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Campbell v. Colvin

United States District Court, E.D. Washington

November 30, 2017

TINA M. CAMPBELL, Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Defendant.

          ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

          FRED VAN SICKLE SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         BEFORE THE COURT are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 16 and 17. This matter was submitted for consideration without oral argument. The plaintiff is represented by Attorney Joseph M. Linehan. The defendant is represented by Special Assistant United States Attorney Leisa A. Wolf. The Court has reviewed the administrative record and the parties' completed briefing and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, the court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 17, and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 16.

         JURISDICTION

         Plaintiff Tina M. Campbell protectively filed for disability insurance benefits on January 15, 2013. Tr. 175-83. Plaintiff alleged an onset date of June 1, 2009. Tr. 177. Benefits were denied initially (Tr. 118-20) and upon reconsideration (Tr. 122-27). Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which was held before ALJ Jesse K. Shumway on April 3, 2015. Tr. 44-92. Plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified at the hearing. Id. Medical expert Arvin J. Klein, M.D. also testified. Tr. 53-65. The ALJ denied benefits (Tr. 17-37) and the Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 1. The matter is now before this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

         BACKGROUND

         The facts of the case are set forth in the administrative hearing and transcripts, the ALJ's decision, and the briefs of Plaintiff and the Commissioner, and will therefore only the most pertinent facts are summarized here.

         Tina M. Campbell (“Plaintiff”) was 39 years old at the time of the first hearing. Tr. 72. Plaintiff graduated from high school and then received her AA in medical office administration from Interface College. Tr. 73. At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff lived with her husband, who was a truck driver, and their two children aged six and eleven. Tr. 71-72. Plaintiff's work history includes insurance clerk, certified nurse assistant, sewing machine operator, administrative clerk, specimen processor, and billing clerk. Tr. 65-71, 82-83. Plaintiff testified that she was 5'10” tall and weighed 367 pounds at the time of the hearing in April 2015; and in March 2015 the record indicates she weighed 370 pounds and had a body mass index of 53.13. Tr. 72, 534-35.

         Plaintiff testified that she stopped working in January 2009 due to anemia during her pregnancy; and deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism after her son was born. Tr. 73-74. She further reported that the “main symptom” that prevents her from working is “constant” swelling in her right leg and foot, which causes pain and makes standing, sitting, and walking a “challenge.” Tr. 74. Plaintiff testified that she spends “the majority of the day” lying down, due to the swelling; and she estimated that in an eight-hour work day she would need to be lying down, with her leg elevated up on a pillow, for “at least six, seven hours.” Tr. 75-76. She can stand for 20 minutes at the most before needing to sit down; walk for 30 to 45 minutes, maybe an hour at the longest; and sit for 30 minutes to an hour before she needs to lie down and elevate her leg. Tr. 75-76, 79. She does grocery shopping while holding the cart; and struggles to do laundry because she has to climb stairs. Tr. 77-78. Plaintiff testified that she takes care of her six year old son by herself, except when he is in preschool a few hours a week. Tr. 79-80. When she was sick right after her son was born in 2009, her family helped take care of her son, but at the time of the hearing her family helped take care of her kids and housework an average of four or five hours a week. Tr. 80-81. Plaintiff alleges disability due to Graves disease, intestinal issues, hair loss, knee injury, blood clots, coagulation disorder, knee, obesity, back, asthma, depression, migraines, neck, hip, fatty liver, and restless leg syndrome. See Tr. 122.

         STANDARD OF REVIEW

         A district court's review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is limited; the Commissioner's decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence” means “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 1159 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence equates to “more than a mere scintilla[, ] but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). In determining whether the standard has been satisfied, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole rather than searching for supporting evidence in isolation. Id.

         In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. If the evidence in the record “is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). Further, a district court “may not reverse an ALJ's decision on account of an error that is harmless.” Id. An error is harmless “where it is inconsequential to the [ALJ's] ultimate nondisability determination.” Id. at 1115 (quotation and citation omitted). The party appealing the ALJ's decision generally bears the burden of establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009).

         FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

         A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Second, the claimant's impairment must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[, ] but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

         The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the Commissioner considers the claimant's work activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity, ” the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).

         If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the analysis proceeds to step two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the claimant's impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, ” the analysis proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant's impairment does not satisfy this severity threshold, however, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

         At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant's impairment to severe impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude a person from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as severe or more severe than one of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled and award benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).

         If the severity of the claimant's impairment does not meet or exceed the severity of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess the claimant's “residual functional capacity.” Residual functional capacity (RFC), defined generally as the claimant's ability to perform physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite his or her limitations, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1), is relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the analysis.

         At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant's RFC, the claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in the past (past relevant work). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant is incapable of performing such work, the analysis proceeds to step five.

         At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant's RFC, the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner must also consider vocational factors such as the claimant's age, education and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the claimant is capable of adjusting to other work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of adjusting to other work, analysis concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is therefore entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1).

         The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four above. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant is capable of performing other work; and (2) such work “exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2); Beltran v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012).

         ALJ'S ...


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