THOMAS L. SLUMAN, a single person, Appellant,
STATE OF WASHINGTON, by and through the WASHINGTON STATE PATROL; BART H. OLSON, individually and in his official capacity as a TROOPER of the WASHINGTON STATE PATROL; and JANE/JOHN DOE I-X, individually and as Employees/Agents of the WASHINGTON STATE PATROL and/or the STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondents.
common parlance, a door check is an attachment used to close
a door and prevent its slamming. In ice hockey, the term
"check" or "checking" refers to a
defensive move whereby the defenseman moves his body into an
opposing player in order to disrupt the opponent's
possession of the puck. This lawsuit gives rise to a new
meaning to the expression "door check" or
"door-check, " an import presumably derived from
this appeal, we address the tort liability of a law
enforcement officer, to an injured motorcyclist, when the
officer purposely opens his patrol car door so that the door
strikes and stops the speeding cyclist. Law enforcement
refers to the officer's tactic as door-checking. The
defendant officer and other officers pursued the motorcyclist
because of his speeding. In resolving the appeal, we ask
whether some facts support a ruling that the law enforcement
officer seized the motorcyclist within the meaning of the
United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment, and, if
so, whether the officer warrants qualified immunity from
civil liability. We also ask whether the officer and his
employer gain immunity from state law claims under
Washington's felony bar statute. The trial court granted
the officer and his employer summary judgment. We reverse.
statement of facts arises from deposition testimony and from
affidavits in support of and in opposition to summary
judgment motions filed by defendants State of Washington and
Washington State Patrol Trooper Bart Olson. Because the trial
court granted the motions and dismissed plaintiff and
motorcyclist Thomas Sluman's claims, we view the facts in
a light favorable to Sluman.
sunny morning of Wednesday, July 21, 2010, Thomas Sluman, a
Port Angeles denizen, rode his motorcycle eastbound on
Interstate 90 in lower Kittitas County ten miles west of
Ellensburg. On that same morning, Washington State Patrol
Trooper John Montemayor piloted the aircraft "Smokey
6" and patrolled traffic from the craft. An aerial
patrol officer employs a series of white stains, known as
aerial traffic surveillance marks, painted on the road at
half-mile intervals to measure the speed of vehicles. The
officer gauges the speed of a vehicle with a stopwatch as the
vehicle travels between marks. Trooper Montemayor, by using
the surveillance marks, measured Sluman as traveling between
seventy-six and eighty-nine miles per hour on the seventy
miles per hour interstate. Montemayor radioed Trooper David
Hinchliff, who patrolled on the ground, to stop and cite
Sluman. Trooper Hinchliff's patrol car parked facing
northbound on Thorp Highway near Interstate 90 exit 101, the
location of Thorp Fruit and Antique Mall.
Sluman left Interstate 90 at exit 101. Sluman stopped at the
stop sign at the end of the off-ramp, activated his
motorcycle's right turn signal, and turned right onto
South Thorp Highway. According to Trooper David Hinchliff,
Sluman did not turn his head to the left to see Trooper David
Hinchliff's patrol car before Sluman turned right.
According to Sluman, he looked to the left and saw the patrol
car, but the car faced the opposite direction.
Thorp Highway mainly travels east and west, but south of
Interstate 90. Trooper Hinchliff performed a U-turn on Thorp
Highway, activated his overhead lights, and radioed dispatch
to notify it that he would pursue Sluman. After radioing
dispatch, Hinchliff activated his siren and chased Sluman on
South Thorp Highway. Sluman never saw Hinchliff reverse
directions in order to pursue him.
David Hinchliff soon lost sight of Thomas Sluman because the
two-lane South Thorp Highway frequently curves. From
Interstate 90 exit 101, the highway runs five miles before it
again crosses the interstate at exit 106, the western exit
for Ellensburg. Trooper John Montemayor eyed Sluman from the
air while maintaining contact with Hinchliff. From his
vantage point, Trooper Montemayor estimated Sluman reached a
speed over one hundred and twenty miles per hour. Sluman
disputes this speed approximation because South Thorp Highway
lacks aerial traffic surveillance marks, but Sluman does not
testify as to his speed. While riding on Thorp Highway,
Sluman obeyed all traffic laws except the speed limit. Sluman
never looked behind him to see Trooper Hinchliff in pursuit.
Hinchliff concluded that he did not need to pursue Sluman at
a high rate of speed, since the air patrolman followed
State Trooper Bart Olson also patrolled, in a Dodge Charger,
along Interstate 90 near exit 101 on the morning of July 21,
2010. Trooper Olson had just completed a traffic stop, when
he overheard Trooper David Hinchliff notify dispatch about
Hinchliff's pursuit of Thomas Sluman. Olson unilaterally
joined the pursuit by traveling eastbound on Interstate 90,
not on South Thorp Highway.
