United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma
B. Leighton, United States District Judge.
MATTER is before the Court on the following:
Plaintiff Lindberg's “Motion to Withdraw Document #
40” (so titled in CM/ECF) [Dkt. #41].
The title of the document itself is “Motion for Amend
Case.” Document #40 is a (proposed) amended complaint,
filed without leave of court. The purpose of the filing is
not clear, but the court will treat Dkt. #41 as a Motion for
Leave to Amend, and to file the amended complaint she already
filed at Dkt. # 40.
to amend a complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) “shall be
freely given when justice so requires.” Carvalho v.
Equifax Info. Services, LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir.
2010) (citing Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962)). This policy is “to be applied with extreme
liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon,
Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted). In determining whether to grant leave under Rule
15, courts consider five factors: “bad faith, undue
delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of
amendment, and whether the plaintiff has previously amended
the complaint.” United States v. Corinthian
Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis
added). Among these factors, prejudice to the opposing party
carries the greatest weight. Eminence Capital, 316
F.3d at 1052.
proposed amendment is futile “if no set of facts can be
proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would
constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.”
Gaskill v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 11-cv-05847-RJB,
2012 WL 1605221, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 8, 2012) (citing
Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1393
(9th Cir. 1997)).
Lindberg's proposed amended complaint nor the motion meet
even the liberal Rule 15 standard. First, despite their
length, none of Lindberg's complaints articulates any
fact or allegation to the Defendant-the Secretary of the
Navy-she sued. Her recent filing does not state a plausible
claim against anyone, certainly not Spencer. Instead, it is a
long, vague list of complaints by other people and about
other people, including Alison McKay:
Lindberg can prove without a doubt Alison L. McKay made money
practicing law in Washington State and introduced her herself
as an Attorney. The Defendant's Agency introduced Alison
L. McKay as an Attorney for the Defendant.
of facts was submitted to my previous WSBA # Attorney Jonah
Harrison unbeknown to me are the results of any motion for
the attorneys have refused to disclose to me the Pro Se
Plaintiff As grounds therefore, plaintiff provide as follows
for Amendment of Complaint:
for production sent do the U.S, attorney Sarah Morehead on
December/2017 and January/2018 related to the investigation
of Case 3:16-cv-05671RBL by EEO office at the PSNS & IMF
Refueling Facility in Bremerton-WA (DON), by the
DCPAS/Department of Defense (DoD), by EEOC Office in
Seattle-WA, and San Francisco-CA. Judges involved on Case
3:16-cv-05671 were Steven Gaffin Seattle Office, and Daniel
Leach, Supervisory Judge Terrie Brodie California Office.
Agency designated Counsel or attorney was Alison L McKay and
Complainant's designated representative (Under MD-110)
was Ceu Alves.
41 at 4] This has nothing to do with Richard Spencer, or the
Navy, or Lindberg's employment there. It does have
something to do, apparently, with a series of cases filed by
Joe Ann West, and Lindberg implausibly claims that she
learned about West (and McKay) through “Google.”
But this Court already pointed out the similar
“McKay” allegations-and the similar use of
“assistant” Ceu Alves-in a prior Order in this
case. [See Dkt. # 38] In any event, McKay has not
appeared in this case. Any claim based on the argument that
she practiced law without a license and thus that Lindberg
(or West) was wrongly discharged, (or that the Navy is liable
to Lindberg for McKay's conduct) is nonsensical. The
proposed pleading does not state a plausible claim against
the defendant, it articulates no basis for relief or demand
for relief, it has no coherent statement of facts about the
Plaintiff or her employment or termination, and permitting
its filing would be futile. Furthermore, it has been more
than a year and a half since this case was filed, and much
more than that since the events outlined in Lindberg's
filings. There is no reason for the undue delay in asserting
these “claims” even if they were plausible or
related to Lindberg.
Motion to Amend to file the proposed amended complaint is
DENIED. The operative complaint remains Dkt.
#1, the sex discrimination employment complaint.
Lindberg's Motion to Compel Discovery [Dkt. #
43] and related “Emergency Motion to
Compel” [Dkt. # 44]. Lindberg seeks
broad discovery into cases and events that appear to have no
connection to her. For example, she seeks information about
her assistant Ceu Alves, and she seeks salary
information about DOJ attorneys who may or may not have
played some role in the case:
Produce the U.S. DOJ Assistant Attorney Jamal White N.
Whitehead pay for the date for 08/07/2015 and 08/14/2015.
Produce Agency Counsel Alison L. McKay pay for 08/07/15 and
08/14/15. Produce Alison L. McKay pay grade as a Licensed
attorney practicing law and/or litigating in Washington State
from 1999 to 2016. Request to redact all files, records,
and/or documents for PII and PHI.
44 at 5]. The Secretary opposes the requests as well beyond
the scope of legitimate discovery in this sex discrimination
case. He also points out that Lindberg's Motion fails to
follow the Civil Rules. He is correct. It is not clear what
Lindberg is trying to accomplish with these ...