United States District Court, E.D. Washington
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FRED VAN SICKLE, Senior District Judge.
BEFORE THE COURT are cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Ct. Rec. 16, 21.) Attorney D. James Tree represents plaintiff; Special Assistant United States Attorney Franco Becia represents defendant. After reviewing the administrative record and briefs filed by the parties, the court GRANTS defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff Lorena Estrada protectively filed for supplemental security income (SSI) on behalf of J.E., a minor (plaintiff), on December 17, 2007. (Tr. 189.) Plaintiff alleged an onset date of November 27, 2007. (Tr. 129.) Benefits were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 62, 68, 76.) Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which was held before ALJ R.S. Chester on October 23, 2009. (Tr. 37-58.) ALJ Chester denied benefits (Tr. 21-36) and the Appeals Council denied review. (Tr. 1.) Plaintiff filed a claim in U.S. District Court and the matter was remanded for further review. (Tr. 304-21.) A second hearing was held before ALJ Ruperta M. Alexis on May 7, 2013. (Tr. 348-78.) Plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified at the hearing. (Tr. 370-74.) Plaintiff's mother also testified. (Tr. 350-68.) ALJ Alexis denied benefits (Tr. 278-94) and the matter is again before the court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of the case are set forth in the administrative hearing transcripts, the ALJ's decision, and the briefs of plaintiff and the Commissioner, and will therefore only be summarized here.
Plaintiff was 13 years old and in in seventh grade at the time of the second hearing. (Tr. 350, 370.) According to his mother, he has missed a lot of school due to colds and in-house suspensions. (Tr. 352.) He has been suspended because of his behavior. (Tr. 352.) He has also received lunch detention and Friday school. (Tr. 352.) Plaintiff's mother said he gets detention because he will not pay attention and refuses to do what is asked. (Tr. 353.) He is constantly reminded to get on task. (Tr. 353.) He gets in trouble at school because he talks back to the teacher and is defiant. (Tr. 353.) His mother testified plaintiff has trouble focusing and everything distracts him. (Tr. 354.) It has been recommended that plaintiff get therapy but insurance does not cover therapy. (Tr. 357.) His sleep has improved since he has been taking medication. (Tr. 359-60.) According to his mother, plaintiff is "in his own world" a lot of the time. (Tr. 361.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A Court must uphold the Commissioner's decision, made through an ALJ, when the determination is not based on legal error and is supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). "The [Commissioner's] determination that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence." Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-602 (9th Cir. 1989); Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence "means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations omitted). "[S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence" will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On review, the Court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the decision of the Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1980)).
It is the role of the trier of fact, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson , 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. Sec'y of Health and Human Serv., 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987).
On August 22, 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 105 which amended 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3). Under this law, a child under the age of eighteen is considered disabled for the purposes of SSI benefits if "that individual has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382(c(a)(3)(C)(i)(2003).
The regulations provide a three-step process to determine whether a child is disabled. First, the ALJ must determine whether the child is engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b). If the child is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the analysis proceeds to step two. Step two requires the ALJ to determine whether the child's impairment or combination of impairments is severe. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c). The child will not be found to have a severe impairment if it constitutes a "slight abnormality or combination of slight abnormalities that cause no more than minimal functional limitations." Id. If, however, there is a finding of severe impairment, the analysis proceeds to the final step, which requires the ALJ to determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments "meet, medically equal or functionally equal" the severity of a set of criteria for an impairment in the listings. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d).
The regulations provide that an impairment will be found to be functionally equivalent to a listed impairment if it results in extreme limitations in one area of functioning or marked limitations in two areas of functioning. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a). To determine functional equivalence, the following six broad areas of functioning, or domains, are considered: acquiring and using information, attending and completing tasks, interacting and relating with others, moving about and manipulating objects, caring for self, and health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a.
At step one of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity since December 17, 2007, the application date. (Tr. 281.) At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff had the following severe impairments: attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and behavioral problems. (Tr. 281.) At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (Tr. 281.) The ALJ then determined plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that functionally equals a listing. ...