Washington State Patrol regulation prohibits a trooper from
unilaterally joining a suspect's pursuit. Troopers may
join a pursuit only when requested by the first officer in
pursuit or when directed by a supervising officer. The State
Patrol adopted this regulation because pursuits pose as one
of the riskiest actions that a law enforcement officer
undertakes. Trooper Bart Olson denies that he pursued Thomas
Sluman since Olson did not chase Sluman on South Thorp
Highway. Nevertheless, State Patrol rules consider an officer
as pursuing the suspect, even if the trooper does not chase
the suspect from behind, if the trooper acts to intercept or
stop the pursued driver.
haste, Trooper Bart Olson passed another patrol officer,
Trooper Paul Blume, on Interstate 90. Blume drove a sports
utility vehicle (SUV). Trooper Olson then received
instruction to end his pursuit since Trooper John Montemayor
followed Thomas Sluman from the air. Olson ignored the
instruction and proceeded to Interstate 90 exit 106 where
Olson anticipated he could intercept Sluman on South Thorp
Olson exited Interstate 90, he turned right on South Thorp
Highway and journeyed in the opposite direction of Sluman and
Trooper David Hinchliff. Olson then saw Sluman's
motorcycle rounding a corner in the oncoming lane. According
to Olson, "nobody was in the area." Clerk's
Papers (CP) at 535. Trooper Olson drove his patrol car across
the centerline of the road, quickly braked, and parked his
car, while straddling the center line, on a bridge across the
Yakima River, with the car's emergency lights activated.
Trooper Olson explained his intent:
And, anyway, the motorcyclist was coming at me. And I could
see the speed of the motorcycle, which was at a high rate,
rapidly slowing. . . . I'm going to place this person in
custody or worst [sic]-you know, I'm going to place him
in custody, do a felony-style stop, or they're going to
be going slow enough that if it comes down to it I'm
going to basically horse collar this person off the
motorcycle and end this pursuit, so that they don't end
up with serious injuries, kill themselves, kill an innocent
CP at 532. After Trooper Olson parked, Trooper Paul Blume
pulled behind Trooper Olson's patrol car and blocked more
of the road.
Washington State Patrol does not authorize a state trooper to
tackle, horse collar, or otherwise physically remove a driver
from a motorcycle. State Patrol personnel deem such a
maneuver to be unwise and unsafe. State Patrol regulations do
not permit a trooper to drive patrol cars into the lane of
oncoming traffic or to park in the middle of the road. Under
a State Patrol regulation, a roadblock occurs when officers
position one or more vehicles or other obstructions across a
roadway in order to prevent the escape of a fleeing vehicle.
The regulation requires any roadblock to afford an
"escape route" for the suspect. CP at 246, 662.
State Patrol rules allow a roadblock only with supervisory
approval and only when law enforcement seeks to apprehend the
suspect for homicide, assault with intent to kill, rape,
robbery in the first degree, or prison escape. Trooper Olson
lacked supervisory approval for blocking the road and law
enforcement did not pursue Thomas Sluman for any of the
requisite crimes. Olson insists that he allowed space for
Sluman to steer around his patrol car.
to Thomas Sluman, he traveled sixty miles an hour as he
rounded a curve on South Thorp Highway into the straightaway
across the Yakima River Bridge. Sluman applied his brakes
because he saw lights and vehicles on the bridge. He did not
know that one or more of the cars were police cars. He
intended to stop near the cars. After he rounded the curve,
he did not accelerate. Suddenly a sports utility vehicle
entered his lane.
Trooper Bart Olson remained parked in the middle of South
Thorp Highway, he observed Thomas Sluman's motorcycle
rapidly slow. Sluman probably then traveled between
thirty-one and thirty-seven miles per hour. As Sluman slowed,
he steered his motorcycle to the right and away from the
highway's centerline in order to pass Trooper Olson's
vehicle. According to Trooper Paul Blume, Sluman appeared to
be stopping his motorcycle. As Sluman attempted to pass,
Olson opened his patrol car door into the oncoming lane where
Sluman traveled. The parties refer to Olson's maneuver as
"door-checking." In his investigation report, Olson
did not volunteer that he purposely opened the door to cause
the door to strike Sluman. Trooper Olson's open door
struck Sluman's motorcycle and propelled Sluman over the
Yakima River Bridge to the ground thirty feet below and into
a campground. A video captured Sluman crossing the Yakima
River Bridge, Olson opening his patrol car door, and Sluman
driving by the side of the door.
a deposition, Thomas Sluman testified that he only remembered
encountering a sports utility vehicle. According to Sluman,
the SUV drove toward him in his lane and struck him.
