United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CHASE'S MOTION TO
RICARDO S. MARTINEZ, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on Defendant JPMorgan Chase
Bank, NA. ("Chase")'s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt.
#19. Plaintiff Muffin Anderson opposes this Motion. Dkt. #21.
For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS
Defendant's Motion and dismisses all claims against
A. Factual Background
Anderson received a loan and mortgage on the property at 3503
S. Hudson Street, Seattle, from Chase in February of 2007.
Dkt. #17 ¶¶ 10-11. On April 22, 2013, Ms. Anderson
received a letter from Chase stating that she was approved
for a trial-loan modification plan, provided that she made
three trial payments for June, July, and August 2013.
Id. at ¶¶ 12-13. On May 15, 2013, Chase
informed Anderson it was transferring loan servicing to
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. ("Select
Portfolio") and said to make payments and inquiries to
it. Id. ¶ 15. However, On May 30, 2013, Ms.
Anderson received a second letter from Chase stating that the
June payment was due, which created confusion about where Ms.
Anderson was to send payments. Id. at 16. Ms.
Anderson made the first three trial payments to Chase,
id. at ¶ 14, and subsequent payments to Select
Portfolio, id. at ¶ 17.
January 31, 2014, Select Portfolio informed Anderson she was
eligible for a trial modification plan and she returned an
agreement for it. Id. ¶ 18. On May 22, 2014,
Select Portfolio informed Anderson that she was not approved
for the loan modification and that it was not honoring the
trial modification that was put in place by Chase in 2013.
Id. ¶ 19.
2013 to the present date, Ms. Anderson continuously contacted
Select Portfolio and Chase to try to resolve the issues with
her mortgage loan. Id. at ¶ 20. In the
meantime, she has continued to send in the modified loan
payments each month. Plaintiff made her monthly payment for
several years without incident. Id.
December 15, 2016, Select Portfolio sent Ms. Anderson a
letter, informing her that it was returning her mortgage
payment and that she owed $51, 966.91 to halt foreclosure
action on her home. Id. at ¶ 21. On January 26,
2017, Ms. Anderson received a fax from Chase, allegedly
informing her that it was attempting to collect a debt on her
loan. Id. at ¶ 23; see Dkt. #19 at 60
(January 26, 2017, Fax).
2, 2017, Ms. Anderson receive a letter from Quality Loan
Servicing, Inc. with a Notice of Trustee's Sale set for
September 29, 2017. Id. at ¶ 26.
Anderson filed this action in King County Superior Court on
December 28, 2017. Dkt. #1-1. Chase removed to this Court on
January 18, 2018. Dkt. #1. Ms. Anderson filed an Amended
Complaint on March 12, 2018. Dkt. #17. Ms. Anderson's
claims against Defendant Chase are brought under: RCW 19.86
Washington's Consumer Protection Act ("CPA"),
RCW 19.146 Mortgage Broker Practice Act, RCW 61.24 Deeds of
Trust Act ("DTA"), breach of contract, breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud.
Id. Chase now moves to dismiss these claims. Dkt.
making a 12(b)(6) assessment, the court accepts all facts
alleged in the complaint as true, and makes all inferences in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Baker
v. Riverside County Office of Educ,584 F.3d 821, 824
(9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). However, the
court is not required to accept as true a "legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation."
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). The complaint "must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Id. at 678. This
requirement is met when the plaintiff "pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Id. The complaint need not include
detailed allegations, but it must have "more than labels