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Lindberg v. Spencer

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma

May 7, 2018

ANNE LINDBERG, Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD SPENCER, Defendant.

          ORDER

          RONALD B. LEIGHTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         THIS MATTER is before the Court on the following Motions: Defendant Spencer's Motions for Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 60], and for Relief from deadlines [Dkt. # 73]; and on Plaintiff Lindberg's Motions for Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 59]; to add Joe Ann West's Affidavit [Dkt. #64]; for Judgment Cases Dockets for Case No. 16-5671 [Dkt. # 65]; for Sanctions for Willful Violation Laws by Morehead [Dkt. # 70] and to Introduce Material/Evidence of Violation of Protective Order [Dkt. #71].

         Lindberg has been employed at the Navy Shipyard in Bremerton since 1980. She received a variety of promotions and positive evaluations, and apparently had a good relationship with her employer until 2012.

         Lindberg claims that she was moved from one position to another in 2012. She engaged in "EEO activity" regarding that move in May, and in June she was offered a promotion. That offer was rescinded, and she was reprimanded for failing to do her then-current job. She claims the higher paying job she sought was given to a male, instead. In August, 2012 Lindberg was suspended for one day for leaving the job site. She claims that both adverse employment actions were instead in retaliation for her EEO activity. She filed another EEOC complaint, for sex discrimination that month. Lindberg claims she was denied another promotion in 2014 due to her EEO activity. Her EEOC process ended in May 2016 with an "Order/Dismissal in favor of U.S. District Court Action." [Dkt. # 1 at 7]

         She sued shortly thereafter, claiming sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Her attorney withdrew and Lindberg is proceeding pro se[1].

         Spencer now seeks Summary Judgment. He argues, and demonstrates, that Lindberg was in fact promoted several times after her initial EEO activity [See Rider Dec. Dkt. #63 at ] ¶¶ 7-10] Spencer also demonstrates that Lindberg failed to perform her job duties dating to April 2012, prior to her initial EEO activity. He provides excerpts of Lindberg's own deposition conceding some of these points. He also argues, and demonstrates, that Lindberg walked off the job June 13, 2012, angered when she was given a written reprimand. He argues that that incident-and not Lindberg's prior EEO activity-led to the rescission of the promotion offer made to Lindberg just a week before. In fact, in claims, the person who rescinded the offer did not know of the EEO complaint. See generally Dkt. # 60 at 2-7, and Declarations and Exhibits referenced therein.

         Lindberg's own Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #59] is a long list of repeated complaints, accusations, and rhetorical questions. At times it hints at the underlying facts related to her employment and the claims she put at issue in her complaint, but it includes no evidence; instead it claims that "emails are available" and that evidence will be provided at trial. It references the underlying EEO process but does not include any of the evidence she apparently wants the Court to review. The following excerpt is typical of the entire document: Navy Case No. 16-4523A-02785 (EEOC 551-2013-00215X) DISMISSED on 04/17/2017 by Terrie Brodie as a MIXED complaint by (for being 3 EEO complaints in 1 EEO complaint) Federal EEOC Supervisor Administrative Judge. However, DON DOCKET 15-4523A-3311 was dismissed by Terrie Brodie on September 30, 2016 (order of dismissal is provided on [DKT. # 54]). DON DOCKET 16-4523A-01226 was dismissed by EEOC/OFO Director Carlton M. Hadden on October 7, 2016 (order of dismissal is provided on [DKT. # 54]). How did the agency introduce DON NO. 16-4523A-01226, or a dead EEO complaint into a live EEO complaint DON NO 16-4523A-02785/EEOC Nos 550-2016-00215X? The Decision by the Office of Federal Operation (OFO) by Carlton M. Hadden is provided to Federal Judge Ronald B Leighton with a request for his interpretation of the right to file an appeal or about the Complainant's Rights to File a Civil Action (S0610). Who can appeal or process DON DOCKET No 16-4523A-01226 further? Did the agency appeal 01226 on Complainant's behalf? Did Complainant Anne Lindberg Pro se plaintiff had a designated representative on file? (Certificate of service provided on [DKT. # 54]). How did 01226 made to California, and became a MIXED COMPLAINT? How?

         [Dkt. 59 at 14-15]. Lindberg concludes her Motion by asking the Court to rule in her favor as a matter of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to her:

Because the Plaintiffs evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to her, is sufficient to establish all of the elements of her claims sexual harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge (equal pay). I, Anne Lindberg the Plaintiff Pro Se is entitled to summary judgment on all claims. Tn addition, the undisputed evidence indicates that the Plaintiff has proven her affirmative burden of proving her Civil Action, entitling her to summary judgment on that defense.

[Dkt. # 59 at 19]. But that is not the summary judgment standard.

         Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether an issue of fact exists, the Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovingparty and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson Liberty Lobby, Inc., Ml U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986) (emphasis added); Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1996). A genuine issue of material fact exists where there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52. The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is no evidence which supports an element essential to the nonmovant's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the movant has met this burden, the nonmoving party then must show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 411 U.S. at 250. If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex, 411 U.S. at 323-24.

         There is no requirement that the moving party negate elements of the non-movant's case. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-movant must then produce concrete evidence, without merely relying on allegations in the pleadings, that there remain genuine factual issues. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

         Lindberg has not met her burden of demonstrating that, viewed in the light most favorable to Spencer, the evidence (of which she has supplied none[2]) demonstrates that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Her Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #59] is therefore DENIED.

         The Court will consider this Motion (and each of Lindberg's other recent motions and filings) as part of her ...


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