United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle
WARREN E. BELL, Plaintiff,
JEANETTE FISCHER, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS CITY OF SEATAC'S AND
FISCHER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND STRIKING SECOND
RICARDO S. MARTINEZ CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on Defendant City of
SeaTac's and Jeannette Fischer's Motion for Summary
Judgment. Dkt. #39. Defendants seek dismissal of
Plaintiff's claims against them, asserting that Plaintiff
fails to provide factual evidence to support his claims, and
that Defendant Fischer committed no due process violation and
she is entitled to quasi-judicial and qualified immunity.
Id. Plaintiff essentially responds that there are
material factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Dkt.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees with
Plaintiff, and GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary
initially filed this action on December 5, 2017, in King
County Superior Court. Dkt. #1-1. Plaintiff alleges that on
June 2, 2017, he appeared for arraignment on a bench warrant
that had been issued for a prior failure to appear. Dkt. #1-1
at ¶ 1.4. He was released, and returned to court on June
5, 2017, where he reported to SeaTac Municipal Court
Probation Officer Jeanette Fischer. Dkt. #1-1 at ¶
¶ 1.5, 1.6, 4.5 and 4.6. Ms. Fischer apparently told him
the warrant had been executed because she was unable to
locate his current address. Id.
evidentiary record in this case reveals the following.
Defendant Fischer is a probation officer for the City of
SeaTac. Dkt. #41 at ¶ 1. On February 28, 2017, a Summons
to appear at a March 16, 2017, Review Hearing was issued to
Plaintiff, and addressed to Post Office Box 9**49, Seattle,
WA. Dkt. #29 at ¶ 19, Ex. C at SEATAC 000101. Plaintiff
did not appear and a Bench Warrant was issued for
“Failure to Appear at Hearing”. Id. at
SEATAC 00095 and 100. Ms. Fischer states that she had no
involvement in scheduling the March 16th review
hearing, nor did she have any involvement in preparing the
summons/subpoena or bench warrant. Dkt. #41 at ¶ ¶
4 and 5.
2, 2017, Plaintiff appeared in Court on the charge of failing
to have an interlock device installed on his car as required
by his Judgment and Sentence. Id. at ¶ 21, Ex.
C at SEATAC 00086. He was released on his personal
recognizance in order to present documentary proof that the
device was properly installed. Id.
5, 2017, Plaintiff reported to Ms. Fischer's office and
provided her with the documentation requested by the Court
during his June 2, 2017, hearing. Dkt. #41 at ¶ 6.
Plaintiff questioned her about the address the Court had on
record for him. Id. at ¶ 7. She showed
Plaintiff the address on file with the Court, which was PO
BOX 9**49, Seattle, WA. Id. Defendant Fischer had no
involvement in entering or changing Plaintiff's address
with the court. Id. at ¶ 3.
subsequently brought this lawsuit. Defendants removed this
action to this Court on January 3, 2018. Dkt. #1. Plaintiff
filed a motion for remand, which was denied. Dkts. #10 and
#18. This Court has since granted Defendants SCORE Jail's
and Mindy Breiner's motions for summary judgment,
dismissing those Defendants from the action. Dkts. #28 and
Legal Standard on Summary Judgment
judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). In ruling on summary judgment, a
court does not weigh evidence to determine the truth of the
matter, but “only determine[s] whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Crane v. Conoco,
Inc., 41 F.3d 547, 549 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny &
Meyers, 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992)). Material
facts are those which might affect the outcome of the suit
under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party. See O'Melveny & Meyers,
969 F.2d at 747, rev'd on other grounds, 512
U.S. 79 (1994). However, the nonmoving party must make a
“sufficient showing on an essential element of her case
with respect to which she has the burden of proof” to
survive summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Further, “[t]he mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.
Plaintiff's Claims ...