Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 95-8-02522-8. Date filed: 08/28/95. Judge signing: Hon. Maurice Epstein.
PER CURIAM. W.K. appeals his juvenile court Disposition of first degree criminal trespass. The principal of W.K.'s junior high school told him verbally and in writing that he was not allowed on school grounds after his classes without written permission from school personnel. After spotting him and his friends at an evening school concert, the vice-principal told W.K. to leave. W.K. left but returned to the school. After W.K. refused to leave, the vice-principal called the police. W.K. argues that this evidence was insufficient to support the court's finding that he remained unlawfully on school grounds, a necessary element of criminal trespass. We disagree and affirm.
To find W.K. guilty of first degree criminal trespass under RCW 9A.52.070, the State must show he "knowingly entered or remained unlawfully in a building." "A person 'enters or remains unlawfully' in or upon premises when he is not then licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to so enter or remain." RCW 9A.52.010(3).
Relying on State v. Shelby, 61 Wash. App. 214, 811 P.2d 682 (1991), W.K. contends there was insufficient evidence to show that he remained unlawfully at the school because there was no evidence demonstrating that his license or privilege as a student to attend school activities had been revoked. W.K.'s argument is not well-taken. The issue in Shelby was whether RCW 9A.52.080, the "general" criminal trespass statute and RCW 28A.87.055, the "special" statute which prohibits disobeying a valid order to leave school property are concurrent statutes.
This court concluded that the two statutes do not address the same conduct and are thus not concurrent. As an example, we noted generally that a student's legal status on school property is not always immediately transformed into that of a "trespasser" when a school official orders a disruptive student to leave. Shelby, 61 Wash. App. at 220. Our holding in Shelby does not support W.K.'s position.
The test of sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Green, 94 Wash. 2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). This test is met here.
Here, it was undisputed that W.K. was previously told that he was forbidden to be on school grounds after his classes without the written permission from either the principal or vice-principal. There was a "letter of no trespass" in his school file. These facts support a finding that W.K. was not "licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged" to enter or remain at the school. W.K. did not have permission to attend the school's evening concert. There is also no dispute that W.K. remained on school grounds even after the vice-principal told him repeatedly to leave. These facts amply support the court's finding that W.K. remained unlawfully on the school grounds.