United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY ALICE THEILER, Chief Magistrate Judge.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY CONCLUSION
Petitioner is a state prisoner who is currently confined at the Stafford Creek Corrections Center in Aberdeen, Washington. He seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 from a 2012 Snohomish County Superior Court judgment and sentence. Respondent filed a timely answer to petitioner's federal habeas petition and submitted relevant portions of the state court record for the Court's review. Petitioner filed a response to respondent's answer. Petitioner has also filed a number of other motions which are pending at this time. This Court, having carefully reviewed the petition, the briefs of the parties, the state court record, all of petitioner's pending motions, and the balance of the record, concludes that petitioner's federal habeas petition should be dismissed with prejudice and all of petitioners pending motions should be stricken as moot.
On March 19, 2012, petitioner pled guilty in Snohomish County Superior Court to charges of child molestation in the first degree, rape of a child in the third degree, and communication with a minor for immoral purposes via electronic communication. ( See Dkt. 28, Exs. 2, 3.) Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.
In August 2012, petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in Snohomish County Superior Court. ( Id., Ex. 4.) Petitioner identified the following "claims" in his motion: (1) oppressive confinement; (2) ineffective counsel; (3) denial of civil rights under color of law; (4) government misconduct; (5) malicious prosecution; (6) abuse of warrants; and, (7) excessive sentencing. ( See id., Ex. 4 at 2-3.) In December 2012, the motion was transferred to the Court of Appeals for consideration as a personal restraint petition. ( See id., Ex. 5.) Petitioner appealed the Superior Court's order transferring his motion to the Court of Appeals for consideration as a personal restraint petition. ( See id. ) The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's objection to the transfer and dismissed both the appeal and the personal restraint petition. ( Id., Ex. 7.)
Petitioner next filed a motion for discretionary review in the Washington Supreme Court. ( Id., Ex. 8.) Petitioner identified the following issues for review in his motion to the Supreme Court:
(1) All four of these terms are met in my case, but I am not an eloquent attorney, nor capable of expressing clearly my meaning. I need a lawyer, to have legal representation is a constitutional right. The rest of the terms of dismissal are grossly overstated & wrong. Evidence was presented. The courts chose to ignore it.
(2) Restating endlessly that "Donald Lee pleaded guilty" is a nonsensical argument in a case requesting a reversal of that plea. In no instance did the court or prosecution reject this claim. The facts aren't denied by the state, thus I hold that the statements I made be accepted as undisputed.
(3) The court refused to communicate, to grant indigency, and to allow an attorney in a case involving a life sentence. There can be no more clear need for representation than in such cases.
(Dkt. 28, Ex. 8 at 2-3.)
Petitioner also provided the following statement of his case:
As claimed in my appeal and CrR 7.8 motions, affidavits, and subsequent motions; to include the fact that Trueblood clearly failed to represent her client when she substituted an amended plea to the court without her clients (Mr. Lee) knowledge, instructing him to sign it without reading it while before the judge and while being (illegible).
Requests for evidence, records, and statements have been ignored or denied. I cannot afford to "repurchase" my discovery that Trueblood holds/held.
Trueblood has failed to appeal, to send any documents, or to enable my case in any way.
( Id., Ex. 8 at 3.)
Petitioner offered the following argument as to why review should be accepted:
The district one court abused its discretion, and sidestepped many notable instances of law and of procedure to issue a bald denial "et al".
Such a blanket dismissal indicates a refusal to consider the merits, and prejudice of the court.
Appeals refused to consider indigency, counsel, abuse of discretion in 7.8 to PRP conversion, records requests, urgency, and all other facts unrelated to the validity of the CrR 7.8.
( Id., Ex. 8 at 4.) Petitioner submitted an Affidavit of Facts to the Washington Supreme Court in conjunction with his motion for discretionary review in which he detailed his complaints about his attorney and denied having committed the crimes with which he was charged. (Dkt. 28, Ex. 8 at 6-8.)
Petitioner next submitted an "answer" to the Supreme Court which was initially rejected for filing but which was subsequently added to petitioner's motion for discretionary review. ( Id., Ex. 8 at 16-47.) Petitioner's answer, which was not a model of clarity, appeared to challenge various portions of the Court of Appeals' order dismissing his personal restraint petition and his consolidated appeal, to respond to arguments made by the state in its motion to transfer petitioner's motion for relief from judgment to the Court of Appeals, and to argue that the state was in "default" because it failed to adequately examine the merits of his claims. ( Id., Ex. 8 at 21-29.) Petitioner also submitted a "brief" which was apparently accepted by the Supreme Court for filing. ( Id., Ex. 9.) In that brief, petitioner asserted his innocence of the charges to which he pled guilty and attributed his decision to plead guilty to misrepresentations made by his attorney. ( Id. )
On December 5, 2013, the acting commissioner of the Washington Supreme Court issued a ruling denying petitioner's motion for discretionary review. ( Id., Ex. 10.) On April 2, 2014, the Washington Supreme Court denied a motion by petitioner to extend time to file a motion to modify the commissioner's ruling. ( Id., Ex. 11.) Petitioner now seeks federal habeas review of his convictions.
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
Petitioner identifies 42 grounds for relief in his ...