In re the Personal Restraint of RONALD SORENSON, Petitioner.
Sorenson filed this personal restraint petition (PRP) about
13 months after this court issued its mandate on his direct
appeal. He asserts the petition is timely, despite the one
year time-bar in RCW 10.73.090, because it was filed less
than one year after the trial court corrected scrivener's
errors on his judgment and sentence, as directed to do on
remand. We hold his petition is time-barred because it was
filed more than a year after the mandate on his direct appeal
issued and the trial court did not exercise its independent
judgment in correcting the scrivener's errors on remand.
unpublished portion of this opinion, we hold that even if
Sorenson's petition is not time-barred, Sorenson fails to
show that defense counsel was ineffective.
we dismiss Sorenson's PRP.
State charged Sorenson with multiple counts of child
molestation. State v. Sorenson, No.
43199-8-II, slip op. at 2 (Wash Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2014
The jury convicted Sorenson of nine counts of child
molestation. Sorenson appealed.
January 28, 2014, in an unpublished decision, we affirmed
Sorenson's convictions but remanded to the superior court
with instructions to correct the scrivener's errors in
the judgment and sentence. Sorenson, No. 43199-8-II,
slip op. at 10. Specifically, we held:
Sorenson's judgment and sentence incorrectly states the
dates that Sorenson committed the offenses in counts 2, 3,
and 9. Sorenson committed count 2 between March 9, 2002 and
March 8, 2004; count 3 between March 9, 2003 and March 8,
2006; and count 9 between August 23, 2006 and August 22,
2009. We accept the State's concession and remand to the
trial court for it to correct Sorenson's judgment and
sentence on counts 2, 3, and 9 to accurately reflect when
Sorenson committed those crimes.
We affirm, but remand to correct scrivener's errors in
Sorenson's judgment and sentence.
Br. of Resp't at App. B; Sorenson, No.
43199-8-II, slip op. at 10.
appealed our decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
denied review on July 9. State v. Sorenson, 180
Wn.2d 1022, 328 P.3d 902 (2014). On August 12, we issued our
mandate to the trial court.
September 3, Sorenson filed a "Waiver of Presence at
Hearing for Correction of Scrivener's Errors." Br.
of Resp't at App. D (some capitalization omitted). In
this filing, Sorenson stated that he was "waiv[ing]
[his] right to be present at the hearing for correction of
scrivener's errors in the judgment and sentence."
Br. of Resp't at App. D. The record before us does not
contain further indication that a hearing was held.
September 15, the trial court signed an order correcting
Sorenson's judgment and sentence, as directed by our
opinion. The trial court's order stated in part:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUGED AND DECREED that in the
Judgment and Sentence filed on March 8, 2012, in State of
Washington v. RONALD LEE SORENSON, Clark County Cause No.
10-1-01995-2 shall reflect on Page 1, Section 2.1, Count 02
crime dates between March 9, 2002 and March 8, 2004; Count 03
crime dates between March 9, 2003 and March 8, 2006, and
Count 09 between August 23, 2006 and August 22, 2009.
Br. of Resp't at App. D. The trial court's order was
filed the following day, on September 16.
filed this PRP on September 15, 2015.
Timeliness of Petition
threshold issue in Sorenson's collateral attack is
whether his petition is timely. We hold that Sorenson's
PRP is time-barred because it was filed more than one year
after the mandate disposing of his direct appeal was issued,
and the trial court did not exercise its discretion on remand
in correcting the scrivener's errors, which would have
restored the pendency of his appeal.
In relevant part, RCW 10.73.090 provides that:
(1) No petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment
and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one
year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and
sentence is valid on its face ....
. . . .
(3) For the purposes of this section, a judgment becomes
final on the last of ...