March 31, 2014
Cannabis Action Coalition et al., Plaintiffs, Steve Sarich et al., Appellants ,
The City of Kent, Respondent
Reconsideration denied April 14 and April 25, 2014.
Superior Court County: King. Superior Court Cause No: 12-2-19726-1.KNT. Date filed in Superior Court: 10/22/12. Superior Court Judge Signing: Jay V. White.
John Worthington, pro se.
David S. Mann (of Gendler & Mann LLP ); Joseph L. Broadbent ; and Aaron A. Pelley (of Pelley Law PLLC ), for appellants.
Arthur M. " Pat" Fitzpatrick, City Attorney, and Thomas C. Brubaker and David A. Galazin, Assistants, for respondent.
Jared Van Kirk, Sarah A. Dunne, and Mark M. Cooke on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union of Washington Foundation, amicus curiae.
Timothy J. Donaldson, Kathleen J. Haggard, J. Preston Frederickson, and Timothy J. Reynolds on behalf of Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys, amicus curiae.
AUTHOR: Dwyer, J. We concur: Spearman, A.C.J., Schindler, J.
[180 Wn.App. 460] ¶ 1
The Washington Constitution grants the governor the power to veto individual sections of a bill. The governor may exercise this power even when doing so changes the meaning or effect of the bill from that which the legislature intended. As a corollary of this power, when the governor's sectional veto alters the intent of the bill and the legislature does not override the veto, the governor's veto message becomes the exclusive statement of legislative intent that speaks directly to the bill as enacted into law.
¶ 2 In this case, the governor vetoed over half of the sections in a 2011 bill amending the Washington State Medical Use of Cannabis Act  (MUCA), substantially changing the meaning, intent, and effect of the bill. Although
Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill (ESSSB) 5073 was originally designed to legalize medical marijuana through the creation of a state registry of lawful users, as enacted it provides medical marijuana users with an affirmative defense to criminal prosecution.
¶ 3 Following the governor's sectional veto and the new law's effective date, the city of Kent enacted a zoning ordinance which defined medical marijuana " collective gardens" and prohibited such a use in all zoning districts. By so doing, Kent banned collective gardens.
[180 Wn.App. 461] ¶ 4 An organization and several individuals (collectively the Challengers) brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the ordinance. The Challengers claimed that ESSSB 5073 legalized collective gardens and that Kent was thus without authority to regulate or ban collective gardens. In response, Kent sought an injunction against the individual challengers enjoining them from violating the ordinance. The superior court ruled in favor of Kent, dismissed the Challengers' claims for relief, and granted the relief sought by Kent.
¶ 5 We hold that neither the plain language of the statute nor the governor's intent as expressed in her veto message supports a reading of ESSSB 5073 that legalizes collective gardens. The Kent city council acted within its authority by enacting the ordinance banning collective gardens. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by dismissing the Challengers' actions and granting relief to Kent.
¶ 6 In 2011, the Washington legislature adopted ESSSB 5073, which was intended to amend the MUCA. The bill purported to create a comprehensive regulatory scheme, whereby--with regard to medical marijuana--all patients, physicians, processors, producers, and dispensers would be registered with the state Department of Health. The legislature's intended purpose in amending the statute, as stated in section 101 of the bill, was so that
(a) Qualifying patients and designated providers complying with the terms of this act and registering with the department of health will no longer be subject to arrest or prosecution, other criminal sanctions, or civil consequences based solely on their medical use of cannabis;
[180 Wn.App. 462] (b) Qualifying patients will have access to an adequate, safe, consistent, and secure source of medical quality cannabis; and
(c) Health care professionals may authorize the medical use of cannabis in the manner provided by this act without fear of state criminal or civil sanctions.
ESSSB 5073, § 101, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011) (italics and boldface omitted). The legislature also amended RCW 69.51A.005, the MUCA's preexisting purpose and intent provision, to state, in relevant part:
Qualifying patients with terminal or debilitating medical conditions who, in the judgment of their health care professionals, may benefit from the medical use of cannabis, shall not be arrested, prosecuted, or subject to other criminal sanctions or civil consequences under state law based solely on their medical use of cannabis, notwithstanding any other provision of law.
ESSSB 5073, § 102.
