United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
W. CHRISTEL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
District Court has referred this action, filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, to United States Magistrate Judge David
W. Christel. Plaintiff Jonathan Donnell Turner, proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated
this civil rights action in July of 2017.
alleges Defendants violated his rights when they provided him
deliberately indifferent medical care. However, Plaintiff has
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing
this action. Further, he has alleged only a single incident
of neglect, which is not sufficient to show constitutionally
deficient medical care. Finally, he has only alleged general
supervisory liability as to Defendant NaphCare, which is also
not enough to show deliberate indifference. Therefore, the
Court recommends Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Motion”) (Dkt. 21) be granted and
Plaintiff's action be dismissed.
initially filed his complaint in July of 2017. Dkt. 1.
Pursuant to an Order from this Court (Dkt. 5), Plaintiff
filed an Amended Complaint in September of 2017 (Dkt. 9). In
his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Janel
French gave him an antidepressant instead of his blood
pressure medication on one occasion. Dkt. 9. He also alleges
Defendant John Doe, an unknown corrections officer, failed in
his duty to double-check the medication before Plaintiff
received it. Id. He finally alleges Defendant
NaphCare, Inc., failed in its duty to hire reliable medical
staff and failed to “follow up” on “urgent
medical treatment or care.” Id. at 3. He does
not explain whether he informed Defendant NaphCare he needed
care. Id. He also alleges the Pierce County Jail
failed in its duty to provide him medical care. Id.
filed an initial grievance with the Pierce County Jail. Dkt.
9 at 8. He did not file an appeal or second tier grievance,
and generally alleges he failed to appeal because jail staff
failed to listen to his verbal requests. Id. at 7.
Defendant “Pierce County Prison Facility” moved
for summary judgment in December of 2017, and the District
Court granted summary judgment in February of 2018. Dkts. 19,
30-32. Defendants French and NaphCare filed a Motion to
Dismiss in December of 2017. Dkt. 21. The Court converted the
Motion to Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment in
February of 2018 and provided the parties an opportunity for
supplemental briefing. Dtk. 31. Defendants filed a
supplement, but plaintiff did not. Dkt. 33.That Motion is
currently before the Court.
to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
“the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” A party asserting a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). All facts and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d
1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Torres v. City of
Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011); Tarin
v. County of Los Angeles, 123 F.3d 1259, 1263 (9th
party moving for summary judgment, Defendants have the
initial burden to demonstrate no genuine issue of material
fact remains in this case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); In re Oracle Corp. Securities
Litigation, 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). A
“material” fact is one which is “relevant
to an element of a claim or defense and whose existence might
affect the outcome of the suit, ” and the materiality
of which is “determined by the substantive law
governing the claim.” T.W. Electrical Serv., Inc.
v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass'n,
809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
“[d]isputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts,
” therefore, “will not preclude a grant of
summary judgment.” Id. Rather, the nonmoving
party “must produce at least some ‘significant
probative evidence tending to support the
complaint.'” Id. (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 290); see also California
Architectural Building Products, Inc., 818 F.2d at 1468
(“No longer can it be argued that any disagreement
about a material issue of fact precludes the use of summary
judgment.”). Since Plaintiff has the burden of proof at
trial, if Defendants demonstrates that they are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, Plaintiff is still required to
present admissible evidence to prove that there exists a
material issue of fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, ...