United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RICARDO S. MARTINEZ CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order Staying Discovery on an Interim
Basis Pending Decision on Motion for Stay of Discovery. Dkt.
#57. Having considered the motion and the record and for the
reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendants'
filed this action for breach of contract and deprivation of
wages on June 27, 2017. Dkt. #1. Defendants answered on
August 11, 2017. Dkts. #15, 16, 17. The Court issued an Order
Setting Trial Date and Related Dates on August 25, 2017, and
required that all discovery related motions be filed by March
22, 2018, and that discovery be completed by April 23, 2018.
#22. Defendants filed a Motion for Relief from Discovery
Deadlines or for Stay of Discovery (“Motion for
Stay”) concurrently with a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (“Motion for Judgment”) on March 29,
2018. Dkts. #51, 55. The Motion for Stay is noted for April
6, 2018, and the Motion for Judgment is noted for April 20,
2018. On April 2, 2018, Defendants filed the instant Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order to Stay Discovery. Dkt. #57.
seeks a TRO because they believe that the Court may not rule
on their Motion for Stay before the expiration of the
discovery deadline. Dkt. #57 at 2. Defendants explain that
until the close of discovery, and “absent a stay of
discovery, both sides will be producing documents, responding
to written discovery, and taking and defending
depositions.” Id. at 4. Defendants do not
specify the pending discovery to be completed or the number
or dates of depositions.
apparently believe that their prior Motion for Stay may be
largely moot as the Court will not have an opportunity to
rule on the motion prior to the parties substantially
completing discovery, but have not withdrawn that motion.
Id. at 2, 4. Rather, Defendants have filed this
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order to Stay Discovery,
presumably in an attempt to obtain expedited consideration
from the Court.
standards for issuing a TRO are similar to those required for
a preliminary injunction. Lockheed Missile & Space
Co., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F.Supp. 1320, 1323
(N.D. Ca. 1995). The Ninth Circuit has described the
standards for deciding whether to grant a motion for a
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must
show either (1) a combination of probable success on the
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that
serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships
tips sharply in its favor. These formulations are not
different tests but represent two points on a sliding scale
in which the degree of irreparable harm increases as the
probability of success on the merits decreases. Under either
formulation, the moving party must demonstrate a significant
threat of irreparable injury, irrespective of the magnitude
of the injury.
Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Anchorage Sch.
Dist., 868 F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations
omitted). The speculative risk of a possible injury is not
enough; the threatened harm must be imminent. Caribbean
Marine Services Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674
(9th Cir. 1988); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 65(b)(1)(A).
The Ninth Circuit has recently reiterated that courts
analyzing TRO requests are guided by four questions:
‘(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2)
whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a
stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially
injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and
(4) where the public interest lies.' Lair v.
Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Nken, 556 U.S. at 434). ‘The first two factors
. . . are the most critical, ...