United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS
L. ROBART UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the court is pro se Plaintiffs Francis Anthony
Trevino and Mark Newton Kelly's (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) motion for preliminary and
permanent injunctive relief (Inj. Mot. (Dkt. # 9)), second
motion for reconsideration (2d MFR (Dkt. # 10)), and motion
to certify for interlocutory appeal (IA Mot. (Dkt. # 11)).
Defendants Kevin W. Quigley and Dorothy Sawyer (collectively,
“Defendants”) have not responded. The court has
considered the motions, the relevant portions of the record,
and the applicable law. Being fully advised,  the court denies
the motions and orders Plaintiffs to show cause why this case
should not be dismissed for failure to comply with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).
their complaint is difficult to follow, it appears that
Plaintiffs bring suit to challenge their confinement and
Washington State's procedures for evaluating civil
competency and commitment. (See Compl. (Dkt. # 1) at
12 (stating that over 190 days have elapsed and citing
Washington's statute on competency examinations); see
also Id. at 15-16 (citing RCW ch. 10.77); id.
at 10 (citing Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1022 (9th
Cir. 1981), which discusses the constitutionally protected
liberty interest of a person who has been involuntarily
committed).) Mr. Trevino alleges that he was arrested on
August 6, 2016. (Id. at 7.) He further alleges a
“monopoly” between Mr. Quigley and Ms.
Sawyer-allegedly the heads of the Washington State Department
of Social and Health Services and Eastern State Hospital,
respectively-related to his speedy trial clock.
(Id.) Mr. Kelly alleges that he was arrested on
December 3, 1995, and arraigned on January 9, 1996.
(Id. at 8.) He contends that attorney John Nollette
and Spokane County Superior Court Judge James M. Murphy
appointed a “sanity commission” and a
“15[-]day stay.”(Id. (omitting internal
punctuation).) He further alleges that he was
“forgotten” and “held” beyond 60
days. (Id.) Plaintiffs are currently imprisoned at
Coyote Ridge Correctional Center. (See Id. at 1.) As
exhibits to their complaint, Plaintiffs attach various
filings from Spokane County Superior Court. (See
id., Ex. 1 (Dkt. # 1-2).) One of the exhibits reveals
that Mr. Trevino was recommended for inpatient evaluation at
Eastern State Hospital on December 14, 2016, and that on
December 23, 2016, he was deemed competent to stand trial.
(See Id. at 17, 20.)
the “Statement of Claim” section, Plaintiffs
reference “‘[t]he “Birth” of
Trueblood (# C14-1178MJP)'; Antitrust
Violation(s); Profit in ‘Predatory'
Interest(s)' ‘Monopoly' of RCW 10.77 &
CrR3.3(e)(1); Merger Thru [sic] Barriers Formed
‘Distinct Group' Excluded Period(s) . . .
‘Qui Tam' Action.” (Id. at 4
(internal brackets omitted and internal punctuation altered);
see also Id. at 3 (raising the First Amendment right
to petition the government, qui tam, the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343,
2201, 2202; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 57 and 60(b);
and Washington State Rules of Criminal Procedure).) They ask
the court whether Trueblood v. Washington State
Department of Social & Health Services, No.
C14-1178MJP (W.D. Wash. 2014), a case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution, or an
“actual controversy” under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, “make[s] a
distinct sep[a]ration of economic resources, economic
interests, and intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine” and
whether “this [is] a matter of usurped
authority.” (Id. at 8 (internal punctuation
and capitalization omitted).)
construed, the court discerns that Plaintiffs allege
constitutional violations related to their confinement and
Washington State's procedures for civil competency
evaluation and commitment, as addressed in
Trueblood, 2016 WL 4268933, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug.
15, 2016) (requiring Washington State to complete in-jail
competency evaluations within 14 days of a court
order). (See, e.g., Compl., Ex. 1 at 60.)
They seek relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), treble
damages, qui tam awards, $90 million for Mr. Trevino, and
$270 million for Mr. Kelly. (Id. at 30.)
8, 2018, the court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against
Defendants Spokane County Superior Court Judge Gregory D.
Sypolt; Spokane County Superior Court Judge James M. Murphy;
Washington State Supreme Court Clerk Erin L. Lennon; and
Washington State Supreme Court Clerk Susan L. Carlson
(collectively, “Judicial Defendants”). (5/8/18
Order (Dkt. # 6) at 3.) The court concluded that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over Judicial Defendants because
Plaintiffs' allegations showed that Judicial Defendants
were entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity.
(Id. at 2-3.) On June 11, 2018, Plaintiffs moved for
reconsideration, which the court denied for two reasons: (1)
the motion was untimely, and (2) Plaintiffs failed to show
manifest error in the court's prior ruling or any new
facts or legal authority that Plaintiffs could not have
brought to the court's attention earlier. (6/15/18 Order
25, 2018, Plaintiffs moved for both a preliminary injunction
and a permanent injunction. (See Inj. Mot.)
Plaintiffs also filed a “supplement” in which
they contest the court's June 15, 2018, order denying
reconsideration of its decision to dismiss Judicial
Defendants. (See 2d MFR at 2-3; see also
6/15/18 Order (Dkt. # 8) at 2-3 (denying first motion for
reconsideration).) The court construes the supplement as a
second motion for reconsideration. (See generally 2d
MFR.) Finally, Plaintiffs request leave to appeal the
dismissal of Judicial Defendants, which the court construes
as a motion for interlocutory appeal. (See IA Mot.
at 1.) No. defendant has yet appeared or responded, and there
is no indication that Plaintiffs have served Defendants.
(See Dkt.) The court now addresses Plaintiffs'
Second Motion for Reconsideration
ask the court to reconsider its decision denying
Plaintiffs' previous reconsideration motion.
(See 2d MFR at 2.) Plaintiffs argue that the first
motion was timely because they completed a postage transfer
on May 21, 2018, and their first motion was mailed on May 25,
2018. (Id. at 2; see also Id. at 4
(attaching the postage transfer as an exhibit).) In making
that argument, Plaintiffs appear to invoke the prison mailbox
rule. See Hernandez v. Spearman, 764 F.3d 1071, 1074
(9th Cir. 2014) (stating that “[a] pro se
prisoner's notice of appeal from the denial of a federal
habeas petition is filed” at the time the prisoner
delivers the notice to “prison authorities for
forwarding to the court clerk”); Adler v.
McDonald, No. 2:15-cv-0789 TLN CKD P, 2016 WL 2346980,
at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2016) (“Under the mailbox rule,
a prisoner's pleading is deemed filed when he hands it
over to prison authorities for mailing to the relevant
court.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988))).
Plaintiffs turned over their motion to prison authorities for
filing on May 21, 2018 (see 2d MFR at 4), the court
nevertheless also denied the motion because Plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate manifest error or any new facts or legal
authority that they could not have brought to the court's
attention before (see 6/15/18 Order at 2).
Plaintiffs' current submission does not change that
conclusion. (See 2d MFR at 2 (raising only the
timeliness issue).) Thus, the court denies Plaintiffs'
second motion for reconsideration and turns next to
Plaintiffs' motion for certification of an interlocutory