¶ 7 As drafted by the legislature, ESSSB 5073 established a state-run registry system for qualified patients and providers. Significantly, section 901 of the bill required the state Department of Health, in conjunction with the state Department of Agriculture, to " adopt rules for the creation, implementation, maintenance, and timely upgrading of a secure and confidential registration system." ESSSB 5073, § 901(1). Patients would not be required to register; rather, the registry would be " optional for qualifying patients." ESSSB 5073, § 901(6). On the one hand, if a patient was registered with the Department of Health, he or she would not be subject to prosecution for marijuana-related offenses.
ESSSB 5073, § 405. On the other hand, if a patient [180 Wn.App. 463] did not register, he or she would be entitled only to an affirmative defense to marijuana-related charges. ESSSB 5073, § 406.
¶ 8 The bill also allowed qualified patients to establish collective gardens for the purpose of growing medical marijuana for personal use. ESSSB 5073, § 403. Furthermore, even though the bill purported to legalize medical marijuana for registered patients and providers, it nevertheless granted authority to municipalities to regulate medical marijuana use within their territorial confines. Section 1102, now codified as RCW 69.51A.140, provides in relevant part:
[180 Wn.App. 464] (1) Cities and towns may adopt and enforce any of the following pertaining to the production, processing, or dispensing of cannabis or cannabis products within their jurisdiction: Zoning requirements, business licensing requirements, health and safety requirements, and business taxes. Nothing in this act is intended to limit the authority of cities and towns to impose zoning requirements or other conditions upon licensed dispensers, so long as such requirements do not preclude the possibility of siting licensed dispensers within the jurisdiction. If the jurisdiction has no commercial zones, the jurisdiction is not required to adopt zoning to accommodate licensed dispensers.
ESSSB 5073, § 1102.
¶ 9 The bill was passed by both houses of the legislature and sent to Governor Gregoire for her signature.
¶ 10 On April 14, 2011, the United States Attorneys for the Eastern and Western Districts of Washington wrote an advisory letter to Governor Gregoire regarding ESSSB 5073. Therein, the district attorneys explained the Department of Justice's position on the bill:
The Washington legislative proposals will create a licensing scheme that permits large-scale marijuana cultivation and distribution. This would authorize conduct
contrary to federal law and thus, would undermine the federal government's efforts to regulate the possession, manufacturing, and trafficking of controlled substances. ... In addition, state employees who conducted activities mandated by the Washington legislative proposals would not be immune from liability under the CSA. Potential actions the Department could consider include injunctive actions to prevent cultivation and distribution of marijuana and other associated violations of the CSA; civil fines; criminal prosecution; and the forfeiture of any property used to facilitate a violation of the CSA.
¶ 11 After receiving this missive, Governor Gregoire vetoed all sections of the bill which might have subjected state employees to federal charges. The governor vetoed 36 sections  [180 Wn.App. 465] of the bill that purported to establish a state registry, including section 901, and including section 101, the legislature's statement of intent. Laws of 2011, ch. 181. The governor left intact those sections of the bill that did not create or were not wholly dependent on the creation of a state registry. Laws of 2011, ch. 181. In her official veto message, Governor Gregoire explained her decision to leave parts of the bill intact:
Today, I have signed sections of Engrossed Second Substitute Bill 5073 that retain the provisions of Initiative 692 and provide additional state law protections. Qualifying patients or their designated providers may grow cannabis for the patient's use or participate in a collective garden without fear of state law criminal prosecutions. Qualifying patients or their designated providers are also protected from certain state civil law consequences.
Laws of 2011, ch. 181, governor's veto message at 1374-75.
¶ 12 The governor recognized that her extensive exercise of the sectional veto power rendered meaningless any of the bill's provisions that were dependent upon the state registry, noting that " [b]ecause I have vetoed the licensing provisions, I have also vetoed" numerous other sections. Laws of 2011, ch. 181, governor's veto message at 1375. However, the governor also recognized that--after her extensive vetoes--portions of some sections would remain meaningful even though references to the registry within those sections would not. Importantly, in one particular example, the governor stated:
I am not vetoing Sections 402 or 406, which establish affirmative defenses for a qualifying patient or designated provider who is not registered with the registry established in section 901. Because these sections govern those who have not registered, this section is meaningful even though section 901 has been vetoed.
