United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma
CHRISTINE D. HAUCK, Plaintiff,
PHILLIP D. WALKER, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STAY
AND MOTION TO VACATE
BENJAMIN H. SETTLE United States District Judge
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Phillip
Walker's (“Walker”) motion for partial
summary judgment (Dkt. 100), Plaintiff Christine Hauck's
(“Hauck”) motion to stay proceeding pending
telephonic hearing (Dkt. 102), and Hauck's motion to
vacate the Court's order imposing sanctions (Dkt. 106).
The Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of
and in opposition to the motions and the remainder of the
file and hereby rules as follows:
August 23, 2013, Hauck filed a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. Dkt. 1. On August 26, 2013, the Court granted
the motion and accepted her civil rights complaint. Dkt. 3.
Hauck asserts causes of action for violations of her Fourth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights and a violation of
article 1, § 7 of the Washington State Constitution.
March 31, 2014, the Court granted Defendants Walker, Robert
Anderson, and Garry Lucas's (“Defendants”)
motion for summary judgment on all of Hauck's claims,
entered judgment for Defendants, and closed this case. Dkt.
26, 27. On April 10, 2018, Hauck filed a notice of appeal.
Dkt. 31. On June 2, 2016, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part
and reversed in part. Dkt. 36. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
summary judgment on all of Hauck's claims except for her
excessive force claim against Walker. Id. On this
claim, the court concluded that Hauck has submitted
sufficient evidence to create a material question of fact
“because Hauck provided evidence that Walker slammed
her head into the ground using the full weight of his body
when she turned toward him while being escorted to the patrol
car and that she was not attempting to spit on him.”
Id. at 2.
March 7, 2018, Walker moved for partial summary judgment on
numerous categories of damages alleged by Hauck. Dkt. 100. On
March 24, 2018, Hauck filed a response/motion to stay pending
telephonic conference. Dkt. 102. On April 9, 2018, Walker
responded to Hauck's motion. Dkt. 105. On April 20, 2018,
Hauck replied. Dkt. 108.
discovery, on April 4, 2018, the Court granted Walker's
motions for sanctions in part and awarded Walker $1, 000 in
monetary sanctions as a result of Hauck's continued
failure to participate in discovery. Dkt. 104. On April 16,
2018, Hauck filed a motion to vacate the award of sanctions.
Dkt. 106. On April 30, 2018, Walker responded. Dkt. 109.
moves for partial summary judgment on a portion of Hauck
excessive force claim and the issue of damages. Dkt. 100.
Hauck failed to respond to the merits of Walker's motion.
Instead, Hauck moved to stay proceeding pending a telephonic
conference to resolve disputes relating to the pending
claims. Dkt. 102. The Court may defer ruling on a motion for
summary judgment if the nonmoving party shows by affidavit or
declaration that she is unable to present facts necessary to
justify her opposition. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (d). Even if the
Court construes Hauck's motion as a Rule 56(d) motion,
Hauck has failed to provide any reason why she is unable to
present facts necessary to justify her damages.
Therefore, the Court denies Hauck's motion to defer
ruling on Walker's motion and denies her request for a
telephonic conference to discuss issues that should have been
addressed in her response brief.
Hauck's failure to respond to the merits of Walker's
motion places the Court in the unfortunate position of
guessing what evidence Hauck intends to rely on if these
issues go to trial. “It is not our task, or that of the
district court, to scour the record in search of a genuine
issue of triable fact. We rely on the nonmoving party to
identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that
precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan,
91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). “[R]equiring the
district court to search the entire record, even though the
adverse party's response does not set out the specific
facts or disclose where in the record the evidence for them
can be found, is unfair.” Carmen v. San Francisco
Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.2001).
Under these guidelines, the Court has reviewed the documents
Hauck filed after and in response to Walker's motion for
partial summary judgment as well as the declarations that
Hauck filed in response to the previous motion for summary
judgment, Dkts. 22-24, 29.
judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the
case on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record,
taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)
(nonmoving party must present specific, significant probative
evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt”).
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conversely, a
genuine dispute over a material fact exists if there is
sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute,
requiring a judge or jury to resolve the differing versions
of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac.
Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.
determination of the existence of a material fact is often a
close question. The Court must consider the substantive
evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must meet at
trial - e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil
cases. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; T.W. Elec.
Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. The Court must resolve any
factual issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party
only when the facts specifically attested by that party
contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party.
The nonmoving party may not merely state that it will
discredit the moving party's evidence at trial, in the
hopes that evidence can be developed at trial to support the
claim. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630
(relying on And ...