United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma
B. LEIGHTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MATTER is before the Court on the following Motions:
Defendant Spencer's Motions for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #
60], and for Relief from deadlines [Dkt. # 73]; and on
Plaintiff Lindberg's Motions for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #
59]; to add Joe Ann West's Affidavit [Dkt. #64]; for
Judgment Cases Dockets for Case No. 16-5671 [Dkt. # 65]; for
Sanctions for Willful Violation Laws by Morehead [Dkt. # 70]
and to Introduce Material/Evidence of Violation of Protective
Order [Dkt. #71].
has been employed at the Navy Shipyard in Bremerton since
1980. She received a variety of promotions and positive
evaluations, and apparently had a good relationship with her
employer until 2012.
claims that she was moved from one position to another in
2012. She engaged in "EEO activity" regarding that
move in May, and in June she was offered a promotion. That
offer was rescinded, and she was reprimanded for failing to
do her then-current job. She claims the higher paying job she
sought was given to a male, instead. In August, 2012 Lindberg
was suspended for one day for leaving the job site. She
claims that both adverse employment actions were instead in
retaliation for her EEO activity. She filed another EEOC
complaint, for sex discrimination that month. Lindberg claims
she was denied another promotion in 2014 due to her EEO
activity. Her EEOC process ended in May 2016 with an
"Order/Dismissal in favor of U.S. District Court
Action." [Dkt. # 1 at 7]
sued shortly thereafter, claiming sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII. Her attorney withdrew and Lindberg is
proceeding pro se.
now seeks Summary Judgment. He argues, and demonstrates, that
Lindberg was in fact promoted several times after
her initial EEO activity [See Rider Dec. Dkt. #63 at
] ¶¶ 7-10] Spencer also demonstrates that Lindberg
failed to perform her job duties dating to April 2012, prior
to her initial EEO activity. He provides excerpts of
Lindberg's own deposition conceding some of these points.
He also argues, and demonstrates, that Lindberg walked off
the job June 13, 2012, angered when she was given a written
reprimand. He argues that that incident-and not
Lindberg's prior EEO activity-led to the rescission of
the promotion offer made to Lindberg just a week before. In
fact, in claims, the person who rescinded the offer did not
know of the EEO complaint. See generally Dkt. # 60
at 2-7, and Declarations and Exhibits referenced therein.
own Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #59] is a long list of
repeated complaints, accusations, and rhetorical questions.
At times it hints at the underlying facts related to her
employment and the claims she put at issue in her complaint,
but it includes no evidence; instead it claims that
"emails are available" and that evidence will be
provided at trial. It references the underlying EEO process
but does not include any of the evidence she apparently wants
the Court to review. The following excerpt is typical of the
entire document: Navy Case No. 16-4523A-02785 (EEOC
551-2013-00215X) DISMISSED on 04/17/2017 by Terrie Brodie as
a MIXED complaint by (for being 3 EEO complaints in 1 EEO
complaint) Federal EEOC Supervisor Administrative Judge.
However, DON DOCKET 15-4523A-3311 was dismissed by Terrie
Brodie on September 30, 2016 (order of dismissal is
provided on [DKT. # 54]). DON DOCKET
16-4523A-01226 was dismissed by EEOC/OFO Director Carlton M.
Hadden on October 7, 2016 (order of dismissal is provided
on [DKT. # 54]). How did the agency introduce DON NO.
16-4523A-01226, or a dead EEO complaint into a live EEO
complaint DON NO 16-4523A-02785/EEOC Nos 550-2016-00215X? The
Decision by the Office of Federal Operation (OFO) by Carlton
M. Hadden is provided to Federal Judge Ronald B Leighton with
a request for his interpretation of the right to file an
appeal or about the Complainant's Rights to File a Civil
Action (S0610). Who can appeal or process DON DOCKET No
16-4523A-01226 further? Did the agency appeal 01226 on
Complainant's behalf? Did Complainant Anne Lindberg Pro
se plaintiff had a designated representative on file?
(Certificate of service provided on [DKT. # 54]).
How did 01226 made to California, and became a MIXED
59 at 14-15]. Lindberg concludes her Motion by asking the
Court to rule in her favor as a matter of law, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to her:
Because the Plaintiffs evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to her, is sufficient to establish all of the
elements of her claims sexual harassment, retaliation, and
constructive discharge (equal pay). I, Anne Lindberg the
Plaintiff Pro Se is entitled to summary judgment on all
claims. Tn addition, the undisputed evidence indicates that
the Plaintiff has proven her affirmative burden of proving
her Civil Action, entitling her to summary judgment on that
[Dkt. # 59 at 19]. But that is not the summary judgment
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether an issue of fact
exists, the Court must view all evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmovingparty and draw all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson
Liberty Lobby, Inc., Ml U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986)
(emphasis added); Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194,
1197 (9th Cir. 1996). A genuine issue of material fact exists
where there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable
factfinder to find for the nonmoving party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The inquiry is
"whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement
to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided
that one party must prevail as a matter of law."
Id. at 251-52. The moving party bears the initial
burden of showing that there is no evidence which supports an
element essential to the nonmovant's claim. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the
movant has met this burden, the nonmoving party then must
show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson,
411 U.S. at 250. If the nonmoving party fails to
establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact,
"the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Celotex, 411 U.S. at 323-24.
is no requirement that the moving party negate elements of
the non-movant's case. Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). Once the moving party
has met its burden, the non-movant must then produce concrete
evidence, without merely relying on allegations in the
pleadings, that there remain genuine factual issues.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
has not met her burden of demonstrating that, viewed in the
light most favorable to Spencer, the evidence (of which she
has supplied none) demonstrates that she is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Her Motion for Summary Judgment
[Dkt. #59] is therefore
Court will consider this Motion (and each of Lindberg's
other recent motions and filings) as part of her ...