United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RICARDO S. MARTINEZ, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Dkts. #18 and #27. Defendant, Capital One, N.A. ("CONA") argues that Plaintiff's claims, which arise under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA") and its implementing Regulation X, must be dismissed because RESPA does not apply to the mortgage at issue in this matter. Dkt. #18. Plaintiff argues that Regulation X conflicts with the statutory language of RESPA, and therefore does not preclude the claims. Dkt. #27. Having reviewed the record before it, and for the reasons discussed herein, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff, DENIES her Motion for Summary Judgment, and GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
This matter stems from a mortgage loan made to Plaintiff by Defendant. Defendant has set forth the factual background in its brief, which Plaintiff does not dispute. See Dkts. #18 at 2-3 and #24 at 3. According to Defendant, on June 14, 2006, Candice Warren purchased over 36 acres of land from Martin and Betty Addicott under a real estate contract. See Dkts. #1-2 at ¶ 6 and #19 at ¶ ¶ 2, 4, and 5 and Ex. A. The property purchased from the Addicotts ("Subject Property") consisted of two parcels, Parcel 125919 and Parcel 47581. Ms. Warren subsequently adjusted the lot lines of these two parcels to increase the size of Parcel 47581 and decrease the size of Parcel 125919. According to the Skagit County Assessor's Office, Parcel 125919 is currently about 31 acres in size. Dkt. #19 at ¶ 5 and Ex. D.
In May 2007, Ms. Warren obtained a loan of $2, 475, 000 from B.F. Saul Mortgage Company ("Loan"). Dkt. #1-2 at ¶ 7. The Loan was secured by a Deed of Trust on the Subject Property. Dkt. #19 at ¶ 6 and Ex. E. Ms. Warren used about $1, 076, 700 of the Loan proceeds to pay off her real estate contract with the Addicotts, which was due by June 15, 2007. Dkts. #1-2 at ¶ 7 and #19 at ¶ 3. Through August 2009, Ms. Warren used most of the remaining Loan proceeds to make improvements to the log house on the Subject Property and to construct certain equestrian improvements including a barn and paddock. Dkt. #1-2 at ¶ ¶ 7 and 12.
The Loan was initially serviced by Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., the parent entity of B.F. Saul Mortgage. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. ("Chevy Chase") was merged into CONA effective July 30, 2009. Dkt. #19 at ¶ 7 and Ex. F. Ms. Warren was notified of Capital One's acquisition of Chevy Chase through a Notice of Transfer of Servicing Rights. Dkt. #19 at ¶ 8 and Ex. G.
The Notice advised Ms. Warren that the servicer of her mortgage loan was changing to CONA. Ms. Warren made payments on the Loan through July 9, 2012. Dkt. #1-2 at Ex. B.
Shortly after making her last mortgage payment, Ms. Warren applied for a loan modification with CONA but it was not approved. Dkt. #19 at ¶ ¶ 9-10 and Exs. H and I. In January 2013, a Notice of Default was given to Ms. Warren, but the non-judicial foreclosure on the Subject Property did not progress further. Dkt. #19 at ¶ 11 and Ex. J.
On or about November 13, 2012, Ms. Warren sent CONA a letter identified as a Qualified Written Request ("QWR"). Dkt. #1-2, Ex. C. The letter was received by an employee of a third-party vendor for CONA but, apparently, an appropriate task was not entered into CONA's workflow system, so CONA never responded to the letter. Dkt. #19 at ¶ 12. On August 1, 2013 and October 25, 2013, Ms. Warren's counsel, James Sturdevant, sent letters or documents to CONA which were also identified as QWRs pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 2605. Dkt. #1-2, Exs. D and F. CONA responded to these letters but Plaintiff alleges that the responses are deficient and do not comply with CONA's obligations under RESPA.
In 2014, Ms. Warren offered to pay off her Loan with $1 million in cash, but CONA declined the offer. Dkt. #19 at ¶ 13 and Ex. K. The instant action followed.
A. Legal Standard on Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). In ruling on summary judgment, a court does not weigh evidence to determine the truth of the matter, but "only determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Crane v. Conoco, Inc., 41 F.3d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1994) ( citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992)). Material facts are those which might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson, ...