United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
C. COUGHENOUR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on Defendant's motion for
summary judgment (Dkt. No. 24). Having thoroughly considered
the parties' briefing and the relevant record, the Court
finds oral argument unnecessary and GRANTS the motion for the
reasons explained herein.
Court has described this case in detail in a prior order
(Dkt. No. 22) and will provide only a brief summary here.
Capitol Pros, Inc., a commercial cleaning company, provided
cleaning services to Defendant Vadata, Inc., a division of
Amazon.com, at its Virginia location between 2005 and 2013.
(Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) A 2008 Master Services Agreement
(“MSA”) governed the parties' relationship
and included a limitation of liabilities clause foreclosing
either party from collecting consequential damages, including
lost profits or lost opportunities, or punitive damages.
(Dkt. No. 1-2 at 6.) The MSA also required the parties to
contract for specific work through work orders incorporated
into the MSA. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) The 2013 Work Order is the
most recent work order signed by the parties and it expired
on December 31, 2013. (Dkt. No. 1-3 at 10.)
alleges that starting in July 2011 Ryan Maheepat,
Defendant's representative managing the parties'
contractual relationship, began forcing Plaintiff to hire his
parents and friends. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4-5.) Plaintiff asserts
that these workers were “unproductive and
unprofessional” and demanded a number of hiring
irregularities-including refusing to sign non-compete
agreements. (Id. at 5.) In January 2013, Plaintiff
also discovered these employees were simultaneously working
for a competitor, Barnard Building Services
(“BBS”). (Id.) Around the same time, the
parties finalized a work order adding building IAD15 to the
contract. (Id. at 6.) However, before Plaintiff
could begin work on the order, Defendant reported that it had
given BBS the contract for the IAD15 building. (Id.)
Plaintiff continued working on the remainder of the contract,
but Defendant declined to issue new work orders after the
2013 Work Order expired. (Id.)
sued Defendant for breach of contract and violation of the
Washington Consumer Protection Act (“WCPA”) based
on Defendant's interference with Plaintiff's
employees, the loss of the IAD15 building, and other conduct
outlined in the Court's prior order. (Dkt. No. 22). The
Court previously dismissed the WCPA claim. (Id.)
Defendant now moves for summary judgment on the remaining
breach of contract claim, arguing that Plaintiff is not
entitled to damages because the contract was paid in full.
(Dkt. No. 24.)
Court shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In making this determination, the Court
must view the facts and justifiable inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and
supported, the opposing party must present specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary judgment is
appropriate against a party who “fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
prove a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must show
“(1) a contract that imposed a duty, (2) breach of that
duty, and (3) an economic loss as a result of the
breach.” Myers v. State, 218 P.3d 241, 243
(2009). “[I]t is not enough for a plaintiff to show
that a breach occurred. A plaintiff must also establish the
damages resulting from the breach with a reasonable degree of
certainty.” Chamberlain Grp. Inc. v. Nassimi,
No. C09-5438-BHS, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 25, 2010).
If Plaintiff cannot “establish damages, ” the
Court need not address the other two elements of the contract
claim: duty and breach. See id.; Myers, 218
P.3d at 243.
parties agree that contract “damages are ordinarily
based on the injured parties' expectation
interest”; therefore, the Court will assess whether
Plaintiff can “establish the existence” of
expectation damages. Compare Dkt. No. 24 at 8,
with Dkt. No. 26 at 7; see Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324. Expectation damages are “intended to give
[the injured] party the benefit of the bargain by awarding
him or her a sum of money that will, to the extent possible,
put the injured party in as good a position as that party
would have been in had the contract been performed.”
Mason, 792 P.2d at 146.
Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to expectation
damages because Defendant reimbursed Plaintiff in full for
all of the money owed under the contract. The 2013 Work Order
stipulates that Defendant pay Plaintiff $828, 396 for work in
2013. (Dkt. No. 24 at 7.) Defendant paid Plaintiff $849,
231.71. (Id.) Therefore, the contract was materially
performed, so there is no amount of damages required to
“put the injured ...