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Anderson v. JP Morgan Chase & Co.

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle

July 26, 2018

MUFFIN ANDERSON, Plaintiffs,
v.
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., et al, Defendants.

          ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CHASE'S MOTION TO DISMISS

          RICARDO S. MARTINEZ, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         I. INTRODUCTION

         This matter comes before the Court on Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA. ("Chase")'s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. #19. Plaintiff Muffin Anderson opposes this Motion. Dkt. #21. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion and dismisses all claims against Chase.

         II. BACKGROUND [1]

A. Factual Background

         Plaintiff Anderson received a loan and mortgage on the property at 3503 S. Hudson Street, Seattle, from Chase in February of 2007. Dkt. #17 ¶¶ 10-11. On April 22, 2013, Ms. Anderson received a letter from Chase stating that she was approved for a trial-loan modification plan, provided that she made three trial payments for June, July, and August 2013. Id. at ¶¶ 12-13. On May 15, 2013, Chase informed Anderson it was transferring loan servicing to Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. ("Select Portfolio") and said to make payments and inquiries to it. Id. ¶ 15. However, On May 30, 2013, Ms. Anderson received a second letter from Chase stating that the June payment was due, which created confusion about where Ms. Anderson was to send payments. Id. at 16. Ms. Anderson made the first three trial payments to Chase, id. at ¶ 14, and subsequent payments to Select Portfolio, id. at ¶ 17.

         On January 31, 2014, Select Portfolio informed Anderson she was eligible for a trial modification plan and she returned an agreement for it. Id. ¶ 18. On May 22, 2014, Select Portfolio informed Anderson that she was not approved for the loan modification and that it was not honoring the trial modification that was put in place by Chase in 2013. Id. ¶ 19.

         From 2013 to the present date, Ms. Anderson continuously contacted Select Portfolio and Chase to try to resolve the issues with her mortgage loan. Id. at ¶ 20. In the meantime, she has continued to send in the modified loan payments each month. Plaintiff made her monthly payment for several years without incident. Id.

         On December 15, 2016, Select Portfolio sent Ms. Anderson a letter, informing her that it was returning her mortgage payment and that she owed $51, 966.91 to halt foreclosure action on her home. Id. at ¶ 21. On January 26, 2017, Ms. Anderson received a fax from Chase, allegedly informing her that it was attempting to collect a debt on her loan. Id. at ¶ 23; see Dkt. #19 at 60 (January 26, 2017, Fax).

         On June 2, 2017, Ms. Anderson receive a letter from Quality Loan Servicing, Inc. with a Notice of Trustee's Sale set for September 29, 2017. Id. at ¶ 26.

         Ms. Anderson filed this action in King County Superior Court on December 28, 2017. Dkt. #1-1. Chase removed to this Court on January 18, 2018. Dkt. #1. Ms. Anderson filed an Amended Complaint on March 12, 2018. Dkt. #17. Ms. Anderson's claims against Defendant Chase are brought under: RCW 19.86 Washington's Consumer Protection Act ("CPA"), RCW 19.146 Mortgage Broker Practice Act, RCW 61.24 Deeds of Trust Act ("DTA"), breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud. Id. Chase now moves to dismiss these claims. Dkt. #19.

         III. DISCUSSION

         A. Legal Standard

         In making a 12(b)(6) assessment, the court accepts all facts alleged in the complaint as true, and makes all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Baker v. Riverside County Office of Educ,584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). However, the court is not required to accept as true a "legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 678. This requirement is met when the plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The complaint need not include detailed allegations, but it must have "more than labels ...


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