[180 Wn.App. 466] Laws of 2011, ch. 181, governor's veto message at 1376. Another section that the governor believed to have meaning, even though it referenced registered entities, was section 1102. With respect to this section, the governor stated:
Section 1102 sets forth local governments' authority pertaining to the production, processing or dispensing of cannabis or cannabis products within their jurisdictions. The provisions in Section 1102 that local governments' zoning requirements cannot " preclude the possibility of siting licensed dispensers within the jurisdiction" are without meaning in light of the vetoes of sections providing for such licensed dispensers. It is with this understanding that I approve section 1102.
Laws of 2011, ch. 181, governor's veto message at 1375. The bill, now consisting only of the 22 sections not vetoed by the governor, was signed into law and codified in chapter 69.51A RCW. The legislature did not override the governor's veto.
¶ 13 Subsequently, Kent sought to exercise its zoning power to regulate collective gardens. On July 5, 2011 and January 3, 2012, Kent issued six month moratoria prohibiting collective gardens within the city limits. On June 5, 2012, Kent enacted Ordinance No. 4036 (the Ordinance), defining collective gardens and banning them within the city limits. The Ordinance states, in relevant part:
A. Collective gardens, as defined in KCC 15.02.074, are prohibited in the following zoning districts:
1. All agricultural districts, including A-10 and AG;
2. All residential districts, including SR-1, SR-3, SR-4.5, SR-6, SR-8, MR-D, MR-T12, MR-T16, MR-G, MR-M, MR-H, MHP, PUD, MTC-1, MTC-2, and MCR;
3. All commercial/office districts, including: NCC, CC, CC-MU, DC, DCE, DCE-T, CM-1, CM-2, GC, GC-MU, O, O-MU, and GWC;
4. All industrial districts, including: MA, M1, M1-C, M2, and M3; and
[180 Wn.App. 467] 5. Any new district established after June 5, 2012.
B. Any violation of this section is declared to be a public nuisance per se, and shall be abated by the city attorney under applicable provisions of this code or state law, including, but not limited to, the provisions of KCC Chapter 1.04.
¶ 14 Thereafter, the Cannabis Action Coalition, Steve Sarich, Arthur West, John Worthington, and Deryck Tsang filed suit against Kent, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. Worthington, Sarich, and West stated in their complaint that they intended to participate in a collective garden in Kent. None of the three, however, actually resided in, owned or operated a business in, or participated in a collective garden in Kent. Tsang, on the other hand, is a resident of Kent and currently participates in a collective garden in the city limits.
¶ 15 In the superior court proceeding, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. After considering all documentation submitted by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of Kent. The trial court dismissed the claims of Cannabis Action Coalition, Sarich, West, and Worthington for lack of standing. On the merits of Tsang's claims, the trial court held that " [t]he Kent City Council had authority to pass Ordinance 4036, Ordinance 4036 is not preempted by state law, and Ordinance 4036 does not violate any constitutional rights of Plaintiffs." The trial court also granted Kent's request for a permanent injunction against all plaintiffs, prohibiting them from violating the Ordinance.
¶ 16 The Challengers appealed to the Washington Supreme Court and requested a stay of the injunction. The Supreme Court Commissioner granted the stay. While the [180 Wn.App. 468] appeal was pending, Kent filed a motion to strike portions of Worthington's reply brief, which Worthington countered with a motion to waive Rule of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 10.3(c). The Supreme Court transferred
the appeal to this court, along with the two unresolved motions.
[180 Wn.App. 469] II
¶ 17 The Challengers contend that the plain language of the MUCA legalizes collective gardens. This is so, they assert, because the MUCA provides that " [q]ualifying patients may create and participate in collective gardens." RCW 69.51A.085(1). Kent, in response, contends that the plain language of the MUCA did not legalize collective gardens because collective gardens would only have been legalized in circumstances wherein the participating patients were duly registered, and the registry does not exist. The trial court properly ruled that Kent is correct.
