United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
CHARLES V. McCLAIN III, et ux, Pro se, Plaintiff,
THE BOEING COMPANY, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STAY AND APPOINT COUNSEL, AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR BAR ORDER
RICARDO S. MARTINEZ, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' renewed Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Dkt. # 45), Plaintiff's Motion for Stay and Court Appointed Counsel (Dkt. # 47) and Defendants' second Motion for Entry of Pre-filing Order (Dkt. # 53). For the reasons that follow, the Court will GRANT Defendants' motion to dismiss, DENY Plaintiff's motion to stay and appoint counsel, and DENY Defendants' motion requesting entry of a prefiling order.
Plaintiff Charles McClain III, proceeding pro se, is a former employee of Defendant the Boeing Company ("Boeing"). Mr. McClain was a member of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (the Defendant "Union") until his employment with Boeing was terminated on October 18, 2006. Mr. McClain filed the present suit in Snohomish County Superior Court on August 30, 2012, alleging a number of claims arising from his termination from Boeing and subsequent actions related to the negotiation of a Settlement and Release Agreement. Dkt. # 2. He asserts claims against Defendant Boeing, its law firm Perkins Coie LLP, the Union, its law firm Robblee Detwiler & Black PLLP, and individual attorney Kristina Detwiler. Dkt. # 29.
This case is the third iteration of Mr. McClain's claims against Boeing and the Union. On April 18, 2007, McClain filed suit for claims related to the Union's duty of fair representation and discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Dkt. # 45, Ex. B (C07-00567-RSM). This Court dismissed the federal claims on summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims raised in the complaint. See Dkt. # 45, Ex. C. McClain filed a Notice of Appeal and the Union cross-appealed to the Ninth Circuit (Nos. 08-35190 and 08-35903).
A Ninth Circuit panel issued a Memorandum disposing of McClain's appeal and the Union's cross-appeal. Dkt. # 45, Ex. D. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court's summary judgment dismissals, but vacated and remanded the case for the Court to consider "whether McClain's state law claims were completely preempted." Id. at 4. This case is referred to as "McClain 1."
Shortly after filing his appeal in McClain 1, McClain filed a second complaint in Snohomish County Superior Court ("McClain 2"). See Dkt. # 45, Exs. E-1, E-2 (C08-00613-RSM). That case was removed to this Court and was stayed indefinitely pending the appeal and cross-appeal of McClain 1. Following the Ninth Circuit's issuance of its Memorandum in McClain 1, McClain 2 was returned to active status.
The Court established a summary judgment briefing schedule and Defendants filed three motions. During the pendency of the briefing schedule, McClain filed a motion "to enforce settlement and release agreement." That motion was denied on May 7, 2012. Dkt. # 45, Ex. F.
The Court granted Defendants' summary judgment motions and dismissed as preempted all of McClain's asserted state law claims: infliction of emotional distress, collusion, retaliation, disparate treatment, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Dkt. # 45, Ex. G. Judgment was then entered in favor of Defendants. In McClain 2, the Court also entered judgment in favor of Defendants. See Dkt. # 45, Exs. H and I.
McClain appealed both McClain 1 and 2 to the Ninth Circuit, and the two cases were consolidated on appeal. Dkt. # 45, Ex. J.
Now before the Court is McClain 3. Defendants timely removed the action to this Court on September 19, 2012, on the basis that Plaintiff's Amended State Court Complaint raised federal claims. Dkt. # 1, p. 2. On July 22, 2013, the Court ruled on several motions presented by the parties. In that Order, the Court denied Mr. McClain's motion for remand and invited Defendants to file a new motion to dismiss to address the claims presented in McClain's Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") (Dkt. # 29). The Court also denied Defendants' motion seeking entry of a pre-filing order. Dkt. # 43.
As directed, Defendants filed a renewed motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). They contend that (1) nine of the ten Counts asserted in the SAC are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, res judicata, or collateral estoppel, and that (2) Count VII is not actionable and subject to dismissal. McClain filed a motion seeking a stay and requesting court appointed counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). ...