United States District Court, E.D. Washington
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FRED VAN SICKLE, Senior District Judge.
BEFORE THE COURT are cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Ct. Rec. 15, 17.) Attorney D. James Tree represents plaintiff; Special Assistant United States Attorney Leisa A. Wolf represents defendant. After reviewing the administrative record and briefs filed by the parties, the court GRANTS plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff Anatoliy Doroschchuk (plaintiff) protectively filed for supplemental security income (SSI) and disability income benefits (DIB) on July 10, 2007. (Tr. 53, 126, 133, 168.) Plaintiff initially alleged an onset date of December 30, 2004, but later amended the alleged onset date to June 1, 2006. (Tr. 12, 126, 133, 602, 656-57.) Benefits were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 66, 74, 79.) Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which was held before ALJ Jean R. Kerins on April 27, 2010. (Tr. 11-45.) After an unfavorable decision (Tr. 53-61), plaintiff appealed to district court and the case was remanded. (Tr. 690-93, 699-700.) A second hearing was held on November 15, 2012 before ALJ James W. Sherry. (Tr. 652-89.) Plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified at the hearing. (Tr. 660-680.) Medical expert Donna Veraldi, Ph.D., and vocational expert Jinnie Lawson also testified. (Tr. 658-60, 681-87.) The ALJ again denied benefits (Tr. 602-13) and the Appeals Council denied review. (Tr. 1.) The matter is now before this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of the case are set forth in the administrative hearing transcripts, the ALJ's decision, and the briefs of plaintiff and the Commissioner, and will therefore only be summarized here.
Plaintiff was 50 years old at the time of the second hearing. (Tr. 660.) He graduated from high school and attended some college. (Tr. 662.) He has work experience as a bricklayer, an assistant at Goodwill, and handyman. (Tr. 664.) He testified he stopped working because his doctor told him he needed light work and his employer did not have that kind of work. (Tr. 668.) He has pain in his back, hips, legs, shoulders, and neck. (Tr. 669.) He testified he has used a cane for many years. (Tr. 670.) He needs to lie down four to five times per day for 30 minutes at a time. (Tr. 671.) Two or three days per week he spends a lot more time lying down or in bed. (Tr. 674.) He was diagnosed with fibromyalgia. (Tr. 671.) He also has carpal tunnel syndrome in both hands. (Tr. 671.) His hands get numb and tingly. (Tr. 672.) He gets headaches when he reads. (Tr. 673.) He cannot concentrate. (Tr. 673.) He has pain everywhere but the worst pain is in his shoulders, hips, legs, arms and neck. (Tr. 675.) He has low energy. (Tr. 676.) He has also been diagnosed with left shoulder impingement which causes pain in the shoulder. (Tr. 677-78.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A Court must uphold the Commissioner's decision, made through an ALJ, when the determination is not based on legal error and is supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). "The [Commissioner's] determination that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence." Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-602 (9th Cir. 1989); Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence "means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations omitted). "[S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence" will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On review, the Court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the decision of the Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1980)).
It is the role of the trier of fact, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. Sec'y of Health and Human Serv., 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987).
The Social Security Act (the "Act") defines "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (d)(1)(A), 1382c (a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a plaintiff shall be determined to be under a disability only if his impairments are of such severity that plaintiff is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering plaintiff's age, education and work experiences, engage in any other substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability consists of both medical and vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step one determines if he or she is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activities, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I).
If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activities, the decision maker proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied.
If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step, which compares the claimant's impairment with a number of listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P App. 1. If the impairment meets or ...