United States District Court, W.D. Washington
C. COUGHENOUR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's motion to
remand (Dkt. No. 4) and Defendant's motion to dismiss
(Dkt. No. 6). Having thoroughly considered the parties'
briefing and the relevant record, the Court finds oral
argument unnecessary and hereby DENIES Plaintiff's motion
to remand (Dkt. No. 4) and GRANTS Defendant's motion to
dismiss (Dkt. No. 6) for the reasons explained herein.
Donte McClellon (“McClellon”) alleges that
Defendant Bank of America (“BOA”) is liable for a
series of fraudulent transactions from Plaintiff's
checking account in 2017. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) In his three-page
complaint, McClellon makes the following allegations against
This is an action under the Uniform Commercial Code (4.22.005
to 925) and Washington Consumer Protection At, RCW 19.86.020,
based upon Defendant's blatant self-dealing and other
intentional negligent misconduct in conversion, freezing,
pooling, otherwise manipulating Plaintiff's funds without
Plaintiff further allege that the Defendant breached the
contract, failed to comply with Regulation E and committed
the tort of negligence in the handling of Plaintiff's
funds. The Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and all other
damages (i.e., direct and consequential damages) allowed by
law, and payment of costs and attorneys' fees.
Plaintiff opened an checking account with Defendant . . .
Plaintiff timely filed his good faith Regulation E claims
with Defendant but the Defendant failed to protect the
checking account in subject, provisional credit the Plaintiff
and have those funds be accessible to him.
The fraudulent transactions at issue that took place in the
checking account in subject are $123, 553.15 on April
3rd, 2017 and $54, 000.00 on April
18th, 2017 . . . Regulation E states that a
provisional credit must be provided within 10 business
(Id. at 1-2.) McClellon originally filed his
complaint in King County Superior Court. (Id. at 1.)
On June 7, 2018, BOA removed the case, citing 28 U.S.C.
section 1332 as the basis for this Court's
jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 1-3.) On June 12, 2018,
McClellon filed a motion to remand the case to state court
(Dkt. No. 4). Two days later, BOA filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted (Dkt. No. 6). The Court addresses these
motions in turn.
Legal Standard for Remand
to a civil action brought in state court may remove that
action to federal court if the district court would have had
original jurisdiction at the time of both commencement of the
action and removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a);
14B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3723 (4th ed. 2013). Once
removed, the case can be remanded to state court for either
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or defects in the removal
procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The
removing party bears the burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co, 846
F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). There is a “strong
presumption” against removal. Gaus v. Miles,
Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992). The Court
resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.
Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042
(9th Cir. 2009).
McClellon's Motion to Remand
asserts that BOA improperly removed this case because there
is not complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in
controversy requirement is not met. (Dkt. No. 4 at 1- 3.)
McClellon, a resident of Washington, asserts that BOA is also
a resident of Washington because “it regularly conducts
business in the state.” (Id. at 1.)
Additionally, McClellon states that the $75, 000 amount in
controversy requirement is not met because his ...