Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County. Docket No: 95-1-00776-1. Date filed: 10/19/95. Judge signing: Hon. Thomas J. Wynne.
PER CURIAM. Martin Crane appeals the convictions entered following his guilty plea to first degree burglary committed with sexual motivation and residential burglary committed with sexual motivation. He contends he is entitled to resentencing because he was not informed of a direct consequence of his plea. We disagree and affirm.
Only the facts relating to Crane's plea and sentencing are relevant to the issues on appeal.
Crane pleaded guilty to one count of first degree burglary and one count of residential burglary. The information alleged that both counts were committed with sexual motivation.
Crane's "Statement on Plea of Guilty" recited the charges, including the allegations of sexual motivation. Crane's description of the offenses stated that he committed them with sexual motivation. The document informed Crane that the court could sentence him outside the standard range if it found substantial and compelling reasons to do so.
At his plea hearing, Crane told the court he was entering the plea in part to take advantage of the State's offer to recommend a treatment-based Sexual Offender Sentencing Alternative.
The court imposed exceptional sentences upward on both counts based on a finding of sexual motivation. This appeal followed.
Crane contends he is entitled to be resentenced within the standard range because he was never informed of a direct consequence of his plea--i.e. that an admission of sexual motivation would justify a departure from the standard range. We disagree.
A guilty plea is invalid if the defendant was not aware of the direct consequences of his plea prior to its acceptance. State v. Barton, 93 Wash. 2d 301, 609 P.2d 1353 (1980); State v. Ross, 129 Wash. 2d 279, 916 P.2d 405 (1996). A "direct consequence" is one which has a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range of a defendant's punishment. Ross, 129 Wash. 2d at 284. To determine whether the consequence affects punishment, courts "examine whether the effect enhances the defendant's sentence or alters the standard of punishment." Ross, 129 Wash. 2d at 285.
Here, Crane's guilty plea to allegations of sexual motivation did not automatically enhance his sentence. *fn1 Although it created a basis for the court to impose an exceptional sentence if it so exercised its discretion, *fn2 it had no immediate and largely automatic effect on Crane's sentence. See Ross, 129 Wash. 2d at 285; In re Paschke, 80 Wash. App. 439, 909 P.2d 1328 (1996); State v. Music, 40 Wash. App. 423, 698 P.2d 1087 (1985).
Crane's plea also did not "alter the standard of punishment." State v. Ward, 123 Wash. 2d 488, 513, 869 P.2d 1062 (1994). The decisions in Ward, 123 Wash. 2d at 513-14 and Ross, 129 Wash. 2d at 287-88 treat that language as requiring some additional punishment other than an enhancement of the sentence of confinement. Crane's admission of sexual motivation did not result in any additional, non-confinement form of punishment.
Contrary to Crane's assertions, State v. Cameron, 30 Wash. App. 229, 633 P.2d 901, review denied, 96 Wash. 2d 1023 (1981) does not support his argument. The Cameron court held that the possibility of restitution is a direct consequence of a guilty plea, and that a defendant cannot be required to pay restitution if he or she was not informed of that possible punishment at the time of the plea. Although Cameron might support the proposition that "direct consequences" include all punishment available to the court at sentencing, that proposition is inapposite here since Crane was informed of the entire range of possible punishment, including the possibility of an exceptional sentence.
In Conclusion, Crane's admission of sexual motivation had no immediate, largely automatic effect on his sentence or punishment. Accordingly, there was no requirement that he be ...