United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
C. COUGHENOUR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on Defendants' motion to
quash subpoena (Dkt. No. 10) and motion to stay discovery
(Dkt. No. 24). Having thoroughly considered the parties'
briefing and the relevant record, the Court finds oral
argument unnecessary and hereby GRANTS the motions for the
reasons explained herein.
Kirk Williams alleges that Defendant King County Detective
Cynthia Sampson forced him to provide a DNA sample pursuant
to a court order that she altered. (Dkt. No. 4 at 2.)
Williams argues that this violated the Fourth Amendment; the
Fourteenth Amendment; article I, section 7 of the Washington
Constitution; and Washington Criminal Rule 4.7. (Id.
January 31, 2017, Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds
of statute of limitations and improper service. (Dkt. No. 5.)
Defendants further moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Williams's claims are barred by Heck v.
Humphrey; that Defendant Shoreline Police
Department is an entity incapable of suit; and that qualified
immunity applies. (Dkt. No. 11.)
February 13, 2017, Williams subpoenaed King County Superior
Court Judge Sharon Armstrong for documents relating to
“the written request to change the order date of motion
for DNA testing who changed the date and I would also want to
know was Hon. Sharon Armstrong the neutral and detached
magistrate judge.” (Dkt. No. 7 at 2.) On March 17,
2017, Williams moved to compel discovery. (Dkt. No. 22.)
Williams has not served Defendants with any discovery
requests thus far. (Dkt. No. 24 at 2.)
now seek to quash the subpoena and to stay discovery pending
the outcome of the dispositive motions. (Dkt. Nos. 10, 24.)
Motion to Quash
argue that the subpoena should be quashed because (1) it does
not comport with the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 45 and (2)
it is not the proper method by which to request discovery
from an opposing party. (Dkt. No. 10 at 1.)
Rule 45's requirements, Defendants note that the subpoena
fails to “set out the text of Rule 45(d) and (e)”
as required by Rule 45(a)(1)(A)(iv) and does not allow a
“reasonable time to comply” as required by Rule
45(d)(3)(A)(i). (Dkt. No. 10 at 2-3.) Williams responds that
these are mere technicalities that he can remedy. (Dkt. No.
17 at 2.) He submitted an amended subpoena along with his
response. (Id. at 4-11.)
of whether Williams cured the defects in his subpoena, it
would still be inappropriate to issue it. First, Williams has
not served Defendants with any discovery requests, which
would be the appropriate way to obtain this information.
See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 26; Fed.R.Civ.P. 34.
Moreover, Defendants indicate that they have produced the
information Williams sought, thus mooting his request. (Dkt.
No. 20 at 1-2.) The motion to quash (Dkt. No. 10) is GRANTED.
Motion to Stay
ask the Court to stay discovery until it has resolved the
pending motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 5) and motion for summary
judgment (Dkt. No. 11). (Dkt. No. 24 at 1.) Defendants argue
that the issues of jurisdiction and immunity raised in their
dispositive motions warrant a stay. (Dkt. No. 24 at 3)
(citing Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins. of
Wausau, 124 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Nev. 1989) (“[A]
pending Motion to Dismiss is not ordinarily a situation that
in and of itself would warrant a stay ...