United States District Court, W.D. Washington
B. Leighton United States District Judge
MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff McCracken's
“Dramatically Amended Proposed Complaint” in
support of her application to proceed in forma
pauperis [Dkt. # 21] and on McCracken's Motion for
Relief from Fraud and Emergency Injunctive Relief [Dkt. # 22]
latter motion asks this court to “restore her only
financial asset (apparently, historic private residential
property in Oregon), and implicitly suggests that there is
some final order (apparently regarding the foreclosure of
that property) in an Oregon Court that she claims was wrongly
decided. There is not a final order in this case and
it is wholly unclear what order she asks this court to vacate
or otherwise relieve her from.
clear, however, that this Court is not an appellate court. It
cannot and will not review decisions of other courts, and
Rule 60 does not give it the power to vacate the decision of
some other court. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
precludes “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments . . .
and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521, 161
L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). [W]hen a losing plaintiff in state court
brings a suit in federal district court asserting as legal
wrongs the allegedly erroneous legal rulings of the state
court and seeks to vacate or set aside the judgment of that
court, the federal suit is a forbidden de facto
appeal. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156
(9th Cir. 2003); Carmona v. Carmona, 603
F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008).
Motion for Relief from some unspecified fraud allegedly
committed in another proceeding is DENIED. A Motion to
correct such conduct is properly addressed to the court where
it occurred, or to an appropriate appellate court after an
appeal of the adverse judgment.
proposed amended complaint is 117 pages long. It purports to
plausibly articulate the “who what when where and
why” of her complaint against Shaprio & Sutherland,
the law firm that apparently represented Wells Fargo in the
still-unidentified underlying litigation or foreclosure
proceeding. However, instead of telling a coherent story,
identifying the parties and the facts, she continues to use
conclusory labels, accusations and legal citations and
quotations that have no apparent connection to any plausible
has also attempted to add a host of new defendants (including
this Court, for harming her by requiring an amended
complaint) but there is no articulation of who they are or
what they did, when, where, or why they did it, or with what
actual, actionable effect on McCracken. Instead, there is
page after page with passages like this:
#21 at 50] The only thing that can be gleaned from this is
that McCracken is objecting to Judge Panner's conduct in
some other case. Labelling her claims “§1983
claims” does not change their essential character: she
is seeking redress here for conduct that occurred in some
district court may permit indigent litigants to proceed in
forma pauperis upon completion of a proper affidavit of
indigency. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Court has broad
discretion in resolving the application, but “the
privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis in civil actions
for damages should be sparingly granted.” Weller v.
Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied
375 U.S. 845 (1963). Moreover, a court should “deny
leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it
appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the
action is frivolous or without merit.” Tripati v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1369
(9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). An in forma pauperis complaint is
frivolous if “it ha[s] no arguable substance in law or
fact.” Id. (citing Rizzo v. Dawson,
778 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Franklin v.
Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984).
pro se Plaintiff's complaint is to be construed
liberally, but like any other complaint it must nevertheless
contain factual assertions sufficient to support a facially
plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570,
127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim for relief
is facially plausible when “the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
the Court will permit pro se litigants an opportunity to
amend their complaint in order to state a plausible claim.
See United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d
984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Dismissal without leave to
amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de novo review,
that the complaint could not be saved by any
proposed amended complaint is a significant step away from
meeting this standard. It continues to avoid addressing why
this Court has jurisdiction to reverse or undo a foreclosure
that apparently already took place in Oregon. That
foreclosure apparently already resulted in litigation and an
adverse outcome there-possibly as early as 2011, though there
are references to a 2017 decision, as well. It remains
entirely unclear what the law firm representing Wells Fargo
actually factually did or why it was actionable. Instead the
complaint simply repeats that McCracken is the victim of
fraud, elder abuse and the like. She claims the law firm
obtained a judgment without first acquiring in rem
jurisdiction, but as described above (and previously) this
Court cannot and will not review or reverse other courts'
decisions. The rest is largely incomprehensible. There is no
plausible claim ascertainable from McCracken's lengthy
submittal, and the few facts that are alleged demonstrate
that the claim is not viable in this Court.
Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis based on this
proposed amended complaint is therefore DENIED. McCracken
shall pay the filing fee within 21 days or
this matter will be DISMISSED. All other pending Motions (and