United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
BENJAMIN H. SETTLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Tacoma Public
School District No. 10's (“District”) motion
for summary judgment (Dkt. 30). The Court has considered the
pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the motion
and the remainder of the file and hereby grants the motion
for the reasons stated herein.
January 29, 2016, Plaintiff Sandra Holmes
(“Holmes”) filed a complaint against the District
in Pierce County Superior Court for the State of Washington.
Dkt. 1-1. Holmes asserts causes of action for wrongful
termination and discrimination on the basis of her race,
disability, and age. Id.
April 29, 2016, the District removed the matter to this
Court. Dkt. 1.
28, 2017, the District filed a motion for summary judgment.
Dkt. 30. On July 17, 2017, Holmes responded. Dkt. 34. On July
21, 2017, the District replied. Dkt. 35.
was an elementary school teacher for the District from 2006
until the District placed her on administrative leave on
February 10, 2014. Dkt. 1-1, ¶ 6. On May 13, 2014, the
District officially terminated Holmes. Dkt. 31-2. Holmes
appealed the termination that same day. Dkt. 31-3. On March
5, 2015, Hearing Officer Robert Peterson upheld the
termination. Dkt. 31-4.
October 5, 2015, Holmes filed a charge of discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). Dkt. 31-5. Holmes alleged that the
discrimination took place from February 10, 2013, to February
7, 2014. Id. On November 2, 2015, the EEOC notified
Holmes that her charge “was not timely filed with the
EEOC.” Dkt. 31-6.
District argues that Holmes's claims are barred by her
failure to timely exhaust her administrative remedies. Dkt.
30. The Court agrees.
Summary Judgment Standard
judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the
case on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record,
taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)
(nonmoving party must present specific, significant probative
evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt”).
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conversely, a
genuine dispute over a material fact exists if there is
sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute,
requiring a judge or jury to resolve the differing versions
of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac.
Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.
determination of the existence of a material fact is often a
close question. The Court must consider the substantive
evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must meet at
trial - e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil
cases. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; T.W. Elec.
Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. The Court must resolve any
factual issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party
only when the facts specifically attested by that party
contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party.
The nonmoving party may not merely state that it will
discredit the moving party's evidence at trial, in the
hopes that evidence can be developed at trial to support the
claim. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630
(relying on And ...