United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
RICARDO S. MARTINEZ CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Rebecca
Alexander's Motion for Reconsideration. Dkt. #22.
Plaintiff moves the Court to “reconsider its order
granting plaintiff's motion for remand (Dkt 21) to the
extent this Court Order holds that remanding this
case… moots Alexander's request for sanctions
against [Defendants].” Id. at 1.
case was removed on April 26, 2017. Dkt. #1. Plaintiff filed
a Motion to Remand on May 9, 2017, noted for consideration on
June 2, 2017. Dkt. #10. In that Motion, Plaintiff's
“requested relief” was only for the Court to
remand the case and “for an award of attorney fees
pursuant to § 1447(c) for wrongfully removing this case
to federal court.” Dkt. #10 at 2. Relief under 28
U.S.C. § 1927 was not mentioned under the
“requested relief” section. Later in the Motion,
Plaintiff requested the Court award fees pursuant to §
1447(c) “and/or” sanctions
pursuant to the Court's inherent power or § 1927.
Dkt. #10 at 11 (emphasis added). All of the case law cited by
Plaintiff refers to awards under §1447(c).
Plaintiff's Reply failed to mention § 1927.
See Dkt. #17.
18, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. #12.
Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, in part requesting sanctions under 28 U.S.C.
§1927. Dkt. #19. Id.
8, 2017, before the noting date for Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Remand,
denied the Motion to Dismiss as moot, and remanded this case.
Dkt. #21. The Court also found that Plaintiff was entitled to
fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), and ordered
Plaintiff to request those in a “Supplemental Motion
for Attorney's Fees.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff
filed that Supplemental Motion and the instant Motion for
Reconsideration on June 19, 2017. Dkt. #23.
not satisfied with fees under §1447(c), Plaintiff argues
in the instant Motion that the Court failed to consider her
“motion for sanctions… pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927.” Dkt. #22 at 2. Plaintiff argues that she
needs such fees to compensate her for legal expenses in
responding to the Motion to Dismiss. Id. at 3.
Plaintiff misstates the legal standard for a motion for
reconsideration in the Western District. Id. at 3-4
(citing, inter alia, Craig C. Reilly, Interlocutory
Orders: Getting it Right the Second Time, 22 Litig. 43, 44
(1996)). Plaintiff argues, confusingly, that “the Court
made an error of law by finding Alexander's request for
sanctions pursuant to to [sic] 28 U.S.C. 1927 was moot
notwithstanding its vexatious and unreasonable nature given
this Court had no subject matter jurisdiction to even
consider the merits of such a motion until this Court had
determined that the presumption against it having subject
matter jurisdiction had been rebutted.” Dkt. #22 at 4.
Plaintiff expands upon the merits of her request for §
1927 sanctions. Id. at 4-8. Plaintiff argues that
the Court “was not free to ignore its discretion,
without explanation, where Alexander had raised it as an
issue for this Court's consideration.” Id.
for reconsideration are disfavored.” LCR 7(h)(1).
“The court will ordinarily deny such motions in the
absence of a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or
a showing of new facts or legal authority which could not
have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable
never filed a separate motion requesting sanctions under 28
U.S.C. § 1927. Plaintiff's request for sanctions in
her Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was not
heard because Defendants' Motion was found to be moot,
but nothing in the Court's Order precluded Plaintiff from
seeking the same fees under § 1447(c). In her Motion to
Remand, Plaintiff requested fees under 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c) and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The
Court awarded fees under 28 U.S.C. §1447(c) because that
was the proper basis for fees. Even now, Plaintiff fails to
set forth sufficient evidence that Defendants “so
multiplie[d] the proceedings… unreasonably and
vexatiously, ” or otherwise exhibited conduct rising to
the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. As it stands, the
Court believes that the assessment of fees under §
1447(c) is a sufficient deterrent and appropriate for this
case. Pragmatically speaking, it is unclear to the Court how
the amount of fees awarded under the two statutes would
differ. Plaintiff is not entitled to the same fees twice,
once under each statute. Because the Court allowed Plaintiff
to seek fees under § 1447(c), Plaintiff has not been
prejudiced by the Court's Order.
has failed to convince the Court that its prior Order was
“manifest error” and does not allege new facts or
legal authority. Accordingly, having reviewed the relevant
briefing, the declarations and exhibits attached thereto, and
the remainder of the record, the Court hereby finds and