United States District Court, E.D. Washington
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT
L. QUACKENBUSH, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THE COURT is Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, ECF No.
10. Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Spokane County
Jail, is proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis. The Court has not directed service of the
complaint, but attorneys Michael J. Hines and Erin E. Pounds
have entered notices of appearance on behalf of Defendant
Washington Trust Bank. ECF Nos. 5 and 6.
seeks $5, 000, 000.00 against each of the named Defendants.
He also seeks to have a case from the Western District of
Washington, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989
F.Supp.2d 1122 (W.D.Wash. 2013), “re-enforce[d].”
In that case, a district court found a systemic overburdening
of public defenders resulted in counsels' failure to meet
the client in a confidential setting and an inability to
understand their clients' goals or whether defenses or
mitigating circumstances required investigation.
Wilbur, 989 F.Supp.2d at 1131-32. Plaintiff makes no
analogous allegations in his First Amended Complaint. This
Court is without authority to enforce an order of another
court affecting parties over whom this Court had no
construing the First Amended Complaint in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds he has failed to
present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
complains that on approximately August 22, 2016, an unknown
officer searched a black laptop bag without a warrant in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. ECF No. 10-1 at 10. This
is a mere legal conclusion which is not entitled to the
“assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Plaintiff has failed to
state a plausible claim for relief against this unknown
claims “orders” were given to a bank to
“aid and abet” law enforcement to
“seize” Plaintiff. ECF No. 10-1 at 10-11. Even if
a private bank could be considered a state actor for purposes
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff has alleged no facts from
which the inference could be drawn that the seizure of his
person was without probable cause. He offers no facts from
which the Court could infer that his pretrial confinement is
illegal. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S.__,
137 S.Ct. 911 (2017). As presented, Plaintiff's
allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
further complains “video surveillance, ” which
was allegedly “key evidence to his defense, ” was
destroyed. ECF No. 10-2 at 11. Apart from his conclusory
assertions, Plaintiff fails to allege the evidence possessed
“an exculpatory value that was apparent before the
evidence was destroyed, and [was] of such a nature that the
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by
other reasonably available means.” California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984). Plaintiff's
factual allegations are sparse. He does not state the nature
of the charges against him or what exculpatory evidence would
have been obtained from video surveillance.
lost or destroyed evidence is deemed to be only potentially
exculpatory, as opposed to apparently exculpatory, the
defendant must show that the evidence was destroyed in bad
faith. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58
(1988). Plaintiff has alleged no facts from which the Court
could infer evidence was destroyed in bad faith and under
color of state law, rather than in the normal course of
business or due to negligence. Indeed, Plaintiff seems to
allege that if other Defendants had properly set hearings,
then the evidence might have been preserved. His allegations
are insufficient to state a constitutional claim against
Washington Trust Bank regarding the preservation of evidence.
OF TERM “ET AL.”
uses the abbreviation “et al.” inappropriately.
See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th
Cir. 1992). A plaintiff must name all defendants in his
complaint (an amended complaint supersedes the initial
complaint). Id. Failing to name all defendants in
his complaint denies the court jurisdiction over the unnamed
defendants. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a), accord United States ex
rel. Blue Circle West, Inc. v. Tucson Mechanical Contracting
Inc., 921 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff
must be careful to list only those defendants in the caption
of his complaint who are the subject of his claims.
names Spokane County and the “Spokane County
Prosecuting Office” as Defendants. Section 1983
provides a cause of action against any “person”
who, under color of law, deprives an individual of federal
constitutional or statutory rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The term “person” includes local governmental
entities, Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d
1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002), but does not encompass municipal
or county departments. See United States v. Kama,
394 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2005) (Ferguson, J.,
concurring)(municipal police departments and bureaus are
generally not considered “persons” within the
meaning of section 1983). Therefore, the Spokane County
Prosecutor's Office would not be a proper Defendant in
governmental entity cannot be held liable under section 1983
for its employees' acts unless Plaintiff can prove the
existence of unconstitutional policies, regulations, or
ordinances, promulgated by officials with final policymaking
authority. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 121 (1988); Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc.
Servs.,436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). “[I]t is when
execution of a government's policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury that the government as an entity is responsible under
section 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. While
a single decision may satisfy the “policy”
requirement, that decision must have been properly made by
one of the municipality's ...