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Lyall v. U.S. Bank National Association

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle

August 17, 2017

MARTA D. LYALL, Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; TRUMAN TITLE 2013 SC3 TITLE TRUST; TRUMAN CAPITAL ADVISORS, LP; RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC; BANK OF AMERICA N.A.; DITECH HOME LOAN SERVICING; CWABS MASTER TRUST, REVOLVING HOME EQUITY LOAN ASSET BACKED NOTES, SERIES 2004-"O"; CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY; UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON; WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE; DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER OF KING COUNTY; and JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-100, Defendants.

          ORDER

          Honorable Richard A. Jones United States District Judge

         This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC (“Rushmore”), and U.S. Bank National Association as Legal Title Trustee for Truman 2013 SC3 Title Trust's (erroneously sued as U.S. Bank National Association, Truman Title 2013 SC3 Title Trust, Truman Capital Advisors, L.P.; hereinafter the “Loan Trust”) Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. # 87. Plaintiff filed a late response in opposition to the motion that far exceeds the page limitations dictated by this Court's Local Rules. LCR 7(e)(3) (limiting Plaintiff's response to twenty-four pages). Therefore, when considering the response, the Court may exercise its discretion to limit its inquiry to the first twenty-four pages. The Court is also in receipt of the parties' briefs arguing whether the Court should convert the TRO into a preliminary injunction, as well as Plaintiff's request for extension of time to file her response to the motion to dismiss. Dkt. ## 92, 96, 97.

         Having reviewed the briefs, relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss. Dkt. # 87. The Court DISSOLVES the injunction.

         I. BACKGROUND

         The parties are well versed in the relevant history of this case. At issue is whether Plaintiff has properly alleged her claims against Defendants. Moreover, the Court must determine whether the TRO currently in place should convert into a preliminary injunction.

         II. LEGAL STANDARD

         Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. The rule requires the court to assume the truth of the complaint's factual allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising from those allegations. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). A court “need not accept as true conclusory allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must point to factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). If the plaintiff succeeds, the complaint avoids dismissal if there is “any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint” that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 563; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

         A court typically cannot consider evidence beyond the four corners of the complaint, although it may rely on a document to which the complaint refers if the document is central to the party's claims and its authenticity is not in question. Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006). A court may also consider evidence subject to judicial notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).

         III. DISCUSSION

         In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff lodges claims against Defendants to quiet title, for fraud, and for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Dkt. # 16 (Amended Complaint) at 24-53.

         A. Quiet Title

         “Any person having a valid subsisting interest in real property, and a right to the possession thereof, may recover the same by action in” court. RCW 7.28.010 (describing who may maintain such actions). “The plaintiff in an action to quiet title must succeed on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of his adversary.” Desimone v. Spence, 318 P.2d 959, 961 (1957); see also Robertson v. GMAC Mortg. LLC, 982 F.Supp.2d 1202, 1208 (W.D. Wash. 2013).

         Plaintiff's quiet title action fails as a matter of law because she has defaulted on the mortgage. Dkt. # 16 (Amended Complaint) at 26-27. Her Amended Complaint seeks to invalidate her mortgage agreement due to a fraudulent scheme allegedly devised by Defendants. However, even if these facts were true, they do not give credence to a claim for quiet title when Plaintiff does not have superior title. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES the quiet title claims as alleged against Defendants.

         B. Cla ...


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