¶ 18 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Fiore v. PPG Indus., Inc., 169 Wn.App. 325, 333, 279 P.3d 972 (2012). " The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and carry out legislative intent." Bennett v. Seattle Mental Health, 166 Wn.App. 477, 483, 269 P.3d 1079, review denied, 174 Wn.2d 1009 (2012). " The court must give effect to legislative intent determined 'within the context of the entire statute.'" Whatcom County v. City of [180 Wn.App. 470] Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996) (quoting State v. Elgin, 118 Wn.2d 551, 556, 825 P.2d 314 (1992)). " If the statute's meaning is plain on its face, we give effect to that plain meaning as the expression of what was intended." TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 170 Wn.2d 273, 281, 242 P.3d 810 (2010) (citing Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). " In approving or disapproving legislation, the Governor acts in a legislative capacity and as part of the legislative branch of government." Hallin v. Trent, 94 Wn.2d 671, 677, 619 P.2d 357 (1980). Accordingly, when the governor vetoes sections of a bill, the governor's veto message is considered a statement of legislative intent. Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wn.2d 582, 594, 957 P.2d 1241 (1998).
¶ 19 The plain language of ESSSB 5073, as enacted, does not legalize medical marijuana or collective gardens. Subsection (1) of RCW 69.51A.085 delineates the requirements for collective gardens. RCW 69.51A.085 further provides that " [a] person who knowingly violates a provision of subsection (1) of this section is not entitled to the protections of this chapter." RCW 69.51A.085(3).
¶ 20 The " protections of this chapter" to which RCW 69.51A.085(3) refers are found in RCW 69.51A.040 and 69.51A.043. RCW 69.51A.040 provides that " [t]he medical use of cannabis in accordance with the terms and conditions of this chapter does not constitute a crime" if the patient meets the six listed
requirements. One of the listed requirements is that
The qualifying patient or designated provider keeps a copy of his or her proof of registration with the registry established in *section 901 of this act and the qualifying patient or designated provider's contact information posted prominently next to any cannabis plants, cannabis products, or useable cannabis located at his or her residence.
RCW 69.51A.040(3) (emphasis added). Therefore, in order to obtain the protections provided by RCW 69.51A.040, the patient must be registered with the state.
¶ 21 [180 Wn.App. 471] RCW 69.51A.043, on the other hand, delineates the protections for patients who are not registered:
(1) A qualifying patient or designated provider who is not registered with the registry established in *section 901 of this act may raise the affirmative defense set forth in subsection (2) of this section, if:
(a) The qualifying patient or designated provider presents his or her valid documentation to any peace officer who questions the patient or provider regarding his or her medical use of cannabis;
(b) The qualifying patient or designated provider possesses no more cannabis than the limits set forth in RCW 69.51A.040(1);
(c) The qualifying patient or designated provider is in compliance with all other terms and conditions of this chapter;
(2) A qualifying patient or designated provider who is not registered with the registry established in *section 901 of this act, but who presents his or her valid documentation to any peace officer who questions the patient or provider regarding his or her medical use of cannabis, may assert an affirmative defense to charges of violations of state law relating to cannabis through proof at trial, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she otherwise meets the requirements of RCW 69.51A.040 . A qualifying patient or designated provider meeting the conditions of this subsection but possessing more cannabis than the limits set forth in RCW 69.51A.040(1) may, in the investigating peace officer's discretion, be taken into custody and booked into jail in connection with the investigation of the incident.
(Emphasis added.) Section 901 of ESSSB 5073, referred to in both RCW 69.51A.040 and 69.51A.043, was vetoed. As a result of the governor's veto, the state registry does not exist. Thus, it is impossible for an individual to be registered with the registry. Accordingly, no individual is able to meet the requirements of RCW 69.51A.040.
¶ 22 Pursuant to RCW 69.51A.043, patients who are not registered may be entitled to an affirmative defense. [180 Wn.App. 472] As we hold today in State v. Reis, 180 Wn.App. 438, 449, 322 P.2d 1246 (2014), " by default, qualifying patients and designated providers are entitled only to an affirmative defense." As such, the only available " protection" to which collective garden participants are entitled pursuant to RCW 69.51A.085(3) is an affirmative defense to prosecution.
¶ 23 Although such a reading may appear to render RCW 69.51A.040 meaningless, it does not, in fact, do so. RCW 69.51A.040 delineates the non-registry-related conditions for possessing medical marijuana. These conditions are referenced in RCW 69.51A.043  and are essential components of the affirmative defense. Thus, the plain language of the statute does not legalize the use of medical marijuana. Instead, it provides
a defense to an assertion that state criminal laws were violated. As such, medical marijuana use, including collective gardens, was not legalized by the 2011 amendments to the MUCA.
