United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT, DKT.
Theresa L. Fricke, United States Magistrate Judge.
the Court is plaintiff Daniel Jay Perez’s motion for
leave to amend his civil rights complaint to correctly name
“Jane Doe” as Kara Hubbs. Dkt. 114. In a
response, defendants asked the Court to deny the amendment.
Dkt. 118. At a telephonic hearing on September 26, 2017, and
having reviewed the motion, defendants’ response, and
the rest of the record, the undersigned GRANTED Mr. Perez
leave to amend. This written order further explains the
Perez filed his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint
in this case on December 21, 2016, alleging defendants
violated his rights to adequate medical treatment and care.
Dkt. 4. This Court permitted Mr. Perez to file a first
amended complaint (FAC) on June 14, 2017. See Dkt.
Perez moved to amend the FAC on July 27, 2017. Dkt. 89. The
defendants objected that Mr. Perez did not comply with the
local rule requiring that he provide a “red-line”
copy highlighting the changes he made to the FAC. Dkt. 94;
see Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 15. In a telephonic
hearing on August 31, 2017, this Court ordered Mr. Perez to
re-file his proposed amended complaint in compliance with LCR
15. Dkt. 110. Mr. Perez re-filed his proposed amended
complaint (PAC) on September 6, 2017, this time providing a
“red-lined” copy that highlighted changes made to
his first amended complaint. Dkt. 114-1. Mr. Perez wrote and
highlighted the PAC by hand. Id.
defendants again ask this court to deny Mr. Perez leave to
amend the complaint. They contend that Mr. Perez has still
not complied with LCR 15 and does not show “good
cause” for making late amendments to the FAC. Dkt. 118.
Since the defendants filed their response, Mr. Perez has
filed a proposed supplemental amended complaint. Dkt. 120-2.
Mr. Perez’s proposed amended complaint does not
strictly comply with LCR 15.
requires that a party seeking leave to amend a complaint
attach to its motion a copy of the proposed amended pleading
and indicate on that proposed pleading how it differs from
the pleading it seeks to amend. A district court has broad
discretion in interpreting its local rules, and its
application of those rules is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1223
(9th Cir. 2007).
filing the PAC, Mr. Perez did not strictly comply with LCR
15. Mr. Perez made several changes to the prior complaint
without highlighting those changes as the rule requires.
Those changes are primarily minor changes in wording,
including to paragraphs 1.23, 1.27, and 1.72 (renumbered 1.73
in the PAC). The most significant change to the FAC is in
dividing previous paragraph 1.33 in two, resulting in a new
paragraph, 1.34. The new paragraph does not contain new
allegations. Compare Dkt. 114-1, p. 12 with
Dkt. 58, p. 6.
Court has broad discretion to enforce LCR 15. See
Bias, 508 F.3d at 1223. Because of the difficulties Mr.
Perez encountered in filing his amended complaint, because he
alleges cause for his delay in naming the previously unnamed
Jane Doe defendant as Kara Hubbs, and because the other,
unmarked changes he makes are minimal and not substantive,
the undersigned determines that Mr. Perez should not be
denied leave to amend based on LCR 15.
Leave to amend should be “freely granted”
the court enters a pretrial scheduling order under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 16, FRCP 15(a) sets the
standard for amending pleadings. Johnson v. Mammoth
Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992).
FRCP 15(a) provides that leave to amend “shall be
freely given when justice so requires.” Under this
provision, a court should grant leave to amend “unless
amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing party, is
sought in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue
delay.” Martinez v. Newport Beach City, 125
F.3d 777, 786 (9th Cir. 1997).
where the court has entered a pretrial scheduling order, the
court analyzes the proposed amendment under the more liberal
standard of FRCP 15(a) only if the party seeking relief shows
“good cause” for failing to amend the pleading
before the scheduled deadline. Coleman v. Quaker Oats
Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000). But where the
scheduling order did not set a deadline for amendments to the
pleadings, the defendant is not required to seek a
modification of the scheduling order and the “good
cause” standard is not ...