United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, AIRLINE DIVISION, and AIRLINE PROFESSIONALS ASSOC. OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 1224, Plaintiffs, ALASKA AIR GROUP, INC, and HORIZON AIR INDUSTRIES, INC. Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A
PROTECTIVE ORDER AND TO COMPEL AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO STAY
J. PECHMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for a
Protective Order and to Compel Initial Disclosures (Dkt. No.
33) and Motion to Stay Consideration of Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss and for Relief from a Deadline (Dkt. No.
44). Having considered the Motions, the Responses (Dkt. Nos.
39, 49), the Reply (Dkt. No. 46) and the related record, the
Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for a Protective Order
and to Compel Initial Disclosures and GRANTS Plaintiffs'
Motion to Stay.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“IBT”)
and the Airline Professionals Association of the IBT, Local
Union No. 1224 bring this action against Defendants Alaska
Air Group (“AAG”) and Horizon Air Industries,
Inc. seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based upon
Defendants' alleged violation of the terms of a 2016
Letter of Agreement (“LOA”). (Dkt. No. 1.)
Plaintiffs allege that the LOA was negotiated in connection
with AAG's purchase of thirty Embraer 175 regional jet
aircraft and that it granted pilots for Horizon Air the
exclusive right to fly the Embraer 175s. (Id.)
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated the terms of
the LOA by allowing SkyWest pilots to operate the aircraft.
filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint,
claiming that any dispute as to the terms of the LOA is
“minor” within the meaning of the IBT-Horizon Air
Collective Bargaining Agreement and must therefore be
resolved through binding arbitration. (Dkt. No. 16.)
Plaintiffs requested leave to take expedited discovery to
determine (1) whether Defendants violated the LOA and (2) if
so, whether violation raises a “major dispute”
such that this action is properly within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Court. (Dkt. Nos. 14, 21.) On November 2,
2017, the Court granted Plaintiffs' request and ordered
Defendants to respond to Plaintiffs' First Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production within 15 days
(the “November 2 Order”). (Dkt. No. 32.)
the Court's Order, Defendants have failed to produce
either the requested discovery or its initial disclosures.
(See Dkt. No. 33 at 4-5.)
Motion to Compel
move to compel production of initial disclosures and
responses to their discovery requests. (See id.)
Defendants appear to claim that their pending Motion to
Dismiss entitles them to withhold the requested discovery and
to violate the clear terms of the Court's November 2
Order. (See Dkt. No. 39 at 4-5; see also
Dkt. No. 32.) This is untenable. It is well-established that
the Court may order discovery “where pertinent facts
bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or
where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is
necessary.” Laub v. United States Dept. of the
Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted); see also Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo
Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430 n.24 (9th Cir. 1977)
(“[I]t is clear that a court may allow discovery to aid
in determining whether it has in personam or subject matter
jurisdiction.”). Here, the Court did precisely that.
(Dkt. No. 32.) Defendants' failure to comply with the
unambiguous terms of the Court's November 2 Order is
unacceptable. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs'
Motion to Compel.
Motion for Protective Order
move for entry of a protective order to facilitate the timely
production of documents responsive to their discovery
requests. (Dkt. No. 33.) While the parties agree on the need
for a protective order, they dispute the terms of the order.
(See id.; see also Dkt. No. 39.) In
particular, the parties dispute whether a more restrictive
“Attorney's Eyes Only” (“AEO”)
designation is needed to protect against disclosure of
confidential information to customers and competitors of
Embraer and AAG. (Dkt. No. 39 at 9-11.) The Court finds
Defendants have not demonstrated that an AEO designation is
appropriate in this case. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), a party
seeking a protective order bears a “heavy burden”
of demonstrating that “disclosure will cause a specific
prejudice or harm.” Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384
F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs have proposed a
protective order consistent with this Court's Model
Stipulated Protective Order. The proposed order restricts the
use of confidential information to this case only, and
Plaintiffs have not indicated any intent to violate the
order. (See Dkt. No. 34, Ex. A.) Defendants'
claims that documents not designated AEO will be improperly
disclosed or relied upon in other contexts are speculative
and amount to “[b]road allegations of harm,
unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated
reasoning.” Rivera, 384 F.3d at 827.
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for a
Protective Order, and orders the parties to enter the
protective order proposed by Plaintiffs (Dkt. No. 34, Ex. A)
or another mutually agreed upon protective order.
Motion to Stay
move to stay the Court's ruling on Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 27) pending
Defendants' compliance with the Court's discovery
orders. (Dkt. No. 44.) The Court has “broad
discretionary power to stay proceedings in its own
court.” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d
1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Landis v. North Am.
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). In determining whether a
stay is warranted, the Court considers “the competing
interests which will be affected, ” including
“the possible damage which may result from the granting
of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer
in being required to go forward, and the orderly course of
justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating
of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be
expected to result from a stay.” CMAX, Inc. v.
Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing
Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55). Here, the Court finds
that each of these factors favors entry of a stay. Without
the requested discovery, Plaintiffs will be unable to respond
to Defendants' jurisdictional arguments. ...