¶ 24 All parties contend that the legislative history of ESSSB 5073 supports their reading of the act. In order to analyze the legislative history of ESSSB 5073 as [180 Wn.App. 473] enacted, however, we must first determine which sources of legislative intent are proper for us to consider. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the governor's veto message is the sole source of relevant legislative history on the 2011 amendments to the MUCA, as enacted.
¶ 25 Article III, section 12 of the Washington Constitution allows for the governor to veto " one or more sections ... while approving other portions of the bill." Prior to 1984, the long-standing rule governing the governor's sectional veto power was that the governor could only use the executive veto power in a " negative" manner, and not in an " affirmative" manner. Wash. Fed'n of State Emps., AFL-CIO, Council 28 AFSCME v. State, 101 Wn.2d 536, 545, 682 P.2d 869 (1984). Phrased another way,
" [T]he Governor may use the veto power to prevent some act or part of an act of the legislature from becoming law. Likewise, the Governor may not use the veto power to reach a new or different result from what the legislature intended. In other words, the veto power must be exercised in a destructive and not a creative manner."
State Emps., 101 Wn.2d at 545 (alteration in original) (quoting Wash. Ass'n of Apartment Ass'ns v. Evans, 88 Wn.2d 563, 565-66, 564 P.2d 788 (1977)).
¶ 26 In State Employees, the Supreme Court disavowed that rule, holding that, " [i]ts use by the judiciary is an intrusion into the legislative branch, contrary to the separation of powers doctrine, and substitutes judicial judgment for the judgment of the legislative branch." 101 Wn.2d at 546 (citations omitted). From then on, " [t]he Governor [was] free to veto 'one or more sections or appropriation items', without judicial review." State Emps., 101 Wn.2d at 547. Thus, the current analytical approach is that the governor is free to veto sections of a bill even when doing so changes the meaning of the bill from that which the legislature originally intended.
¶ 27 Significantly, the Supreme Court characterized the veto process as follows:
[180 Wn.App. 474] " In approving or disapproving legislation, the Governor acts in a legislative capacity and as part of the legislative branch of government." Hallin v. Trent, 94 Wn.2d 671, 677, 619 P.2d 357 (1980). In effect, the Governor holds one-third of the votes. The veto is upheld if the Legislature fails to override it. Fain v. Chapman, 94 Wn.2d 684, 688, 619 P.2d 353 (1980). To override the Governor's veto, the Senate and House must agree by a two-thirds vote. Const. art. 3, § 12 (amend. 62).
State Emps., 101 Wn.2d at 544. The legislature's power to override, the Supreme Court held, serves as an adequate " check" on the governor's veto power. State Emps., 101 Wn.2d at 547. Thus, if the legislature disapproves of the new meaning or effect of the bill resulting from the governor's veto, it can vote to override the veto and restore the bill to its original meaning or effect.
¶ 28 Here, Governor Gregoire vetoed 36 of the 58 sections of ESSSB 5073. This veto significantly altered the meaning and effect of the sections that remained for enactment. When returning the bill to the Senate, the governor provided a formal veto message expressing her opinion as to the meaning and effect of the bill after her veto. See Wash. State Grange v. Locke, 153 Wn.2d 475, 490, 105 P.3d 9 (2005) (" The expression of [an opinion as to the statute's interpretation] is within the governor's prerogative." ). Had the legislature objected to the governor's veto, it could have overturned it by a two-thirds vote.
Const. art. III, § 12. A legislative override would also have nullified the governor's veto message. By not overriding the veto, the legislature failed to provide an interpretation of the MUCA contrary to that articulated by Governor Gregoire. Cf. Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 116 Wn.2d 342, 349, 804 P.2d 24 (1991) (legislature's actions in not overriding veto, but later amending parts of the statute, functioned as legislative approval of governor's veto message with respect to unamended portions of the statute).
