United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
Honorable Richard A. Jones, United States District Judge.
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Carrington
Mortgage Services, LLC's (“Carrington”)
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. # 21). For the reasons set forth
below, the Court GRANTS Carrington's
Motion to Dismiss.
as this Court can tell, Plaintiff's lawsuit alleges that
defendants, either in whole or part, fraudulently or
otherwise improperly handled loan procedures related to a
loan that Plaintiff failed to make timely payments on, which
then resulted in a foreclosure. Dkt. ## 1, 10. On February 8,
2017, Defendants Selene Finance, L.P. and Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. moved to dismiss Plaintiffs
Complaint or for a more definite statement. Dkt. # 6. On May
25, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to amend
her complaint. Dkt. # 11. Plaintiff filed her Amended
Complaint on April 21, 2017. Dkt. # 10.
12, 2017, Defendants Selene Finance, L.P. and Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. moved again to dismiss
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint as to them under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). Dkt. # 12. On February 5, 2018, this Court ruled
that “[t]he Amended Complaint does not cure the defects
found in Plaintiff's original Complaint . . .
[s]pecifically, the Amended Complaint remains too vague to
afford Defendants proper notice about the claims and actions
for which they are called upon to defend, ” and noted
that her Amended Complaint “remained inadequate.”
Dkt. # 19. The Court granted the motion to dismiss as to
Defendants Selene Finance, L.P. and Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. Id.
as the sole remaining defendant in this lawsuit, moves to
dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on the same grounds
as Selene Finance, L.P. and Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. Dkt. # 21. Specifically, Carrington asserts
that this Court's prior ruling that the Amended Complaint
was “too vague to afford Defendants proper notice about
the claims and actions for which they are called upon to
defend” applies with equal force to Carrington. Dkt. #
21 at 5.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim. The rule requires the court to
assume the truth of the complaint's factual allegations
and credit all reasonable inferences arising from those
allegations. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910
(9th Cir. 2007). A court “need not accept as true
conclusory allegations that are contradicted by documents
referred to in the complaint.” Manzarek v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th
Cir. 2008). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 568 (2007). Although the Court must accept as true a
complaint's well-pleaded facts, “conclusory
allegations of law and unwarranted inferences will not defeat
an otherwise proper motion to dismiss.” Vasquez v.
L.A. County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007).
just as Plaintiff's Amended Complaint failed to state a
claim against Selene Finance and Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, it fails to state a claim as to
Carrington. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not
address what Carrington allegedly did wrong, or what role
Carrington played in Plaintiff's alleged harm. It is not
clear from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint why Carrington
is named in this lawsuit at all, as Plaintiff allege no facts
in connection with Carrington. It is not clear what laws
Plaintiff refers to, or which defendants, if any, were
responsible for any violations. Plaintiff's allegations,
even after amendment, remain too vague to afford Carrington,
or any other defendant, proper notice about the claim against
Response (Dkt. # 22) does not address Carrington's
argument. Instead, it is a nearly word-for-word copy of
Plaintiff's previous response to the prior motion to
dismiss. Compare Dkt. # 15 with Dkt. # 22.
In its previous Order, the Court noted that this response
“merely quotes the language of Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and repeats the vague
allegations in her Amended Complaint.” Dkt. # 19 at 2.
This criticism applies with equal force here, to what is
essentially the same response. Plaintiff's Response does
nothing to cure the terminal vagueness of her Amended
Complaint and her failure to allege any sort of cognizable
harm or claim against Carrington.
question then turns to whether to grant Plaintiff leave to
amend. Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave
to amend is proper only if it is clear that the deficiencies
cannot be cured by amendment. Terrell v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank N.A., C14-930 MJP, 2014 WL 5449729, at *1 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 24, 2014) (citing Flowers v. First
Hawaiian Bank, 295 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir.
2002)). “A district court, however, does not abuse its
discretion in denying leave to amend where amendment would be
futile.” Id. Here, Plaintiff has been afforded
an opportunity to amend her Complaint but still does not
allege a viable cause of action against any defendant.
Throughout these proceedings Plaintiff has not identified any
additional basis that would entitle her to any relief.
Plaintiff has not given this Court any reason to believe it
can state a claim against Carrington. The Court concludes
that allowing further amendments would be futile. See,
e.g., Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829
F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1987) (denial without leave to amend
proper where party is put on notice of factual deficiencies
in complaint but fails to cure them in amended pleading).
these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant
Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC's Motion to Dismiss
(Dkt. # 21). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims are
dismissed as to ...