United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
C. COUGHENOUR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration (Dkt. No. 91) of this Court’s order
dismissing remaining state law claims without prejudice (Dkt.
No. 93). “Motions for reconsideration are
disfavored.” W.D. Wash. Local Civ. R. 7(h). “The
court will ordinarily deny such motions in the absence of a
showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of
new facts or legal authority which could not have been
brought to its attention earlier with reasonable
argues the Court committed manifest error in dismissing his
claims because: (1) the Court retains original jurisdiction
over portions of his state law claims, and (2) the Court
failed to undertake sufficient analysis when it declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining. (Dkt. No.
93 at 1–2.) Neither argument merits a reconsideration
of the Court’s order.
Court does not have original jurisdiction over the remaining
claims in this matter. Plaintiff asserts that his legal
malpractice claims fall under a narrow exception allowing a
federal court to exercise original jurisdiction over
state-law claims that necessarily turn on issues of federal
law. (Dkt. No. 93 at 3.) However, this Court has dismissed
the majority of the claims that Plaintiff asserts fall under
this exception. (Dkt. Nos. 49 at 7, 56 at 2.) The Court
also struck these claims when Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint re-alleged them without the Court’s
leave. (Dkt. No. 79 at 2–3.) That Plaintiff has
flaunted this Court’s orders and continued to assert
these arguments does not provide a basis for original
issues of federal law are not significant enough to merit
federal-question jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has narrowly
construed federal courts’ jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v.
Darue Eng’g & Mfg, 545 U.S. 308, 308,
311–312 (2005); Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc.
v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006). A federal court
may exercise original jurisdiction over a state-law claim
only where the claim “necessarily raise[s] a stated
federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a
federal forum may entertain without disturbing a
congressionally approved balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities.” Grable, 545 U.S.
only remaining relevant assertions in Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint are that Ms. Murphy committed
malpractice by failing to inform Judge Rosen that: (1) his
refusal to allow Plaintiff to write an objection on his
signed medical waiver violated the First Amendment, and (2)
his failure to ascertain whether Plaintiff would waive his
rights before being incarcerated violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. (Dkt. No. 59 at ¶¶ 96, 105.) Resolution
of these claims will not, as Plaintiff claims, necessarily
require a determination as to whether Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights were violated. (See Dkt. No.
93 at 2.) The actual and substantial disputed issues here are
whether Plaintiff can state a viable legal malpractice claim
under Washington law without showing he has obtained
post-conviction relief, and whether he can show that Ms.
Murphy’s failure to raise these constitutional
arguments proximately caused his detention. See generally
Ang v. Martin, 114 P.3d 637 (Wash. 2005) (discussing the
elements of a Washington legal malpractice claim); (Dkt. Nos.
80, 86). The Court did not commit manifest error by finding
that Plaintiff’s state-law claims, which will not turn
on substantial questions of federal law, did not give rise to
federal-question jurisdiction. See Grable, 545 U.S.
Court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing
Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. The Court
undertook case-specific analysis “to determine whether
denying supplemental jurisdiction [comported] with the
underlying objective of most sensibly [accommodating] the
values of economy, convenience, fairness and comity.”
Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 978–79
(9th Cir. 2004). Given the novel issues of state law
Plaintiff’s arguments raise and the posture of the case,
the Court determined that these factors weighed in favor of
declining to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1),(3). That Plaintiff
disagrees with this analysis makes it neither conclusory nor
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Dkt. No. 93) is
 The Court dismissed legal malpractice
claims based on Plaintiff’s attorney’s failure to
raise federal constitutional and statutory objections to
Judge Rosen’s actions. (Dkt. Nos. 49 at 7, 79 at
2–3.) Multiple state courts concluded that Washington
courts have the authority to order reasonable psychiatric
treatment as a condition of probation, and Judge Rosen acted
reasonably under this authority. (Dkt. No. 49 at 7.)
On this basis, this Court concluded that, as a matter of law,
an attorney does not commit legal malpractice by failing to
make an objection to such authority based on the United
States or Washington constitutions, ADA, or WLAD. (Dkt. No.
49 at 7.) The Court denied Plaintiff leave to amend these
claims. (Dkt. No. 56 at 2.)
 Plaintiff argues for an exception to
the requirement under Washington law that he establish that
he has obtained post-conviction relief in order to bring a