¶ 29 All parties urge us to consider the intent of the legislature in passing ESSSB 5073. However, ESSSB 5073, [180 Wn.App. 475] as passed by both houses of the legislature, was not the bill that was enacted. Rather, the bill that was enacted was that which existed after the governor's veto. Thus, the governor's veto message is the only legislative history that speaks directly to the law as it was enacted. It is the paramount source for us to refer to in order to discern the legislative intent behind the enacted law.
¶ 30 The governor's intent in vetoing a significant portion of ESSSB 5073 was that there should not be a state registry and that medical marijuana should not be legalized. In her veto message, Governor Gregoire stated:
I have been open, and remain open, to legislation to exempt qualifying patients and their designated providers from state criminal penalties when they join in nonprofit cooperative organizations to share responsibility for producing, processing and dispensing cannabis for medical use. Such exemption from criminal penalties should be conditioned on compliance with local government location and health and safety specifications.
Laws of 2011, ch. 181, governor's veto message at 1376 (emphasis added). By stating that she was open to future legislation that would exempt patients from criminal penalties, the governor indicated that she did not read this bill as creating any such exemptions.
¶ 31 Further, the governor concluded her veto message by stating:
I am not vetoing Sections 402 or 406, which establish affirmative defenses for a qualifying patient or designated provider who is not registered with the registry established in section 901. Because these sections govern those who have not registered, this section is meaningful even though section 901 has been vetoed.
Laws of 2011, ch. 181, governor's veto message at 1376. This statement indicates that the governor realized that her veto would preclude the legislature's attempt to legalize certain medical marijuana uses. The governor affirmatively stated her understanding that only affirmative defenses to criminal prosecutions survived her veto.
[180 Wn.App. 476] ¶ 32 These two statements, read in conjunction, demonstrate that the governor did not intend for ESSSB 5073 to legalize medical marijuana. The governor did not read the bill as enacted as exempting medical marijuana users from prosecution. Significantly, although the MUCA provides for an affirmative defense, " [a]n affirmative defense does not per se legalize an activity." State v. Fry, 168 Wn.2d 1, 10, 228 P.3d 1 (2010). Thus, the plain language of the statute, which does not read so as to legalize medical marijuana, is consonant with the governor's expressed intent in signing the bill, as amended by her vetoes.
¶ 33 The governor's statement regarding collective gardens does not suggest otherwise. In her veto message, Governor Gregoire stated, " Qualifying patients or their designated providers may grow cannabis for the patient's use or participate in a collective garden without fear of state law criminal prosecutions."  Laws of 2011, ch. 181, governor's veto message at 1374-75. Two paragraphs earlier, Governor Gregoire stated, " In 1998, Washington voters made the compassionate choice to remove the fear of state criminal prosecution for patients who use medical marijuana for debilitating or terminal conditions." Laws of 2011, ch. 181, governor's veto message at 1374. The governor's use of the phrase " state criminal prosecution[s]" in both sentences indicates
that she intended for the bill to extend the existing legal protections to collective gardens. The 1998 ballot initiative (I-692) provided qualifying patients with an affirmative defense to drug charges. Former RCW 69.51A.040 (1999). I-692 did not legalize medical marijuana, but the governor nevertheless described it as " remov[ing] the fear of state criminal prosecution." Her use of the same phrase when describing ESSSB 5073 must be read in this light. The governor plainly did not intend for ESSSB 5073, [180 Wn.App. 477] after her vetoes, to legalize medical marijuana. The plain language of the MUCA is consonant with the governor's expressed intent.
¶ 34 The Challengers nevertheless contend that the plain language of the MUCA does not allow Kent to regulate collective gardens. This is so, they assert, because RCW 69.51A.085, which deals with collective gardens, is a stand-alone statute that does not grant any regulatory authority to municipalities. We disagree.
¶ 35 Although RCW 69.51A.085 does not itself grant powers to municipalities, this statutory provision cannot be read in isolation. " We construe an act as a whole, giving effect to all the language used. Related statutory provisions are interpreted in relation to each other and all provisions harmonized." C.J.C. v. Corp. of Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wn.2d 699, 708, 985 P.2d 262 (1999) (citing State v. S.P., 110 Wn.2d 886, 890, 756 P.2d 1315 (1988)). RCW 69.51A.085 was passed as part of a comprehensive bill amending the MUCA. This provision must therefore be read in conjunction with the other enacted provisions of ESSSB 5073.
