Appeal from Superior Court of Spokane County. Docket No: 94-1-01467-7. Date filed: 03/20/95. Judge signing: Hon. Michael E. Donohue.
Petition for Review Denied October 13, 1997,
Authored by: John A. Schultheis. Concurring: Dennis J. Sweeney, Ray E. Munson.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Schultheis
SCHULTHEIS, J. David Monson was extradited to Washington from New York State in 1994, 13 years after the second of two complaints were filed in Spokane County District Court charging him with second degree rape. He moved for dismissal of the two charges on the grounds his speedy trial rights had been violated. After the trial court denied the motions, this court granted discretionary review. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural Posture
In July 1980 and again in March 1981, Mr. Monson was charged in district court with two separate counts of second degree rape. *fn1 RCW 9A.44.050(1)(a). Warrants were filed for both complaints in the intrastate and interstate police computer systems. At the time the first warrant was issued, Mr. Monson was on probation for a second degree assault conviction. His failure to comply with the probation conditions led to the January 1981 issuance of an additional warrant for parole violation. Due to the age of these complaints and warrants, the district court files have been destroyed.
Mr. Monson had quit his job at Kaiser Aluminum and moved to Montana by August 1980. During the next decade, he worked as a truck driver, ranch hand and construction worker, and lived in several states. After efforts to serve him in 1980 and 1981, little was done to find him until 1984-85, when Spokane police again told his parents and other relatives about the warrants. From January 1990 until September 1992, he lived in Anacortes and Oak Harbor, Washington, and carried a Washington identification card. He moved to his father's New York State resort in September 1992. Later that month, he was detained by United States Customs agents at the Canada/New York border on the outstanding Spokane County warrants. At that time, a New York officer contacted the Spokane County Sheriff's Department and was told the department would not extradite. Mr. Monson was released from custody.
About 17 months later, in February 1994, a detective from Spokane contacted the New York police and informed them Washington was ready to extradite Mr. Monson. New York officers arrested him and he was extradited to Spokane. On August 15 and September 20, 1994, the State filed informations in Spokane County Superior Court charging Mr. Monson with the July and August 1980 second degree rapes and he was arraigned. *fn2 Subsequently, Mr. Monson moved for dismissal on the grounds his CrR 3.3 and constitutional speedy trial rights had been violated. He argued the speedy trial period should have begun running when he was detained in New York in 1992 and Washington refused to extradite him. The trial court denied the motion and ruled the speedy trial period was not triggered because Mr. Monson was not amenable to process while he was in New York.
Mr. Monson's motion for discretionary review was granted and the two cases were consolidated by notation ruling on October 3, 1995. Mr. Monson's personal restraint petition was linked to these cases in October 1996. For the purposes of this opinion, all matters have been consolidated. Following this court's stay pending the CrR 3.3 speedy trial decision in State v. Hudson, 130 Wash. 2d 48, 921 P.2d 538 (1996), we allowed supplemental briefing. *fn3
Mr. Monson first argues the long delay between the filing of the complaints in district court and his first court appearance violated his CrR 3.3 speedy trial rights.
Under CrR 3.3, a defendant who is not detained in jail or subject to conditions of release must be arraigned within 14 days of his or her first appearance in superior court following the filing of the information or indictment. CrR 3.3(c)(1); State v. Greenwood, 120 Wash. 2d 585, 589, 845 P.2d 971 (1993). A defendant who is first charged by complaint in district court (such as the case here) and who is not detained must be brought to trial no later than 90 days after the date of arraignment less "time elapsed in district court." CrR 3.3(c)(2)(i); State v. Holien, 47 Wash. App. 124, 127, 734 P.2d 508 (1987). "Time elapsed in district court" commences on the date of the first appearance in district court following the filing of the complaint. CrR 3.3(c)(2)(ii). When a defendant is not arraigned within CrR 3.3(c)(1)'s time frame, the court establishes a constructive arraignment date based on the last day the defendant could have been properly arraigned 14 days after the first court appearance, if not in custody. CrR 3.3(c)(1), (4); Greenwood, 120 Wash. 2d at 590. Failure to comply with the time limits of CrR 3.3 will result in dismissal with prejudice. CrR 3.3(i).
If a long and unnecessary delay occurs in bringing a defendant who is amenable to process before the court for his or her first appearance, CrR 3.3's 104-day time-for-trial period *fn4 is deemed to commence at the time the information or complaint was filed (the Striker *fn5 rule). Greenwood, 120 Wash. 2d at 591; State v. Marler, 80 Wash. App. 765, 771-72, 911 P.2d 420, review denied, 129 Wash. 2d 1024, 919 P.2d 601 (1996). Application of the Striker rule, however, depends on whether the defendant was amenable to process during the delay. If the defendant was not amenable to process, the Striker rule is not invoked, and the delay period is excluded from the computation of the time-to-trial period. State v. Lee, 48 Wash. App. 322, 738 P.2d 1081 (1987). The rule also does not apply where the State exercises good faith and due diligence in bringing a defendant before the court for a first appearance. Greenwood, 120 Wash. 2d at 601.
Accordingly, we first ask whether Mr. Monson was amenable to process. Recently, two Washington Supreme Court cases held that out-of-state defendants wanted for crimes in Washington were not amenable to process and therefore could not invoke the Striker rule. State v. Stewart, 130 Wash. 2d 351, 922 P.2d 1356 (1996); Hudson, 130 Wash. 2d 48, 921 P.2d 538. Hudson, a consolidated case, involved defendants charged with crimes after they left the state. In each case, the defendants argued their CrR 3.3 speedy trial rights were violated by the delay in their arraignments. The Supreme Court held that Striker may not be invoked even when the out-of-state defendant had no notice of the warrant or wrote to inform the prosecutor's office of his out-of-state address. Whether or not the ...