United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma
ALEXANDER M. AND AMY N. SOUSIE, Plaintiff,
ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND FOR
MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT LEAVE TO
BENJAMIN H. SETTLE United States District Judge
matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Alexander and Amy
Sousie's (“Sousies”) motion for partial
summary judgment and for more definite statement (Dkt. 9).
The Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of
and in opposition to the motion and the remainder of the file
and hereby grants in part and denies in part the motion for
the reasons stated herein.
January 4, 2017, the Sousies served the Washington Insurance
Commissioner with a complaint against Defendant and foreign
insurer Allstate Indemnity Company (“Allstate”).
Dkt. 1-1. The Sousies assert a cause of action for breach of
their insurance agreement and a violation of Washington's
Insurance Fair Conduct Act. Id.
February 1, 2017, Allstate removed the matter to this Court.
February 17, 2017, Allstate answered the complaint and
asserted the affirmative defense that the Sousies'
damages are not covered under the policy of insurance because
of misrepresentation, concealmend, and lack of ownership.
March 2, 2017, the Sousies moved for summary judgment and for
a more definite statement. Dkt. 9. On March 20, 2017,
Allstate responded. Dkt. 13. On March 24, 2017, the Sousies
replied. Dkt. 16.
Sousies move for partial summary judgment on jurisdiction,
venue, all defenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b), the issuance and contents of the insurance policy,
facts relating to the theft of personal property, and certain
other affirmative defenses. Dkt. 9 at 6-10.
judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the
case on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record,
taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)
(nonmoving party must present specific, significant probative
evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt”).
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conversely, a
genuine dispute over a material fact exists if there is
sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute,
requiring a judge or jury to resolve the differing versions
of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac.
Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.
determination of the existence of a material fact is often a
close question. The Court must consider the substantive
evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must meet at
trial - e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil
cases. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; T.W. Elec.
Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. The Court must resolve any
factual issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party
only when the facts specifically attested by that party
contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party.
The nonmoving party may not merely state that it will
discredit the moving party's evidence at trial, in the
hopes that evidence can be developed at trial to support the
claim. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630
(relying on Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Conclusory,
nonspecific statements in affidavits are not sufficient, and
missing facts will not be presumed. Lujan v. Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990).