United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
WARREN E. BELL, Plaintiff,
JEANETTE FISCHER, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT SCORE'S MOTION FOR
RICARDO S. MARTINEZ, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on Defendant SCORE Jail's
(“SCORE”) Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. #22.
Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against
it, asserting that his claim lacks any legal or factual
basis. Id. Plaintiff essentially responds that
Defendant is lying. Dkts. #25 and #26. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff, and GRANTS
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
initially filed this action on December 5, 2017, in King
County Superior Court. Dkt. #1-1. In his Complaint, Plaintiff
alleges that he was falsely arrested on May 29, 2017, and
booked into the Snohomish County Jail, but then immediately
taken to Swedish Hospital to address his medical concerns.
Dkt. #1-1 at ¶ ¶ 1.1, 4.1 and 4.2. He further
alleges that he was returned to the Snohomish County jail,
but was transferred on May 31, 2017, to SCORE. Dkt. #1-1 at
¶ ¶ 1.2 and 4.3. He alleges that SCORE medical
staff then involuntarily placed him in administrative
segregation with no explanation. Id. at ¶
¶ 1.3 and 4.4. He further alleges that he spent three
days in administrative segregation, he requested an
explanation twice by kite as to why he was in administrative
segregation, all he received in return was a notice of inmate
move to restricted housing, and he never received a due
process hearing. Id. at ¶ 4.4. He was then
released from SCORE on June 2, 2017. Id. at ¶
¶ 1.5 and 4.6.
record in this case reveals the following. Plaintiff was
booked into SCORE Jail on May 31, 2017, at approximately 1:00
p.m. Dkt. #23 at ¶ 3. He was released less than 48 hours
later, on June 2, 2017, at 12:15 p.m. Id. On May
31st, Plaintiff was initially housed in the general
population in cell S3 Mezzanine 13, at approximately 2:46
p.m. Id. About one hour later, at 3:50 p.m., he was
moved to the Medical Unit, “M 10.” Id.
According to Defendant, if Plaintiff had been placed in
administrative segregation, his cell would have been N1 or
Custody Manual allows the jail to move inmates to
“Restricted Housing, ” which includes
administrative segregation, disciplinary detention, and
Medical/Mental Health Housing. Id. at ¶ 5. The
“ad-seg” housing is for those awaiting the
outcome of a disciplinary infraction, and those who have a
history of misconduct that requires long term, restricted
housing. According to Defendant, Plaintiff was in neither
situation, nor had he been found culpable of a disciplinary
code section that would have placed him in
“disciplinary detention.” Id.
had been incarcerated three times previously, in 2012, 2013
and 2014. Id. at ¶ 11. In November 2012, he was
sentenced to 184 days at SCORE, during which time he had been
housed in the Medical Unit. Id. Accordingly,
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was aware of what the
Medical Unit looked like. Id.
removed this action to this Court on January 3, 2018. Dkt.
#1. Plaintiff filed a motion for remand, which was denied.
Dkts. #10 and #18. The instant motion followed.
Legal Standard on Summary Judgment
judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). In ruling on summary judgment, a
court does not weigh evidence to determine the truth of the
matter, but “only determine[s] whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Crane v. Conoco,
Inc., 41 F.3d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny &
Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992)). Material
facts are those which might affect the outcome of the suit
under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party. See O'Melveny & Meyers,
969 F.2d at 747, rev'd on other grounds, 512
U.S. 79 (1994). However, the nonmoving party must make a
“sufficient showing on an essential element of her case
with respect to which she has the burden of proof” to
survive summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Further, “[t]he mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.