United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
L. ROBART UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the court is Plaintiff Ismahan Ismail's motion for
reconsideration of the court's June 5, 2018, order
granting Defendant Amazon.com's (“Amazon”)
motion for summary judgment. (MFR (Dkt. # 54); see
also 6/5/18 Order (Dkt. # 47); Judgment (Dkt. # 49).)
The court has considered the motion, the relevant portions of
the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised, the
court DENIES Ms. Ismail's motion for the reasons set
case arose from Ms. Ismail's employment at Amazon's
Global Security Command Center in Phoenix, Arizona. (Am.
Compl. (Dkt. # 22) ¶¶ 4.1-4.2.) Ms. Ismail filed
suit on October 28, 2016 (see IFP Mot. (Dkt. # 1)),
and alleged claims under (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 for disparate treatment based on her race and
religion, for a hostile work environment based on her
religion, and for retaliation; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1981
based on racial discrimination and retaliation; and (3) the
Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”), Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 41-1461, et seq., based on racial and
religious discrimination and retaliation (see Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 5.1-5.15). The court permitted Ms. Ismail
to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
(See 10/31/16 Order (Dkt. # 2).)
January 12, 2017, Ms. Ismail moved for the appointment of
counsel (MTA (Dkt. # 12)), and per the Western District of
Washington's Pro Bono Screening Committee's
recommendation, the court subsequently appointed
counsel-Timothy Feulner-on March 23, 2017 (3/23/17 Order
(Dkt. # 15); see also 2/23/17 Order (Dkt. # 14)).
Mr. Feulner represented Ms. Ismail from that date until the
court granted Amazon's motion for summary judgment.
(See Dkt.; Withdrawal (Dkt. # 50).)
5, 2018, the court granted Amazon's motion for summary
judgment and dismissed Ms. Ismail's claims with
prejudice. (See 6/5/18 Order.) As to Ms.
Ismail's disparate treatment claim, the court concluded
that under the burden-shifting framework in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), Ms. Ismail
failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of disparate
treatment and that even if she had, Amazon had legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment actions, which
Ms. Ismail could not show were merely pretext for
discrimination. (See Id. at 33-40.) The court
concluded that Amazon was also entitled to summary judgment
on the retaliation claim because although Ms. Ismail had
demonstrated a prima facie case, Amazon had legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions that were not
merely pretextual. (Id. at 45-47.) Finally, the
court granted summary judgment on Ms. Ismail's hostile
work environment claim because the conduct underlying Ms.
Ismail's claim was not sufficiently severe or
pervasive. (Id. at 49-52.)
4, 2018, Ms. Ismail moved for reconsideration of the
court's order. (See MFR.) The gist of her motion
is that she is unhappy with Mr. Feulner's representation.
(See Id. at 1.) She contends that Mr. Feulner did
not gather certain witness statements, threatened to stop
representing Ms. Ismail, requested that Ms. Ismail
communicate with him via email rather than by phone or in
person, and did not communicate Ms. Ismail's final
settlement offer to Amazon. (Id.) She therefore asks
the court to reconsider its summary judgment ruling to allow
her case to be heard “before completely dismissing
it.” (Id.) The court now addresses Ms.
to Local Civil Rule 7(h)(1), motions for reconsideration are
disfavored, and the court will ordinarily deny such motions
unless the moving party shows (a) manifest error in the prior
ruling, or (b) new facts or legal authority that could not
have been brought to the court's attention earlier
through reasonable diligence. Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR
7(h)(1); see also Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of
Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that
“a motion for reconsideration should not be granted,
absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district
court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed
clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the
controlling law”). Furthermore, a motion for
reconsideration “shall be filed within fourteen days
after the order to which it relates is filed.” Local
Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(h)(2) (“Failure to comply with
this subsection may be grounds for denial of the
Ismail does not meet those requirements. First, she brings
her motion nearly a month after the order at issue, and as
such, the motion is untimely. (Compare MFR at 1
(filed on July 4, 2018)), with 6/5/18 Order);
see also Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(h)(2). Second,
Ms. Ismail has not shown manifest error in the court's
prior ruling or any new facts or legal authority that she
could not have brought to the court's attention earlier
though reasonable diligence. See Local Rules W.D.
Wash. LCR 7(h)(1). By arguing that her counsel inadequately
represented her, Ms. Ismail apparently relies on that
“new fact” as the basis for her motion.
(See MFR at 1.) But she does not explain why she
could not have raised her dissatisfaction with Mr.
Feulner's performance earlier or why such dissatisfaction
would warrant a different outcome on Amazon's summary
judgment motion. (See id.) Indeed, dissatisfaction
with counsel does not provide a basis for reconsideration of
the summary judgment motion. Cf. Jackson v. Ylst,
921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that in a criminal
case-in which a defendant has a right to court-appointed
counsel-“there is no automatic right to a substitution
of counsel simply because the defendant informs the trial
court that he is dissatisfied with appointed counsel's
performance”); Terry v. Haw. Air Nat'l
Guard, No. 13-00295-LEK-RLP, 2013 WL 3354562, at *2 (D.
Haw. July 3, 2013) (“[T]he appointment of counsel in
employment discrimination cases is discretionary, and there
is no constitutional right to counsel.”). Because Ms.
Ismail's motion is untimely and fails to articulate a
proper basis for reconsideration, the court denies the
foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Ms. Ismail's motion