United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
C. COUGHENOUR, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on Defendants Micheline Murphy,
Marcus Naylor, and their marital communities'
(“Defendants”) motion to strike portions
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”)
(Dkt. No. 63) and Plaintiff's motion to strike portions
of Defendants' briefing (Dkt. Nos. 71 at 2, 74 at 1-3).
Having thoroughly considered the parties' briefing and
the relevant record, the Court finds oral argument
unnecessary and hereby GRANTS in part Defendants' motion
and DENIES Plaintiff's motions.
Court dismissed Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for
failure to state a claim and because the allegations
contradicted judicially noticed records. (See
generally Dkt. No. 49.) On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal but remanded for the district court to
consider whether Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend
certain claims. (Dkt. No. 54 at 2-4.) Accordingly, the Court
granted Plaintiff leave to amend his claim against Murphy for
legal malpractice, but only to the extent that his
allegations do not contradict judicially noticed records.
(Dkt. No. 56 at 2-4.) The Court also granted Plaintiff leave
to amend his negligent hiring claim by further detailing the
nature of Naylor's supervision. (Id. at 2-3.)
The Court denied Plaintiff leave to amend his discrimination
claims. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff then filed his SAC
(Dkt. No. 59). The Court struck all claims against Defendants
Rosen and Rogers in the SAC as inconsistent with this prior
order. (Dkt. No. 75.)
Defendants' Motion to Strike
Defendants ask the Court to strike portions of the SAC that
breach the Court's order granting Plaintiff leave to
amend his complaint. (Dkt. No. 63 at 3.) A court may strike
any “redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous
matter” from a pleading. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(F). This
includes striking any part of the prayer for relief when the
relief sought is not recoverable as a matter of law.
Bureering v, Uvawas, 922 F.Supp. 1450, 1479 n. 34
(C.D. Cal. 1996).
Court constrained Plaintiff's leave to amend his
pleadings to assertions that do not contradict judicially
noticed records. (See generally Dkt. No. 56.)
Judicially noticed records include State court proceedings
and rulings pertaining to Plaintiff's probation hearings
and appeals. (Dkt. No. 49 at 6.) In these records are
State court findings that the trial court did not exceed its
jurisdiction or violate Plaintiff's right to privacy by
ordering him to complete a mental health evaluation and
treatment or sign a medical release of information while on
probation. (Dkt. No. 20-3 at 64, 78). Upon taking judicial
notice of these findings, this Court concluded that, as a
matter of law, “an attorney does not commit legal
malpractice by failing to object to such authority.”
(Dkt. No. 49 at 7.) Furthermore, this Court took judicial
notice of the Washington Court of Appeals' finding that
the trial court acted reasonably in violating Plaintiff's
probation for his refusal to provide medical records.
(Id. at 8.) Finally, this Court held that judicially
noticed documents preclude any allegations of discriminatory
motivation or claims that Murphy failed to inform the State
court that Plaintiff signed a medical release after being
incarcerated. (Dkt. Nos. 56 at 4, 49 at 7.) Any assertion in
Plaintiff's SAC contrary to these holdings violates the
Court's order granting leave to amend.
claim that no part of his SAC violates this Court's prior
order misunderstands the order, the above-referenced records,
and the Ninth Circuit's remand order. (See Dkt.
No. 71 at 1-2.) The Court, through judicially noticed
records, established that the trial court acted reasonably
and within its authority when it required Plaintiff to sign a
medical release as part of a probation condition. (Dkt. No.
49 at 7-8.) The Court found that Plaintiff's argument to
the contrary was collaterally estopped based on these
records. (Id. at 8.) The Ninth Circuit did not
overrule this holding. (See generally Dkt. No. 54.)
Therefore, Plaintiff's claims based on allegations that
the trial court did not have authority to require him to sign
a medical release, and that such a release was not a
condition of probation, contradict judicially noticed
party may amend its pleading [a second time] only with
opposing party's written consent or the court's
leave.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a)(2). The Court limited
Plaintiff's leave to amend legal malpractice and
negligent hiring claims and denied leave to amend
discrimination claims. (Dkt. No. 56 at 2-4.) Thus, the Court
will strike portions of the SAC that clearly and directly
contradict these limitations as immaterial and
impertinent. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
Plaintiff's Motions to Strike Portions of
response and surreply include motions to strike portions of
Defendants' motion and reply. (Dkt. Nos. 71 at 2, 74 at
1-3.) First, the Ninth Circuit did not overturn the
Court's reliance on collateral estoppel, as Plaintiff
asserts. (See Dkt. Nos. 59, 71 at 2.) Second,
contested portions of Defendants' briefs consist of
proper argument before the Court. (See Dkt. Nos. 71
at 2, 74 at 1-3.)
foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to strike (Dkt. No.
63) is GRANTED in part. The following portions of
Plaintiff's Second ...