The opinion of the court was delivered by: A Benjamin H. Settle United States District Judge
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 52). The Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the motion and the remainder of the file and hereby denies the motion for the reasons stated herein.
On February 25, 2010, Plaintiff Michael Kirkland ("Kirkland") filed the original complaint in this action alleging claims against Defendants relating to an accident that occurred on November 26, 2008, at Kirkland's place of employment, the Cameron Family Glass Packaging plant ("Cameron"). Dkt. 1. On February 16, 2011, Defendants filed their motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 52). On March 7, 2011, Kirkland filed a response to Defendants' motion which he titled as an opposition and cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Dkt. 57. However, because the Court's scheduling order required that dispositive motions be filed no later than February 16, 2011, the Court will not consider Kirkland's response as a cross-motion for summary judgment. On March 11, 2011, Defendants replied (Dkt. 69).
II. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Solely for purposes of deciding the instant motion, the Court will assume the facts as stated in Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 52 at 2-11) because, even when such facts are taken as true, Defendants' motion must be denied.
In his complaint, Kirkland alleges as follows:
4.1 Defendant Emhart Glass is liable for Mr. Kirkland's injuries because the subject Individual Section Machine was not reasonably safe in its design, and because adequate warnings were not provided with the product or after manufacture, and as such, the subject Individual Section Machine was unsafe to an extent beyond that contemplated by an ordinary user and consumer as set forth in RCW 7.72.030.
4.2 The defects in the design of the subject Individual Section Machine include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) the flip plate at the location where Michael Kirkland was working did not extend as far as the trapezoidal foot pad at that location, and (b) Defendant Emhart Glass failed to provide a reasonably safe means of protecting workers from exposure to injury resulting from contact with red hot bottles on the conveyor when performing mold changes.
4.3 Defendant Emhart Glass is strictly liable to Plaintiff because the Individual Section Machine was unsafe to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by an ordinary user.
Dkt. 1 at 11-12. In the instant motion, Defendants state that they anticipate Kirkland will attempt to bring at trial six theories of liability to support his claim under Washington's Product Liability Act ("WPLA") and seek summary judgment on the following five theories: (1) failure to warn based upon a risk-utility analysis; (2) failure to warn based upon a consumer expectations test; (3) a post-manufacturing failure to warn based upon a negligence standard; (4) design defect based upon a consumer expectations test; and (5) a general strict liability claim based upon consumer expectations. Dkt. 52 at 1. Thus, Defendants seek summary judgment of all of Kirkland's theories of liability with the exception of a design defect based upon a risk-utility test. Id.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the case on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (nonmoving party must present specific, significant probative evidence, not simply "some metaphysical doubt"). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or jury to resolve the differing versions of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
The determination of the existence of a material fact is often a close question. The Court must consider the substantive evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must meet at trial -- e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil cases. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. The Court must resolve any factual issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party only when the facts specifically attested by that party contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party. The nonmoving party may not merely state that it will discredit the moving party's evidence at trial, in the hopes that evidence can be developed at trial to support the claim. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630 (relying on ...