In the Matter of the Marriage of Nanako Tsujimoto Raskob, Appellant, and Josh Ian Raskob, Respondent
Order Granting Motion to Publish September 15, 2014.
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Appeal fro King County Superior Court. Docket No: 09-3-04363-2. Date filed: 06/12/2013. Judge signing: Honorable James a Doerty.
Philip C. Tsai (of Tsai Law Company PLLC ) and Marcia Lynn Damerow Fischer, for appellant.
Camden M. Hall (of Camden Hall PLLC ), for respondent.
AUTHOR: James Verellen, ACJ. WE CONCUR: Ann Schindler, J., Mary Kay Becker, J.
[183 Wn.App. 507] ¶ 1 -- When a parent violates the relocation provision of an agreed parenting plan, the trial [183 Wn.App. 508] court has authority to make major modifications to the plan. On remand, the trial court clarified its basis for finding that Nanako Tsujimoto violated the relocation provision of her agreed parenting plan with Josh Raskob. Nanako challenges the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law that she violated the parenting plan. She also argues that the trial court erred in modifying the residential schedule and relocation provision in the parenting plan and in awarding sanctions and attorney fees against her. Because sufficient evidence supports the challenged findings, the trial court's findings support its conclusions of law, the trial court had the statutory authority to modify the parenting plan and award sanctions, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm. We decline to award any attorney fees on appeal.
¶ 2 This case is before us for the second time after Nanako's unilateral relocation of the children to Seattle. Josh argued that Nanako violated the parenting plan's relocation provision that if she moved more than a 30-minute average drive time from his home in Bothell, she must give him 60 days' notice by personal service or by mail requiring a return receipt. Josh decided that it was in the best interests of the children not to try to force them to move again, so he accepted the relocation as a fait accompli but sought adjustments or modifications to the parenting plan.
¶ 3 In her prior appeal, Nanako challenged the trial court's determination that she moved more than a 30-minute drive from Josh's residence, thereby triggering the parenting plan relocation notice requirements. She argued that the trial court improperly modified the parenting plan [183 Wn.App. 509] and awarded sanctions. We remanded to the trial court for clarification of the evidence relied upon to determine whether Nanako moved more than a 30-minute drive time from Josh's residence. We also noted that the trial court should take care to comply with the 24-day-per-year modification limit of RCW 26.09.260(5) to the extent that statute applies to the outcome of the remand.
¶ 4 On remand, the trial judge, who had since retired but heard the case on a pro tem basis, entered a clarified order on relocation, a clarified parenting plan, and a clarified order granting motion for attorney fees/sanctions. In the clarified order on relocation, the trial court explained that it relied upon Josh's three recorded drive times and Nanako's expert's one drive time for an average of about 40 minutes. The trial court found that Nanako's relocation constituted a substantial change in circumstances and adjusted the parenting plan to give Josh an additional 24 full days of residential time. The trial court also adjusted the relocation provision in the parenting plan to require Nanako to give notice by personal service or mail requiring a return receipt if she moves outside of the children's current school attendance boundary. Finally, the trial court ordered Nanako to pay Josh sanctions of $10,500 due to her failure to follow the law and her intransigence.
¶ 5 Nanako appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 6 This court reviews trial court decisions dealing with the welfare of children for abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is " 'manifestly [183 Wn.App. 510] unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons.'" 
¶ 7 We will reverse a trial court's factual findings only if they are unsupported by substantial evidence. We review whether the trial court's conclusions of law flow from its findings de novo. Unchallenged factual findings are verities on appeal.
Rules of Appellate Procedure
¶ 8 As a preliminary matter, Josh argues that Nanako complied with RAP 10.3(g) and 10.4(c) only as to the findings that she moved outside the of the 30-minute drive time limit and that she was intransigent. He contends that we should not consider any other factual challenges. We do not identify any other factual challenges by Nanako.
¶ 9 Nanako argues Josh fails to support certain factual statements with citations to the record as required by RAP 10.3(a)(6). We detect no violation, but in any event, consider only ...