United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ROMERO HEAD, as the court-appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of ROMEO A. HEAD, Plaintiff,
v.
DISTTECH, LLC, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS
RICARDO S. MARTINEZ CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
This
matter comes before the Court upon Defendants DistTech LLC
(“DistTech”) and Jacques Wright's
(collectively “Defendants”) motion for judgment
on the pleadings. Dkt. #21. Mr. Wright, a commercial truck
driver for Defendant DistTech, is allegedly liable for the
wrongful death of Romeo A. Head. Plaintiff Romero Head,
acting as the court-appointed Personal Representative of the
Estate of Romeo A. Head, brought this claim, and asserts a
cause of action for negligence against Mr. Wright, and a
cause of action for negligent hiring, retention, entrustment,
training, and supervision against Defendant DistTech. Because
it is undisputed that Mr. Wright was acting within the scope
of his employment at the time of Romeo's death,
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's negligent hiring,
retention, entrustment, training, and supervision against
Defendant DistTech are redundant and warrant dismissal. For
the reasons stated herein, the Court agrees with Defendants
and GRANTS their motion for judgment on the pleadings.
II.
BACKGROUND
On
February 9, 2014, Romeo Head was allegedly struck, knocked
down, and run over by Mr. Wright's semi-truck and
trailer. Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 3.8, 3.16. Before he was
struck, Romeo, an independent interstate commercial driver,
had just arrived at Ken's Truck Town truck stop. See
id. ¶¶ 3.6-3.17. Romeo was allegedly helping
another truck driver park her truck when Mr. Wright, an
employee of DistTech LLC, drove into Ken's Truck Town.
Id. ¶ 3.20. Mr. Wright allegedly entered and
drove through the truck stop's parking lot “in a
manner and at a speed that was careless and unsafe, ”
and his rear wheels struck and ran over Romeo. Id.
¶ 3.15-3.17. Although the rear wheels of Mr.
Wright's trailer allegedly “bounced, ” Mr.
Wright did not stop his truck, and he proceeded to the truck
stop's fueling station. Id. ¶¶
3.17-3.18. Mr. Wright was inside the truck stop's store
when he was approached by law enforcement. Id.
¶¶ 3.19. Mr. Wright denied knowing his trailer
struck and ran over Romeo. Id. ¶ 3.23.
Romeo's injuries were fatal. Id. ¶¶
3.16, 3.18.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
As long
as trial is not delayed, parties can move for judgment on the
pleadings after the pleadings are closed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).
Rule 12(c) motions challenge “the legal sufficiency of
the opposing party's pleadings.” Perez v. Wells
Fargo and Co., 75 F.Supp.3d 1184, 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(internal quotes and citation omitted). If the moving party
can establish, on the face of the pleadings, that no material
issue of fact remains unresolved and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, a judgment on the pleadings is
proper. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and
Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). The
pleaded facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Perez, 75 F.Supp.3d at 1187
(citing Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d
1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1992)).
The
same standard for granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion applies to
a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See
Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192
(9th Cir. 1989). To survive dismissal, complaints “must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face[.]'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial plausibility can be established
if a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. If it
appears “beyond doubt” that a plaintiff cannot
prove a set of facts that would entitle her to relief, the
plaintiff's claim will be dismissed. SmileCare Dental
Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 88 F.3d 780, 782-83
(9th Cir. 1996).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Defendants
contend Plaintiff's negligence claims against Defendant
DistTech warrant dismissal because they allege no cognizable
theory of recovery. To support this argument, Defendants
argue that when an employer admits that its employee was
acting within the scope and course of its employment
vicarious liability, not negligence, is the proper avenue for
plaintiffs to recover from employers. See Dkts. #21
at 4-5 (citing LaPlant v. Snohomish Cty., 271 P.3d
254, 256 (Wash.Ct.App. 2011)), and #24 at 1-2. Because
Defendant DistTech admits that Mr. Wright was acting within
the scope of his employment when Romeo was killed, Defendants
argue that Plaintiff's claims for negligent hiring,
retention, entrustment, training, and supervision fail as a
matter of law. Dkt. #21 at 5-6. Defendants thus argue that
Plaintiff's negligence claims against DistTech are
redundant because “they are unnecessary for Plaintiff
to recover its damages from DistTech.” Id. at
5.