¶ 36 Importantly, ESSSB 5073, as enacted, includes a section specifically granting regulatory powers to municipalities. RCW 69.51A.140(1) states:
Cities and towns may adopt and enforce any of the following pertaining to the production, processing, or dispensing of cannabis or cannabis products within their jurisdiction: Zoning requirements, business licensing requirements, health and safety requirements, and business taxes . Nothing in chapter 181, Laws of 2011 is intended to limit the authority of cities and towns to impose zoning requirements or other conditions upon licensed dispensers, so long as such requirements do not [180 Wn.App. 478] preclude the possibility of siting licensed dispensers within the jurisdiction.
(Emphasis added.) The plain language of this section allows municipalities to regulate the production, processing, and dispensing of medical marijuana. Only " licensed dispensers" are listed as users that a city may not exclude. This necessarily implies that a city retains its traditional authority to regulate all other uses of medical marijuana. Thus, the MUCA expressly authorizes cities to enact zoning requirements to regulate or exclude collective gardens.
¶ 37 The Challengers contend that the legislative history of ESSSB 5073 does not support a reading of RCW 69.51A.140 that would allow a city to regulate or exclude collective gardens. To the contrary, it is the Challengers' interpretation of the statute that is not supported by the legislative history.
¶ 38 In enacting the 2011 amendments to the MUCA, the governor provided some insight into a locality's ability to regulate medical marijuana. In her veto message, the governor stated:
Section 1102 sets forth local governments' authority pertaining to the production, processing or dispensing of cannabis or cannabis products within their jurisdictions. The provisions in Section 1102 that local governments' zoning requirements cannot " preclude the possibility of siting licensed dispensers within the jurisdiction" are without meaning in light of the vetoes of sections providing for such licensed dispensers. It is with this understanding that I approve Section 1102.
Laws of 2011, ch. 181, governor's veto message at 1375. This statement indicates that the governor intended section [180 Wn.App. 479] 1102 to have meaning even though one provision therein was meaningless. Accordingly, the governor's understanding of section 1102 of the bill was that municipalities would be able to regulate medical marijuana production, processing, or dispensing within their territorial confines.
¶ 39 Further, the governor stated:
I have been open, and remain open, to legislation to exempt qualifying patients and their designated providers from state criminal penalties when they join in nonprofit cooperative organizations to share responsibility for producing, processing and dispensing cannabis for medical use. Such exemption from state criminal penalties should be conditioned on compliance with local government location and health and safety specifications .
Laws of 2011, ch. 181, governor's veto message at 1376 (emphasis added). " [L]ocation and health and safety specifications" are precisely what the Washington Constitution anticipates municipalities will address by enacting ordinances. " Municipalities derive their authority to enact ordinances in furtherance of the public safety, morals, health and welfare from article 11, section 11 of our state constitution." City of Tacoma v. Vance, 6 Wn.App. 785, 789, 496 P.2d 534 (1972) (emphasis added); accord Hass v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wn.2d 929, 932, 481 P.2d 9 (1971). The governor's message thus indicated her understanding that, in the future, if a bill succeeded in legalizing medical marijuana, municipalities should continue to retain their ordinary regulatory powers, such as zoning.
¶ 40 Nonetheless, the Challengers contend that the phrase " production, processing, or dispensing of cannabis or cannabis products" in RCW 69.51A.140 refers only to commercial production, processing, or dispensing. The Challengers' interpretation would render all of RCW 69.51A.140 a nullity. Commercial producers, processors, and dispensers are those producers, processors, and dispensers that would have been licensed by the Department of Health. ESSSB 5073, § 201(12), (13), (14). As a result of the governor's veto of all sections creating a licensing system, commercial [180 Wn.App. 480] producers, processors, and dispensers do not exist. If " producers, processors, and dispensers" referred only to those commercial licensed entities, all of section 1102 would be meaningless. However, the governor did not veto section 1102 along with the other sections creating licensed producers, processors, and dispensers. Rather, the governor stated in her veto message that only those " provisions in Section 1102 that local governments' zoning requirements cannot 'preclude the possibility of siting licensed dispensers within the jurisdiction' are without meaning." Laws of 2011, ch. 181, governor's veto message at 1375. The governor's veto did not leave municipalities without the ability to regulate. In this regard, the Challengers' interpretation of the amended MUCA is contrary to the legislative history of the bill.
