United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JOHN C. COUGHENOUR, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's unopposed motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 15) and supporting documents (Dkt. No 16). Having thoroughly considered the briefing and the balance of the record, the Court finds oral argument unnecessary and hereby GRANTS the motion for the reasons explained herein.
On or around July 10, 2011, a girl, A.W., fell from Defendant Joseph Garrett's horse and was hurt. Dkt. No. 15, pp. 1-3. Though the horse-named Taz-was Garrett's, the injury occurred on the property of Garrett's girlfriend, Monika Glover. Id. Garrett was not insured, but Glover and her ex-husband, Mark Glover, had both a homeowner's policy and a manufactured home policy through Plaintiff State Farm. Id. A.W.'s mother, Sylvia Weber, sued Garrett and Glover in Snohomish County Superior Court for her daughter's damages. Id. Plaintiff State Farm extended a "reservation of rights defense" to Garrett out of "an abundance of caution." Id. at 2.
In the above-captioned matter, Plaintiff State Farm seeks a declaratory judgment to relieve it of its defense and indemnity of Garrett in the Snohomish County suit. Here, State Farm seeks summary judgment on the grounds that Garrett is not "insured" for the purpose of its policy with Monika Glover. Monika Glover is not a party to this action. This Court has already entered default judgment against Garrett. Dkt. No. 14. Garrett did not respond to or oppose State Farm's motion for summary judgment.
A. Standard of Review
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the case's outcome. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. at 49. At the summary-judgment stage, evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-movant's favor. See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2011).
Interpretation of an insurance contract is an appropriate legal question to be resolved on summary judgment. Quadrant Corp v. Am. States Ins. Co., 154 Wash.2d 165, 171 (2005). In interpreting the insurance contract, courts are to consider the entire policy and apply a "fair, reasonable, and sensible construction as would be given by the average person purchasing insurance." Overton v. Consolidated Ins. Co., 145 Wash.2d 417, 427-428 (2002). Courts are bound by the definitions provided in an insurance contract. Id.
Under Washington law, an insurance company's duty to defend only exists where allegations may impose liability on an insured person. Truck Ins. Co. v. VanPort Homes, Inc., 147 Wash.2d 751, 760 (2002). The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. Id. Though courts liberally interpret an insurance company's duty to defend when reading allegations, someone who is not "insured" under an insurance policy is not entitled either to a defense or to indemnity under the policy. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Leahy, 774 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1111 (W.D. Wa. 2011).
Even drawing all reasonable inferences in Defendants' favor, Garrett does not meet the definition of an "insured" under the Glovers' policy. As such, Plaintiff State Farm has no legal duty to defend or indemnify him, and summary judgment is appropriate.
B. Joseph Garrett was Not Insured
Both State Farm policies held by the Glovers contain identical definitions of "insured." Dkt. No. 15, p. 9. The State ...