United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ORDER DECLINING SERVICE AND GRANTING LEAVE TO
A. TSUCHIDA United States Magistrate Judge
December 19, 2017, Andrew Conev, a Snohomish County Jail
detainee filed letter in case number C17-1725 RSM.
See Dkt. 9 (C17-1725 RSM). Because the letter
asserted Mr. Conev was raising “a new claim” it
was assigned the case number herein. The letter alleges on
December 7, 2017, Snohomish County Jail released Mr. Conev
temporarily for a psychiatric evaluation. Mr. Conev indicates
he was prescribed “a couple different meds, ” and
that the jail is not dispensing them as prescribed. He claims
he and his lawyer “are taking this to court next
week.” He also alleges he feels the medical staff is
retaliating against him for making complaints about his
Court declines to serve the complaint because it fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and is
subject to dismissal. It also appears Mr. Conev has not
exhausted his administrative remedies. Additionally, this
Court may be required to abstain from addressing the claim
because as Mr. Conev alleges, he and his lawyer are taking
the matter to Court. However, because Mr. Conev is proceeding
pro se, the Court grants him leave to file by
January 31, 2018, an amended complaint, or
to show cause why the complaint should not be
sustain a civil rights action under § 1983, Mr. Convev
must show (1) he suffered a violation of rights protected by
the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2) the
violation was proximately caused by a person acting under
color of state or federal law. See Crumpton v.
Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).
Liability of Parties
Conev has not named the specific defendants against which he
brings his claims. If he seeks to sue Snohomish County, he
must show the county itself violated his rights or that it
directed its employees to do so. Bd. of County
Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404
(1994). Under this theory of liability, the focus is on the
county's “policy statement, ordinance, regulation,
or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body's Officers.” City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988) (quoting
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). The county is not liable
for the acts of its employees under a respondeat superior
theory of liability. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Therefore, in order to
sue Snohomish County, Mr. Conev must allege facts showing
that any constitutional deprivation he suffered was the
result of a custom or policy of the county.
seeks to sue a county employee who is a supervisor, Mr. Conev
must allege facts showing that the individual defendant
supervisor participated in or directed the alleged violation,
or knew of the violation and failed to act to prevent it.
See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th
Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154 (1999);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937,
1948 (2009) (vicarious liability is inapplicable to a §
finally, if Mr. Conev seeks to sue an individual employee of
the jail, Mr. Conev must prove that a particular defendant
has caused or personally participated in causing the
deprivation of a particular protected constitutional right.
Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981);
Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir.
1977). Mr. Conev must set forth specific facts showing a
causal connection between each defendant's actions and
the harm allegedly suffered by plaintiff. Aldabe v.
Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980).
complaint does not meet these standards. Instead it alleged a
denial of adequate medical care. This is not sufficient to
state an Eighth Amendment violation. Mr. Conev may file an
amended complaint to provide additional facts to support this
claim, including the nature of his injuries and which
individual or individuals knew of his injuries and failed to
Conev should also note the The Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”) provides that:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as
are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement
normally applies to any suit, brought under any federal
statute, regarding conditions of imprisonment, including
“all prisoners seeking redress for prison circumstances
and occurrences . . . whether they involve general
circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (same). Mr. Conev should