United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. #S 5, 15, 17,
18, AND 19]
B. Leighton, United States District Judge
MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Spencer's Motion
to Dismiss [Dkt. # 5]; Plaintiff West's “Second
Motion to Continue Pretrial Conference” [Dkt. #15];
West's Motion to Add Kelly Bishop Affidavit [Dkt. #17];
West's “Motion to Produce Case's Docket for
Case No 16-cv-5671RBL Lindberg v Spencer”
[Dkt. # 18]; and West's Motion to Add West's
Affidavit [Dkt. #19].
Court reads the Motions to “add affidavits” as an
effort to supply additional information in response to the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Because such a motion
tests the only the plaintiff's allegations (the
plausibility of her complaint), and not her evidence,
affidavits attesting to facts properly alleged are not
necessary or particularly useful. Nevertheless, the Court has
read the documents, and West's Motions to file them
[Dkt. #s 17 and 19] are
“Motion to Produce Case's Docket for Case No
16-cv-5671RBL Lindberg v Spencer”
[Dkt. # 18] is nonsensical and is
DENIED. West can access the public portions
of Lindberg's case on line (as she repeatedly alleges);
she claims she is Lindberg's friend, and it is apparent
that each has some connection to Ceu Alves, who may be the
author of most of the filings in this case. The Court is not
going to provide West the docket in what even she claims is
an unrelated case.
the ninth case (out of twelve) West has filed in the past two
years, all facially relating to her employment
at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, from which
she was terminated in August 2016. Each makes the same basic
allegations and accusations.
case, West repeats well-worn accusations about an attorney
(Alison McKay) she claims was not licensed in Washington,
though she fails to allege that anyone ever claimed McKay was
so licensed, or that she engaged in any legal practice here
that would require her to be so licensed. She fails to
explain how that fact remotely-much less plausibly-supports
any claim by West against Spencer or anyone else. West
consistently accuses the Court and the U.S. Attorney of
“failing to inform her” of McKay's status but
fails to demonstrate when why or how the Court was to do so.
West has in each case accused the Court and her opponents of
all forms of conspiracy and impropriety, and has repeatedly
sought recusal of both the Court and the U.S. Attorney. The
first eight of Wests cases have been dismissed, either with
or without prejudice, and her appeal in at least one of the
cases was recently dismissed as frivolous. See West v.
Stackley, C17-5246RBL, Dkt. # 56.
case differs from the others in that West also describes a
variety of sexual and other harassment that she claims to
have endured at the shipyard. She is not clear on the timing,
however, and one of the more graphic and detailed incidents
apparently occurred in 2009. She also claims that she was
sexually harassed “for years” before 2015.
while she does identify at least some of the actors, she does
not name any of them as parties; instead, she continues to
sue only Spencer in his official capacity as Secretary of the
Sean J, Stackley is the Secretary of the United States Navy.
As an employer of the Federal Government, the defendant is
empowered to prescribe regulations for the operation of the
Department of the Navy and the conduct of its employees, and
is subject to the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
[Dkt. #1 at 20]. She makes no other allegations against him.
As in prior cases, West broadly alleges discrimination on the
basis of race, color, and mental disability, and retaliation
for protected EEO activity. She asserts against Spencer
claims under Title VII, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act.
Secretary seeks dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)] and for failure to
state a plausible claim [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)].
considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), the court construes the
complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. See Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney,
Inc.,416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005); see also
Wolfe v. Strankman,392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004).
Generally, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded
allegations of material fact and draw all reasonable