formally terminating the sentence is entered.
The statute now reads in part:
In the case of a person granted a suspended sentence under the provisions of RCW 9.92.060, the court shall establish a definite termination date for the suspended sentence. . . Prior to the entry of an order formally terminating a suspended sentence the court may modify the terms and conditions of the suspension or extend the period of the suspended sentence.
The present version of RCW 9.92.064 controls here. Davis was granted a suspended sentence under RCW 9.92.060. He does not dispute that the court modified his sentence prior to the entry of a termination order. The court thus had jurisdiction under RCW 9.92.064 to modify the terms of his suspended sentence. Davis raises no further arguments supporting relief.
The court's order of modification is affirmed.
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