In
response, Plaintiff contends that its negligence claim
against Defendant DistTech is proper because duties imposed
by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
regulations create an independent basis upon which Plaintiff
can assert these claims. Dkt. #22 at 3-6. Regarding the risk
of redundancy posed by his negligence claims against
Defendant DistTech, Plaintiff proposes the use of a limited
jury instruction to “instruct the jury not to make a
duplicative award if it finds both the driver and the
employer were negligent in causing the same harm.”
Id. at 5-6. However, if Defendants' motion is
granted, Plaintiff asks the Court not to strike paragraphs
5.1 through 5.6 of the dismissed claims because these
paragraphs “merely set forth facts and assertions which
do not include causes of action or claims of
negligence.”[1]
The
Court agrees that Plaintiff's negligent hiring,
retention, entrustment, training, and supervision claims
against Defendant DistTech allege no cognizable legal theory
of recovery. In Washington State, causes of action for
negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision arise
when employees act outside the scope of their employment.
E.g., Evans v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10,
380 P.3d 553, 564 (Wash.Ct.App. 2016) (citing Niece v.
Elmview Grp. Home, 929 P.2d 420, 427 (Wash. 1997));
also Davis v. Clark Cty., Wash., 966 F.Supp.2d 1106,
1144-45 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (affirming Order holding plaintiffs
must show defendants acted outside scope of employment to
maintain claim against county regarding an independent duty
to properly train and supervise its employees) (citing
LaPlant v. Snohomish Cty., 271 P.3d 254
(Wash.Ct.App. 2011)). Consequently, if an employer admits
that its employee was acting within the scope of employment,
a plaintiff can recover based on vicarious liability, and
claims for negligent hiring, retention, entrustment,
supervision, and training are rendered improper.
LaPlant, 271 P.3d at 256-57. This outcome is
appropriate where a cause of action for vicarious liability
and causes of action for negligent hiring, retention,
supervision, and training rest on the determination that an
employee's negligence was the proximate cause of a
plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 257. If a plaintiff
fails to establish the employee's negligence, the
employer cannot be liable, even if the employer was negligent
in training and supervising its employee. Id. Given
the alleged facts, the Court agrees that Plaintiff's
negligent hiring, retention, entrustment, supervision, and
training cause of action is redundant and warrants dismissal.
Here,
Plaintiff has alleged, and Defendant DistTech has admitted,
that Mr. Wright was acting within the scope of his employment
when his trailer struck Romeo. Consequently, if Plaintiff can
establish Mr. Wright's negligence, Defendant DistTech
will also be liable. However, if allowed to proceed,
Plaintiff's claims against Defendant DistTech are
redundant because those claims, like Plaintiff's
negligence claim against Mr. Wright, rest on the
determination that Mr. Wright was negligent, and that this
negligence was the proximate cause of Romeo's death. In
other words, if Plaintiff cannot establish Mr. Wright's
negligence, Defendant DistTech cannot be held liable.
Plaintiff's
arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. Instead of
explaining why Plaintiffs should be allowed to raise mutually
exclusive causes of action, Plaintiff spends several pages
explaining the duties imposed on interstate commercial
carriers like Defendant DistTech. See Dkt. #22 at
3-5. Citation to the regulations imposed on Defendant
DistTech does not explain why Plaintiff should be allowed to
proceed with his negligence claims against Defendant
DistTech, and the Court is equally unpersuaded that the
redundancy caused by Plaintiff's causes of action can be
cured with a jury instruction. Accordingly, because
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