United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
WAYNE R. LAKE, et al., Plaintiffs,
MTC FINANCIAL, INC., et al., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE
L. ROBART United States District Judge
the court is Plaintiffs Wayne R. Lake and Cynthia A.
Lake's (collectively “the Lakes”)
“motion to strike” Defendant's appearance and
motion to dismiss. (Mot. (Dkt. # 13).) Defendant Deutsche
Bank Trust Company Americas as Trustee for the Certificate
Holders of Dover Mortgage Holder Capital 2005-A Corporation
Grantor Trust Certificate, Series 2005-A (hereinafter
“Deutsche Bank”) opposes the Lakes' motion.
(Resp. (Dkt. # 14).) The court has considered the motion, the
submissions filed in support thereof and opposition thereto,
the relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law.
Being fully advised,  the court DENIES the Lakes' motion to
case arises out of a planned foreclosure of the Lakes'
home. (Compl. (Dkt. # 1) at 2.) On October 11, 2002, the
Lakes signed a deed of trust for $145, 000.00, which was
recorded against the Lakes' residence in Lake Forest
Park, Washington. (Id.)
September 20, 2016, the Lakes filed a complaint in which they
allege, in part, that Deutsche Bank violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et
seq., and breached a contract with the Lakes.
(Id. at 7, 13, 15.) On October 12, 2016, Daniel
Gibbons and Steven Dixson filed a notice of appearance as
lead attorneys on behalf of Deutsche Bank. (Not. of App.
(Dkt. # 7) at 1-2.) On November 14, 2016, Deutsche Bank filed
a motion to dismiss the Lakes' complaint against Deutsche
Bank. (MTD (Dkt. # 8).) The Lakes did not respond to the
motion to dismiss (see generally Dkt.), and on
December 19, 2016, Deutsche Bank filed a reply memorandum in
support of its motion (Reply (Dkt. # 12)).
January 10, 2017, after Deutsche Bank filed its reply, the
Lakes moved to strike the appearance of Mr. Gibbons and
Deutsche Bank's motion to dismiss. (See Mot.)
The Lakes contend that Deutsche Bank does not exist and thus
cannot move to dismiss. (Mot. at 1-2.) On January 23, 2017,
Deutsche Bank responded to the Lakes' motion. (Resp.) The
Lakes did not file a reply memorandum. (See
not a model of clarity, the Lakes' motion to strike
appears to argue that the Office of the Washington Secretary
of State confirms that Deutsche Bank does not exist. (Mot. at
1.) In support of their motion, the Lakes attach a memorandum
from the Office of the Washington Secretary of State:
Corporations and Charities Division. (Id. at
In relevant part, the memorandum states that “Deutsche
Bank Trust Company Americas is not registered with [the
Washington Secretary of State's] office.”
(Id.) The Lakes also contend that there are
“no records anywhere, within any known system of
records . . . establishing that [Deutsche Bank]
exists.” (Id. at 1.) Further, based on the
argument that Deutsche Bank does not exist, the Lakes contend
that Mr. Gibbons' appearance in this suit is “false
and deceptive” and that he was “not retained or
requested” by Deutsche Bank. (Id. at 1-2.)
Finally, the Lakes state that Deutsche Bank is “not a
national association and not permitted to appear in this
forum under any rule.” (Id. at 2.) The Lakes
cite no legal authority to support their contentions.
(See generally Mot.)
Bank responds that it is a named defendant in this lawsuit.
(Resp. at 2.) Because the Lakes brought claims against it,
Deutsche Back argues that it has the right to respond to the
claims. (Id.) Further, Deutsche Bank notes that if
the Lakes' motion was accepted by the court, the
appropriate remedy would be for the court to dismiss the
charges against Deutsche Bank. (Id.) Nevertheless,
Deutsche Bank argues that the court has personal jurisdiction
over it and that it has the capacity to be sued.
(Id. at 2-4.)
core, personal jurisdiction represents the right of a court
to exercise judicial power over a party. Dow Chem. Co. v.
Calderon, 422 F.3d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 2005). In order to
adjudicate a suit, a court must have personal jurisdiction
over the defendants. Id. The court's adherence
to the limitations of personal jurisdiction ensures that
“the maintenance of the suit . . . [does] not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'” Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d
1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 915, 193
L.Ed.2d 793 (2016) (quoting Int'l Shoe v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). There are a
variety of ways a court can establish personal jurisdiction
over a party, and the defendant's consent is the most
relevant to the motion at hand. Dow Chem., 422 F.3d
at 831. “[B]ecause the personal jurisdiction
requirement is a waivable right, ” the litigant can
give “express or implied consent to the personal
jurisdiction of the court.” Id. (quoting
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 703 (1982)).
by filing a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) motion
(see MTD) and not raising a defense under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), Deutsche Bank has waived
the right to object to personal jurisdiction. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g), (h). Further, Deutsche Bank has
affirmatively acknowledged that it does not object to the
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over it. (Resp.
at 3.) Thus, the court has personal jurisdiction over