State Patrol regulations consider intentional intervention to
be the act of ramming or hitting another vehicle with a
patrol car in order to damage or force another vehicle off
the road. During discovery in this suit, State Patrol
personnel confirmed that a trooper driving his car into the
oncoming lane of traffic on a two-lane road with a suspect
approaching constitutes the use of intentional intervention.
The State Patrol equates intentional intervention with lethal
force. Intentional intervention should only be used as a last
resort to apprehend a suspect. Intentional intervention
should also be used only when the officer knows or has
reasonable grounds to believe the suspect committed or is
attempting to commit a crime that poses a threat of death or
serious bodily injury.
Patrol regulation declares that intentional intervention
"shall not be used to apprehend a traffic offender,
misdemeanant, or fleeing felon whose only felony is
attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle." CP at
662. The regulation further reads that an officer
"attempting intentional intervention with a vehicle
shall be held to the same standards as are applied to any
other use of lethal force." CP at 662.
Thomas Sluman hit the ground, he lost consciousness. After
Sluman regained cognizance, but before receiving treatment
for his injuries, Trooper Bart Olson asked Sluman why he fled
from the police. Sluman answered that he had outstanding
arrest warrants. An audio recording captured Sluman's
response. Sluman admits he uttered the response, but he
denies his statement to be correct. According to Sluman, he
had outstanding warrants but he did not flee the police
pursuit particularly since he knew not of the pursuit. When
responding to Bart Olson's question, Sluman lay on the
ground in severe pain.
result of the collision with the patrol car door and descent
into the campground, Thomas Sluman sustained fractures of the
tibia and fibula of his right leg, pubic bone, tailbone, and
left elbow. The tibia and fibula breaks required multiple
surgeries to implant and replace hardware and to graft skin
and muscle. Sluman spent one year in a wheelchair while
recovering. He suffered permanent physical impairments.
Sluman later entered an Alford plea to charges of
attempting to elude a police vehicle. According to Sluman, he
entered the plea because he wanted to end the prosecution
because he still recovered from injuries.
Sluman filed suit against Washington State Patrol Trooper
Bart Olson and the State of Washington. Sluman asserted a
federal cause of action for a civil rights violation and
state law causes of action for false arrest, false
imprisonment, negligence, gross negligence, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and negligent training and supervision.
He asserted the latter claim only against the State. Sluman
alleged that Trooper Olson at all times relevant to the suit
acted within the scope of his employment with the State of
response to the civil rights cause of action, the State of
Washington pled the defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity
and Olson pled the defense of qualified immunity. Both the
State and Olson raised the felony bar statute in defense of
Thomas Sluman's state law claims. The State agreed in its
answer that Trooper Bart Olson acted within the scope of his
employment at all times.
State of Washington and Bart Olson moved for summary
judgment. In response, Thomas Sluman agreed to dismissal of
claims for false arrest and false imprisonment. The trial
court granted summary judgment and dismissed all remaining
Rights Cause of Action
Sluman asserts a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the State of Washington and Trooper Bart Olson,
and the trial court dismissed the claim against each
defendant. Sluman only appeals the dismissal of the claim
against Olson. Therefore, we do not address the merits of a
civil rights claim against the State. The appeal of this
dismissal centers on whether Trooper Olson seized Sluman and
imposed excessive force within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment and whether Olson qualifies for qualified immunity
under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. §
U.S.C. § 1983, an often employed, but rarely quoted,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. . . .
1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights. Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104
L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Section 1983 only fulfills the procedural
or remedial role of authorizing the assertion of a claim for
relief. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 393-94. The
pleader must also allege an independent substantive basis for
his claim, whether grounded in a federal constitutional or a
statutory right. Nabozny v. NCS Pearson, Inc., 270
F.Supp.2d 1201, 1205 (D. Nev. 2003). Thomas Sluman contends
Trooper Bart Olson employed excessive force when blocking the
path of his motorcycle and thereby violated the United States
Constitution's Fourth Amendment.
U.S.C. § 1983 admits no immunities. The United States
Supreme Court, however, has, based on common law and policy
grounds, crafted immunities shielding government officials
and employees from personal liability for damages. We will
address available immunities later.
1: Whether Thomas Sluman presents facts to establish that
Washington State Trooper Bart Olson seized Sluman?
first address whether facts support a conclusion that Trooper
Bart Olson infringed Thomas Sluman's Fourth Amendment
rights. In doing so, we view the facts in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, Sluman.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151,
150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Since Sluman sues under the federal
civil rights statute and since he relies on the United States
Constitution, we examine only federal cases.
Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." We first determine
if Trooper Bart Olson seized Thomas Sluman and later decide
whether the seizure was reasonable. Olson denies any seizure
and characterizes his conduct as reasonable as a matter of
Bart Olson impeded the travel of Thomas Sluman when Olson
door-checked Sluman's motorcycle. Whenever an officer
restrains the freedom of a person, he or she seizes that
person for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1
(1985). Seizure occurs when the government official
intentionally terminates a suspect's freedom of movement.
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597, 109
S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989).
v. County of Inyo informs our decision. William Brower
died after the stolen car he drove at high speeds in an
effort to elude pursuing police crashed into a police
roadblock. The United States Supreme Court held that law
enforcement seized Brower, within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, by placement of the roadblock. Contrary to the
Court of Appeals' holding, the high Court explained that
Brower's opportunities to stop the vehicle prior to
impact did not preclude violation of the Fourth
The Court explicated:
[A] roadblock is not just a significant show of authority to
induce a voluntary stop, but is designed to produce a stop by
physical impact if voluntary compliance does not occur. It
may well be that respondents here [law enforcement officers]
preferred, and indeed earnestly hoped, that Brower would stop
on his own, without striking the barrier, but we do not think
it practicable to conduct such an inquiry into subjective
intent. Nor do we think it possible, in determining whether
there has been a seizure in a case such as this, to
distinguish between a roadblock that is designed to give the
oncoming driver the option of a voluntary stop (e.g., one at
the end of a long straightaway), and a roadblock that is
designed precisely to produce a collision (e.g., one located
just around a bend). In determining whether the means that
terminates the freedom of movement is the very means that the
government intended we cannot draw too fine a line, or we
will be driven to saying that one is not seized who has been
stopped by the accidental discharge of a gun with which he
was meant only to be bludgeoned, or by a bullet in the heart
that was meant only for the leg. We think it enough for a
seizure that a person be stopped by the very instrumentality
set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that
result. It was enough here, therefore, that, according to the
allegations of the complaint, Brower was meant to be stopped
by the physical obstacle of the roadblock-and that he was so
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. at 598-99
(internal citations omitted).
footnote in his brief, Trooper Bart Olson denies that he
established a roadblock. But he presents no argument or case
law to the contrary. Looking at the facts in the light most
favorable to Thomas Sluman and accepting his version of the
facts, we conclude Trooper Olson orchestrated a roadblock.
Bart Olson's own deposition testimony suggests he
implemented a roadblock. Olson explained his intent for
driving across the centerline of the road and parking in the
middle of the bridge as placing Sluman in custody by stopping
him or horse collaring him. Trooper Olson stationed his
patrol car to achieve the result of stopping Sluman's
travel. Olson's supervisor testified that Trooper Olson
created a roadblock.
Bart Olson highlights that a semi-tractor trailer could have
squeezed on either side of his patrol car parked on the
Yakima River Bridge. But this emphasis ignores important
facts, including his own testimony that he opened his car
door at the last moment in order to impede Thomas
Sluman's progress. He intended a roadblock and
effectuated this intent. Any opportunity by Sluman to steer
clear of the door does not preclude application of the Fourth
do not consider the question of whether Trooper Bart Olson
erected a roadblock as controlling. A Fourth Amendment
seizure does not require use of a roadblock. For example, a
police officer's fatal shooting of a fleeing suspect
constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure presumably because the
death impedes the suspect's movement. Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. at 7 (1985). Even assuming Olson
employed no roadblock, he, like the officers in Brower v.
County of Inyo and Tennessee v. Garner,
employed means to stop the movement of Thomas Sluman.
2: Whether Thomas Sluman presents facts of an unreasonable
alone does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The amount of
force used to effect the seizure must be unreasonable to
amount to a constitutional violation. Brower v. County of
Inyo, 489 U.S. at 599 (1989). Courts analyze a claim of
excessive force in the course of making a seizure of a person
under the Fourth Amendment's "objective
reasonableness" standard. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 736, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011);
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 388 (1989). In
assessing the reasonableness of the manner of a seizure,
courts balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual's liberty interest against the importance of
the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396. Courts examine
the government interest in safely effecting an arrest in
light of the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he actively resists arrest or
attempts to evade arrest by flight. Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. at 396. Even when some force is
justified, the amount actually used may be excessive.
Santo v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002).
whether a police officer's use of force was reasonable or
excessive requires careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case. Drummond ex rel.
Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th
Cir. 2003). Because such balancing nearly always requires a
jury to sift through disputed factual contentions to draw
inferences therefrom and to assess credibility of witnesses,
courts should grant summary judgment in excessive force cases
sparingly. Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d at 853;
Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976
n.10 (9th Cir. 1997).
judge the reasonableness of the force exacted by a law
enforcement officer from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with hindsight. Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396-97 (1989). The calculus of
reasonableness must recognize that police officers must often
render split-second judgments, in tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving circumstances, about the amount of force
necessary in a particular situation. Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
determining if Trooper Bart Olson exercised unreasonable
force, we must measure the amount of force employed by Olson.
In this regard, Thomas Sluman contends that Olson exercised
deadly force. Even when law enforcement does not intend to
kill or does not kill, courts characterize the force employed
as deadly if the force could cause death or serious injury.
Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343
F.3d at 1056. "Deadly force" entails a substantial
risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. Robinette
v. Barnes, 854 F.2d 909, 911-12 (6th Cir. 1988).
Olson used his car to impede Thomas Sluman's progress. In
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 200, 125 S.Ct.
596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004), the Supreme Court noted that a
car can be a deadly weapon, although the Court deemed
reasonable the officer's decision to stop the car from
possibly injuring others. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
U.S. at 200. We observe that Thomas Sluman rode a motorcycle,
rather than drove an automobile. A law enforcement
officer's use of a squad car to block a motorcycle's
path constitutes deadly and unreasonable force. Walker v.
Davis, 649 F.3d 502, 503-04 (6th Cir. 2011); Donovan
v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 949-50 (7th Cir.
State Patrol regulations confirm use of a patrol car to be
lethal force. The regulations provide "intentional
intervention . . . of a vehicle is the deliberate act of
hitting another vehicle with a patrol vehicle(s) for the
purpose of functionally damaging or forcing the other vehicle
off the road." CP at 661. The State Patrol rules also
declare that "intentional intervention is considered the
use of lethal force . . . [and] officers attempting
intentional intervention with a vehicle shall be held to the
same standards as are applied to any other use of lethal
force." CP at 661-62.
proceed on the assumption that Trooper Bart Olson's
door-checking constituted deadly force. Although the seizure
did not kill Thomas Sluman, the seizure imperiled
Sluman's life and caused serious injury. Bart Olson
denies that he exerted deadly force, but he provides no
decision to support the denial.
now address whether Thomas Sluman's conduct justified
Trooper Bart Olson's exercise of deadly force. The
balancing process applied in excessive force cases
demonstrates that, notwithstanding probable cause to seize a
suspect, an officer may not always do so by killing him.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9 (1985). As a
subset of excessive force claims, the United States Supreme
Court has held that police use of "deadly force"
violates the Fourth Amendment unless the officer has probable
cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious
physical harm, either to the officer or to others.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. The individual
interests at stake rise to their zenith when law enforcement
seizes a citizen by deadly force because of the fundamental
interest in one's life. Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. at 9. The use of deadly force by law enforcement against
a suspect frustrates the interest of the individual, of
society, and in the judicial determination of guilt and
punishment. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9.
peaceful submission of suspects holds no priority over the
interest in life. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at
9-10. Employing deadly force to vindicate our criminal
justice system defeats its purpose since, if successful, that
system will not be set in motion. Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. at 10. Thus, the use of deadly force to
prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the
circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. On the other
hand, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or
probable cause exists to believe that he committed a crime
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious
physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to
prevent escape, and if, when feasible, some warning has been
given. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12. Under
Thomas Sluman's version of the facts, he received no
under the State's version of the facts, Thomas Sluman did
not commit a crime involving serious physical harm to
another. Law enforcement sought to stop Sluman for speeding.
Washington State Patrol officers did not even seek to capture
Sluman because of a crime. Sluman was not armed. No officer
knew that Sluman discerned he was being pursued. According to
Trooper Paul Blume, Sluman never looked in his direction.
Thus, no officer knew that Sluman sought to elude the police.
Bart Olson asserts that he held a governmental interest in
protecting the public from injury or death when stopping
Thomas Sluman. Olson emphasizes that the motorcycle's
high speed posed a risk to persons in the immediate area.
in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)
disassembles Bart Olson's argument. In Garner,
the Supreme Court noted, based on extensive research and
consideration, that laws permitting police officers to use
deadly force to apprehend unarmed, nonviolent fleeing felony
suspects do not protect citizens or law enforcement officers,
do not deter crime or alleviate problems caused by crime, and
do not improve the crime fighting ability of law enforcement
agencies. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 19. Thus,
the government's interest in ending a high-speed chase of
an unarmed perpetrator does not justify deadly force.
Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment's right to be free from