United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE TO MASSACHUSETTS
RICARDO S. MARTINEZ, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on Defendants Charlie's One
Stop Computer Center Inc.'s (“Charlie I”) and
Michael Aucoin's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).
Dkt. #27. For purposes of this motion, Defendants argue that
this Court lacks jurisdiction because maintaining the action
here is not reasonable. Id. at 3. Plaintiff opposes
the motion on the merits, but does not oppose a transfer of
this action to the District of Massachusetts. Dkt. #35.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed herein, the Court
GRANTS Defendants' Motion in Part and hereby TRANSFERS
this matter to Massachusetts.
1, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against John Doe
Defendants alleging that unknown persons had infringed on
several software trademarks by illegally installing such
software on computers using fraudulent product keys.
See Dkt. #1. On June 23, 2016, Microsoft sought
expedited discovery to uncover the identity of the John Doe
Defendants, which this Court granted. Dkts. #5 and #7. As a
result, Plaintiff identified Defendant Charlie's One Stop
Computer Center II, Inc. (“Charlie's II”), an
entity that had purchased assets of Charlie I. Id.
Plaintiff amended its Complaint for a second time on May 10,
2017, to add Charlie I and Mr. Aucoin as additional
Defendants. Dkt. #17. The instant motion followed.
A. Legal Standard for Transfers of Venue
28 U.S.C. § 1404, this Court has discretion to transfer
this case in the interests of convenience and justice to
another district in which venue would be proper. See
Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495,
498 (9th Cir. 2000). Specifically, Section 1404(a) states:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district or division where it might have been
brought or to any district or division to which all parties
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The purpose of this statute is to
“prevent the waste of time, energy, and money and to
protect litigants, witnesses and the public against
unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Pedigo
Prods., Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc., No.
3:12-CV-05502-BHS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12690, 2013 WL
364814, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2013) (quoting
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616, 84
S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964)).
instant matter, Defendants admit that the District of
Massachusetts as an alternate forum “exists and is
available here.” Dkt. #27 at 8. Defendants further
admit that they both “reside” and “may be
found” in that District, that it will be more
convenient, and more efficient. Id. at 8-12.
Plaintiff does not oppose the transfer of this matter to the
District of Massachusetts. Dkt. #35 at 15-16. In fact,
Plaintiff asserts that if this Court were to dismiss this
action for lack of personal jurisdiction, it would simply
refile the matter against the Defendants in that District.
Dkt. #35 at 16.
having reviewed the parties' briefing, the Declarations
in support thereof, and the remainder of the record, the
Court finds that transfer is appropriate.
Request for Attorney's Fees
seek attorney's fees pursuant to RCW 4.28.185(5) for the
costs associated with litigating this matter in Washington.
Dkt. #27 at 15. Washington's long-arm statute provides
that if a defendant is served under the statute “and
prevails in the action, there may be taxed and allowed to the
defendant as part of the costs of defending the action a
reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney's
fees.” RCW 4.28.185(5). Plaintiff opposes the request,
arguing that its matter was brought in this jurisdiction in
good faith, it was not meant for ...