¶ 41 The governor clearly understood the bill to allow cities to use their zoning power to regulate medical marijuana use within their city limits. The governor's understanding is consistent with the plain language of the MUCA.
¶ 42 The Challengers next contend that the Ordinance is invalid because, they assert, the MUCA preempts local regulation of medical marijuana and because the Ordinance conflicts with state law. We disagree.
¶ 43 Generally, municipalities possess constitutional authority to enact zoning ordinances as an exercise of their police power. Const. art. XI, § 11. However, a municipality [180 Wn.App. 481] may not enact a zoning ordinance
which is either preempted by or in conflict with state law. HJS Dev., Inc. v. Pierce County ex rel. Dep't of Planning & Land Servs., 148 Wn.2d 451, 477, 61 P.3d 1141 (2003).
¶ 44 State law preempts a local ordinance when " the legislature has expressed its intent to preempt the field or that intent is manifest from necessary implication." HJS Dev., 148 Wn.2d at 477 (citing Rabon v. City of Seattle, 135 Wn.2d 278, 289, 957 P.2d 621 (1998); Brown v. City of Yakima, 116 Wn.2d 556, 560, 807 P.2d 353 (1991)). Otherwise, municipalities will have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter. HJS Dev., 148 Wn.2d at 477. The MUCA does not express the intent to preempt the field of medical marijuana regulation. To the contrary, as previously discussed in section III, the MUCA explicitly recognizes a role for municipalities in medical marijuana regulation. As the MUCA explicitly contemplates its creation, the Ordinance is not directly preempted by state law.
¶ 45 A local ordinance that is not directly preempted may nevertheless be invalid if it conflicts with state law. Pursuant to article XI, section 11 of the Washington Constitution, " [a]ny county, city, town or township may make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws." A city ordinance is unconstitutional under article XI, section 11 if " (1) the ordinance conflicts with some general law; (2) the ordinance is not a reasonable exercise of the city's police power; or (3) the subject matter of the ordinance is not local." Edmonds Shopping Ctr. Assocs. v. City of Edmonds, 117 Wn.App. 344, 351, 71 P.3d 233 (2003). Whether a local ordinance is valid under the state constitution is a pure question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Edmonds Shopping Ctr., 117 Wn.App. at 351.
¶ 46 Here, the Challengers contend that the Ordinance is unconstitutional because it conflicts with the [180 Wn.App. 482] MUCA. Ordinances are presumed to be constitutional. HJS Dev., 148 Wn.2d at 477. As the party challenging the Ordinance, the burden is on the Challengers to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it is unconstitutional. Edmonds Shopping Ctr., 117 Wn.App. at 355. " 'In determining whether an ordinance is in " conflict" with general laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.'" City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wn.2d 826, 834-35, 827 P.2d 1374 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting City of Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wn.2d 106, 111, 356 P.2d 292 (1960)). " The conflict must be direct and irreconcilable with the statute, and the ordinance must yield to the statute if the two cannot be harmonized." Luvene, 118 Wn.2d at 835.
¶ 47 " The scope of [a municipality's] police power is broad, encompassing all those measures which bear a reasonable and substantial relation to promotion of the general welfare of the people." State v. City of Seattle, 94 Wn.2d 162, 165, 615 P.2d 461 (1980). Generally speaking, a municipality's police powers are coextensive with those possessed by the State. City of Seattle, 94 Wn.2d at 165. Without question, a municipality's plenary powers include the power to " enact ordinances prohibiting and punishing the same acts which constitute an offense under state laws." Schampera, 57 Wn.2d at 109; accord State v. Kirwin, 165 Wn.2d 818, 826-27, 203 P.3d 1044 (2009). As the plain language of the statute and the governor's veto message indicate, collective gardens are not a legal activity. The Ordinance, by prohibiting collective gardens, prohibits an activity that constitutes an offense under state law. As it prohibits an activity that is also prohibited under state law, [180 Wn.App. 483] the Ordinance does not conflict with the MUCA. The trial court did not err by so
¶ 48 Affirmed.
Spearman, A.C.J., and Schindler, J., concur.