United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
BENJAMIN H. SETTLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Simm Associates,
Inc.'s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 23) and
Plaintiff Bryan Andrews's motion for leave to file an
amended complaint (Dkt. 17). The Court has considered the
pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the
motions and the remainder of the file and hereby (1) grants
in part and denies in part Defendant's motion for summary
judgment, and (2) grants Plaintiff's motion for leave to
file an amended complaint.
September 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed his complaint. Dkt. 1.
Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant for violations of
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”)
and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
6, 2017, Plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended
complaint. Dkt. 17. On June 19, 2017, Defendant filed a
response opposing amendment. Dkt. 19. On June 23, Plaintiff
replied. Dkt. 24.
20, 2017, Defendant moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 23. On
July 10, 2017, Plaintiff responded. Dkt. 26. On July 14,
2017, Defendant replied. Dkt. 3.
Motion for Summary Judgment
judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the
case on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record,
taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)
(nonmoving party must present specific, significant probative
evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt”).
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conversely, a
genuine dispute over a material fact exists if there is
sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute,
requiring a judge or jury to resolve the differing versions
of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac.
Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.
moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's FDCPA claim on
three grounds. First, Defendant argues that it is not a
“debt collector” for the purposes of the FDCPA
because it was hired as a “first party collection
service.” Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiff
cannot show that Defendant intended to harass or annoy him
when calling his place of work.
the first argument, the Court concludes that Defendant has
failed to establish that it is entitled to summary judgment
under a theory that it is not a “debt collector”
subject to the FDCPA. Under the FDCPA, a “debt
collector” is one “who uses any instrumentality
of interstate commerce or the mails in any business  the
principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or
 who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly
or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or
due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
“Everyone agrees that the term embraces the repo man-
someone hired by a creditor to collect an outstanding
debt.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.,
137 S.Ct. 1718, 1720 (2017). Such a “repo man”
does not include “any officer or employee of a creditor
while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such